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Chapter I
Introduction
11
The three essays constituting this thesis focus on firms’ financing and cash man-
agement policy. The first essay aims to shed light on why firms issue debt so
conservatively. In particular, it examines the effects of shareholder and creditor
protection on capital structure choices. It starts by building a contingent claims
model where financing policy results from a trade-off between tax benefits, con-
tracting costs and agency costs. In this setup, controlling shareholders can divert
part of the firms’ cash flows as private benefits at the expense of minority share-
holders. In addition, shareholders as a class can behave strategically at the time
of default leading to deviations from the absolute priority rule. The analysis
demonstrates that investor protection is a first order determinant of firms’ fi-
nancing choices and that conflicts of interests between firm claimholders may
help explain the level and cross-sectional variation of observed leverage ratios.
The second essay focuses on the practical relevance of agency conflicts. De-
spite the theoretical development of the literature on agency conflicts and firm
policy choices, the magnitude of manager-shareholder conflicts is still an open
question. This essay proposes a methodology for quantifying these agency con-
flicts. To do so, it examines the impact of managerial entrenchment on corporate
financing decisions. It builds a dynamic contingent claims model in which man-
agers do not act in the best interest of shareholders, but rather pursue private
benefits at the expense of shareholders. Managers have discretion over financing
and dividend policies. However, shareholders can remove the manager at a cost.
The analysis demonstrates that entrenched managers restructure less frequently
and issue less debt than optimal for shareholders. I take the model to the data
and use observed financing choices to provide firm-specific estimates of the degree
of managerial entrenchment. Using structural econometrics, I find costs of control
challenges of 2-7% on average (.8-5% at median). The estimates of the agency
costs vary with variables that one expects to determine managerial incentives. In
addition, these costs are sufficient to resolve the low- and zero-leverage puzzles
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and explain the time series of observed leverage ratios. Finally, the analysis shows
that governance mechanisms significantly affect the value of control and firms’
financing decisions.
The third essay is concerned with the documented time trend in corporate cash
holdings by Bates, Kahle and Stulz (BKS,2003). BKS find that firms’ cash hold-
ings double from 10% to 20% over the 1980 to 2005 period. This essay provides
an explanation of this phenomenon by examining the effects of product market
competition on firms’ cash holdings in the presence of financial constraints. It
develops a real options model in which cash holdings may be used to cover un-
expected operating losses and avoid inefficient closure. The model generates new
predictions relating cash holdings to firm and industry characteristics such as
the intensity of competition, cash flow volatility, or financing constraints. The
empirical examination of the model shows strong support of model’s predictions.
In addition, it shows that the time trend in cash holdings documented by BKS
can be at least partly attributed to a competition effect.
13

Chapter II
Shareholder Protection,
Bondholder Protection and Firm
Financing Policy
15
1 Introduction
Investor protection and its impact on valuations and firms’ policy choices have
been the subject of considerable research in financial economics. Despite the
substantial development of this literature, little attention has been paid to the
relation between investor protection and financing decisions. This is relatively
surprising since economic intuition suggests that investor protection should be an
important determinant of asset prices, and thus, of the relative costs of equity and
debt. For example, the ability of controlling shareholders to extract concessions
from minority shareholders affect the value, and thus the cost, of outside equity.
Similarly, the ability of creditors to repossess collateral affects their payoff in
default and hence the cost of debt financing. Yet, existing models of firms’
financing decisions typically ignore this essential dimension so that the analysis
of the legal determinants of capital structure choices remains uncharted territory.1
In this paper, I attempt to explore this territory. For doing so, I develop a
model in which cash flows to claimholders depend not only on the cash flows
rights of securities but also on the ability of investors to enforce those rights. In
particular, I consider that firms are not widely held, but rather have controlling
shareholders. Moreover, these controlling shareholders have the power to pursue
private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders, within the limits imposed
by investor protection. The recent “law and finance” literature following Shleifer
and Vishny (1997) argues that the expropriation of minority shareholders by
controlling shareholders is at the core of agency conflicts in most countries. To
examine the impact of shareholder protection on financing decisions, I consider a
setting in which firms are set up by controlling shareholders, also referred to as
1Some papers have examined the impact of imperfect creditor protection on leverage choices
(see for example Fan and Sundaresan (2000), Franc¸ois and Morellec (2000), and Hege and
Mella-Barral (2003)). However, these papers typically ignore imperfect shareholder protection
in the choice between equity and debt financing.
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entrepreneurs. At any date, these entrepreneurs can divert part of the firms’ cash
flows as private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders [as in La Porta
et al. (2002)]. In this environment, I examine the impact of the opportunistic
behavior of entrepreneurs on firms’ financing decisions.
Another legal dimension of firm financing policy is the treatment of claimhold-
ers in default. In my framework, default can lead either to liquidation of firm’s
assets or to renegotiation of the debt contract. Since liquidation is costly and
debtholders bear liquidation costs, there is room for strategic default. Sharehold-
ers may thus extract concessions from bondholders by renegotiating outstanding
claims at the time of default. I characterize creditor protection by the bargaining
power of bondholders at the time of default.2
To make the intuition as clear as possible, I use a simple generalization of
the standard Leland (1994) framework in which agency conflicts exist not only
between creditors and shareholders but also between the controlling shareholder
and minority shareholders. These agency conflicts affect the valuation of cash
flows, thereby distorting the firm policy choices. While investor protection may
be relevant to all firm decisions, I focus in this paper on financing policy. Several
important results follow from this analysis. First, the model demonstrates how
investor protection affects valuations. Second, it characterizes the implications
of the relation between investor protection and valuations for financing decisions.
Third, it shows that imperfect shareholder and bondholder protection can help
explain the level and variation of observed leverage ratios.
When capital structure is chosen by the controlling shareholder, the actual
choice of debt differs from the optimal one. In particular, because debt reduces
private benefits, the debt level selected by the controlling shareholder always is
lower than the debt level that maximizes firm value. In addition, when creditor
2Frank and Torous (1989) find that deviations from the absolute priority rule (APR) are
frequent.
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protection is imperfect, shareholders have incentives to default earlier to extract
concessions from bondholders. That is, weak creditor protection favors strategic
default and hence encourages default. Bondholders rationally anticipate share-
holders’ strategic behavior and require a higher rate of return. As a consequence,
cost of debt rises and the selected debt level decreases.
The remainder of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
The objective of the entrepreneur is derived in section 3. Section 4 presents
a benchmark case with perfect investor protection. Section 5 and 6 introduce
imperfect shareholder and creditor protections. Section 7 examines the impact
of endogenous ownership on financing decisions. Section 8 concludes.
2 Model and assumptions
Throughout the paper, agents are risk-neutral and discount cash flows at a con-
stant interest rate r > 0. I consider a model of financing decisions in which a
firm is established by a controlling shareholder, also called entrepreneur. The
technology of the firm has constant returns to scale and firm size is denoted by
K. For simplicity, I presume that the capital stock is chosen at time 0 by the
entrepreneur and stays constant over time. The entrepreneur owns a fixed frac-
tion θ of the firm and makes two types of decisions.3 First, he decides on the
level of private benefits to pursue. Second, he chooses the financing policy of the
firm. For now, I exogenously set θ and K. Section 7 endogenizes both of these
quantities and shows how they interact with the entrepreneur policy choices.
Within the model, the allocation of control rights implies that the entrepreneur
has complete decision power over the firm.4 Empirically, La Porta et al. (1999)
3La Porta et al. (2002) state that ownership of controlling shareholder is extremely stable
over time.
4See Zingales (1995), La Porta et al. (2002) and Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002).
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document that the control of a firm is indeed heavily concentrated in the hands
of a founding family in many countries. Typically, the entrepreneur controls a
higher fraction of votes than of cash flow rights, by owning shares with superior
voting rights, ownership pyramids, cross ownership, and controlling the board
(Bebchuk et al. (2000)).
Cash flows from operations. I consider that the firm is infinitely lived. As
long as the firm is in operation, its assets generate an instantaneous operating
cash flow X that depends on the capital stock K and a stochastic demand shock
. In particular, I have X = K ×  where the process X is governed by the
geometric Brownian motion
dXt = µXt dt+ σXt dZt. (1)
In equation (1) (Zt)t≥0 is a standard Brownian motion, and µ and σ are constant.
This equation implies that the growth rate of cash flows is normally distributed
with mean µ∆t and variance σ2∆t over time interval ∆t. In what follows I denote
by x a realization of the process X. In addition, the growth rate of cash flows
satisfies µ < r to ensure that firm value is finite (as in the Gordon growth model).
Financing policy. I presume that corporate taxes are paid at a constant rate
τ on corporate income. As a result, the entrepreneur may have an incentive to
issue debt to shield operating profit from taxation. To stay in a simple time-
homogeneous setting, I consider debt contracts that are characterized by a per-
petual flow of coupon payments c and a principal payment P that shareholders
have to repay before getting any payment in default. I assume that debt is issued
at par, determining its market value D and coupon rate c/D. Proceeds from the
debt issue are paid as a cash distribution to shareholders on a pro rata basis at
the time of flotation.
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Once debt has been issued, shareholders have the option to default on their
debt obligations. In the event of default at time t, the default value of the firm
is (1− α)A (x), where α ∈ (0, 1) is a proportional default cost, Xt = x, and
A(x) = Ex
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt (1− τ)Xt dt
]
=
(
1− τ
r − µ
)
x, (2)
is the abandonment value of unlevered assets. This equation shows that the firm’s
abandonment value is equal to the present value of a perpetuity that grows at
the rate µ (similar to the Gordon formula). It also reflects the fact the firm loses
all future tax benefits of debt in default.
Investor protection. I am interested in determining the impact of investor
protection on asset values and firms’ financing decisions. Within the present
model, I consider two types of investor protection: shareholder protection and
creditor protection.
Shareholder protection. Agency conflicts between the entrepreneur and
minority shareholders are introduced by considering that the entrepreneur pur-
sues private benefits and can extract a fraction s ∈ (0, 1) of the firm’s net cash
flows as private benefits. This tunneling of funds toward socially inefficient us-
age may take a variety of forms such as excessive salary, transfer pricing, em-
ploying relatives and friends who are not qualified for the jobs in the firm, and
perquisites, just to name a few.5 In general, expropriation is costly (see Burkart
et al. (1998) and La Porta et al. (2002)) and less important when investor pro-
tection is stronger. I model the degree of shareholder protection by using a cost
function for cash diversion. Anticipating that the firm is going to issue debt with
coupon payment c, the cost Φ(s, x) of diverting a fraction s of net income is given
5Barclay and Holderness (1989) provide empirical evidence supporting private benefits of
control.
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by:
Φ(s, x) =
η
2
s2 pi (x) , (3)
where η > 0, s ∈ [0, 1], and pi (x) is the firm’s net income. This quadratic form
of the cost function is similar to the quadratic cost function of diverting cash in
a static environment of La Porta et al. (2002). This cost function is increasing
and convex in the fraction s of net cash flows that the entrepreneur decides to
divert for private benefits. Thus, it is increasingly costly to divert cash for private
benefits. Furthermore, the cost of diverting given fraction s of cash from a larger
firm is assumed to be higher, because a larger amount of earnings after tax is
diverted.
Following La Porta et al. (2002), I interpret the parameter η as a measure
of shareholder protection. A higher η implies a larger marginal cost of diverting
cash for private benefits. When η = 0, diverting cash is costless and the financing
channel completely breaks down, because no investor anticipates any payback
from the firm after they sink their funds in any firm. As a result, ex ante, no
investor is willing to invest in the firm. On the contrary, when η → ∞, the
marginal cost of pursuing a marginal unit of private benefits is infinity. This
corresponds to the case of perfect shareholder protection.
Creditor protection. While imperfect shareholder protection introduces
conflicts of interest between the controlling and minority shareholders, sharehold-
ers as a class may also try to extract concessions from debtholders. In particular,
because liquidation is costly, shareholders may extract some surplus from the
bondholders by renegotiating outstanding claims at the time of default. In this
paper, I interpret creditor protection as the bargaining power of bondholders at
the time of default. In the case of perfect creditor protection, creditors have
all the bargaining power and shareholders’s payoff in default is dictated by the
absolute priority rule (APR). In the case of imperfect creditor protection, bond-
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holders grant concessions to shareholders in default, leading to violations of the
APR to the benefit of shareholders.
3 Objective of the entrepreneur
The objective of the entrepreneur is to maximize his lifetime utility. For doing
so, the entrepreneur can make three types of decisions: (i) issue debt in order to
shield the firm’s operating profits from taxation; (ii) pursue private benefits; and
(iii) select the firm’s default policy. I denote the entrepreneur’s utility before the
flotation of corporate debt by W (x, c). This ex ante utility is given by the sum
of the present value of the cash flows accruing to the entrepreneur after debt has
been issued U(x, c) and the fraction of the proceeds from the debt issue accruing
to the entrepreneur. That is,
W (x, c) = U(x, c) + θ (1− δ)D (x, c) , (4)
where D (x, c) is the market value of corporate debt and δ measures flotation
costs. When choosing financing policy, the objective of the entrepreneur is to
maximize his ex ante utility (4) by selecting the appropriate coupon payment c.
Thus, he solves
sup
c
W (x, c) . (5)
In a rational expectations model, the solution to this problem reflects the fact
that following the flotation of corporate debt, the entrepreneur chooses the level
of private benefits s and default trigger policy z to maximizes his ex post utility
U(x, c). That is, for any coupon payment c, the entrepreneur chooses s and z to
solve
sup
s,z
U(x, c) . (6)
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Intuitively, the entrepreneur solves his intertemporal optimization problem in
the following three steps:
1. Determine the level of cash diversion s, taking the firm’s coupon payment
c and default trigger z as given.
2. Solve for the default trigger strategy z, taking the coupon payment c as
given.
3. Derive the coupon payment c, incorporating his optimal decisions in the
future.
Before solving the entrepreneur’s optimization problem, it will be useful to
derive explicit expressions for the present value of the cash flows accruing to the
entrepreneur after the issuance of corporate debt U (x, c) and the market value of
corporate debt D (x, c). Consider first U (x, c). This quantity is equal to the sum
of the present value of the cash flows the entrepreneur receives when the firm is
in operation and the present value of his cash flows in default.
As long as the firm is in operation, the entrepreneur derives utility from both
the private benefits of control and the dividends he receives as a shareholder in the
firm. Notably, the entrepreneur receives at each time t a cash flow Nt given by the
sum of the dividend payment θ (1− st) pi (Xt) and his private benefits of control
stpi (Xt), minus the cost of diversion Φ(st, Xt). Combining these components
yields a cash flow to the entrepreneur given by
Nt = ntpi (Xt) , (7)
where
nt = θ (1− st) + st − η
2
s2t . (8)
In addition to these cash flows, the entrepreneur may also obtain a fraction
of firm value in default. I denote by Rd(z) and Re(z) the payoffs to debtholders
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and shareholders if the firm defaults at trigger level z. As I show below, the
specific functional forms of these residual values depend on the bargaining power
of debtholders in default. The payoff to the entrepreneur also depends on his
ability to extract concessions from minority shareholders following default. To
keep the analysis simple, I presume that the shareholder protection is unaffected
by default. As a result, for any given coupon payment c, default trigger z and
cash diversion s, the entrepreneur’s utility after the issuance of corporate debt is
given by:
U(x, c) = Ex
[∫ T (z)
0
e−rt nt pi (Xt) dt+ e−rT (z) nT (z) Re(z)
]
, (9)
where T (z) is the default time i.e. the first time the process X reaches z. This
equation shows that the utility of the entrepreneur has two components. First,
it includes the present value of the cash flow stream he receives in continuation
(first term in the square bracket). Second, it incorporates the present value of
the entrepreneur’s payoff in default (second term in the square bracket).
The specification for the private benefits of control implies that at each time
t, a fraction st of the firm’s net cash flows are diverted. As a result, for any given
default trigger z and coupon payment c, the equity and debt values satisfy:
E (x, c) = Ex
[∫ T (z)
0
e−rt (1− st) pi (Xt) dt+ e−rT (z)
(
1− sT (z)
)
Re(z)
]
, (10)
and
D (x, c) = Ex
[∫ T (z)
0
e−rtc dt+ e−rT (z)Rd (z)
]
. (11)
In both (10) and (11), the first term of the right hand side represents the present
value of future cash flows until the time of default. The second terms in the
square brackets of (10) and (11) represent the expected present value of the cash
flows to equityholders and debtholders in default.
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The Appendix shows that at any point in time the entrepreneur optimally
chooses to divert a constant fraction ξ of net income, so that
st = ξ =
1− θ
η
. (12)
Equation (12) reveals that the level of private benefits pursued by the controlling
shareholder decreases with both ownership and shareholder protection. In addi-
tion, it implies that the cash diversion decision is effectively a simple static trade-
off problem between “private benefits” and the resulting reduction of present
value of dividends that the entrepreneur receives from the firm. As a result, for
all t, nt in (8) is constant and given by
nt = n = θ (1 + β) , (13)
where
β =
(1− θ)2
2η θ
, (14)
is the net private benefit of control per unit of ownership. Importantly, this
net private benefit of control decreases with both ownership and shareholder
protection. This result is a direct consequence of the impact of these two factors
on the level of private benefits pursued by the entrepreneur.
Using the expression for n in (9), I may simplify the optimization problem (6)
as follows:
sup
z
θ
(
1 + β
1− ξ
)
E(x, c) , (15)
where β is given in (14). Note that the entrepreneur first chooses the coupon
payment c at time 0 and then decides on the default trigger z. Therefore, I
may solve the optimization problem (6) by first conditioning on a given coupon
payment policy c and then search over admissible default trigger levels z. By
standard arguments (see Dumas (1991)), the entrepreneur determines the trigger
level z by using the smooth-pasting condition:
∂U (x, c)
∂ x
∣∣∣∣
x=z
= θ
(
1 + β
1− ξ
)
∂E (x, c)
∂ x
∣∣∣∣
x=z
= 0. (16)
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Equation (16) states that the entrepreneur chooses the default trigger to max-
imize his ex post utility, i.e. his utility after the debt issuance. Because the
entrepreneur’s utility is proportional to equity value, the default trigger is equiv-
alently determined by a smooth pasting condition for equity value.
Using the solution to (16), I may express the entrepreneur’s ex ante utility
as:
W (x, c) = θ
[
V (x, c) +
β + ξ
1− ξ E(x, c)
]
, (17)
where V (x, c) = E(x, c) + (1− δ)D(x, c) is firm value after debt issuance. I note
that the ex ante utility is larger than his share of the entrepreneur’s ex post firm
value, when shareholder protection is imperfect. Below, I solve the entrepreneur’s
optimization problem under three different scenarios: (i) perfect investor protec-
tion, (ii) imperfect shareholder protection, and (iii) imperfect shareholder and
bondholder protection.
4 Perfect investor protection
I start by analyzing capital structure decisions in a benchmark economy with
perfect investor protection. Let E∗ (x, c), D∗ (x, c), and V ∗ (x, c), represent equity
value, debt value and firm value in this benchmark economy. Equation (17)
implies that W ∗ (x, c) = θV ∗ (x, c), when investor protection is perfect. Thus,
the coupon rate selected by the entrepreneur solves: maxc V
∗(x, c). Denote the
solution to this problem by C∗(x). Given the functional form of A ( · ), I also
know that it is optimal for shareholders to default when equity value is zero so
that the values of bondholders and shareholders claims in default are respectively
equal to Rd(z) = (1− α)A (z) and Re(z) = 0. I then have the following result
(see the Appendix).
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Proposition 1 Consider a benchmark economy in which the entrepreneur acts
in the best interest of minority shareholders and the APR is enforced in default.
In this economy, I have s = 0, Rd(z) = (1− α)A (z) and Re(z) = 0, and the
values of corporate debt and equity satisfy
D∗ (x, c) =
c
r
+
[
(1− α)A (z∗)− c
r
] ( x
z∗
)−γ
, (18)
and
E∗ (x, c) = A(x)− (1− τ) c
r
+
[
(1− τ) c
r
− A (z∗)
]( x
z∗
)−γ
, (19)
where γ > 0 and (x/z∗)−γ is the present value of one dollar to be received in
default. The default threshold z∗ that maximizes the value of equity is given by
z∗ =
(
γ
γ + 1
)(
r − µ
r
)
c, (20)
and the coupon payment that maximizes firm value is given by
C∗ (x) = x
(
γ + 1
γ
) (
r
r − µ
) [
1 + γ (1− δ) 1− (1− τ) (1− α)
τ − δ
]−1/γ
. (21)
Proposition 1 characterizes asset prices and the value-maximizing financing
policy in the benchmark economy. As shown in this proposition, the values of
corporate securities can be written as the sum of the present values of the cash
flows in continuation plus the change in present value of these cash flows that
arises in default (terms in square brackets). The coupon payment that maximizes
firm value is unique and, as shown in the Appendix, increases with the corporate
tax rate and decreases with default costs.
While minority shareholders would like the entrepreneur to implement this fi-
nancing policy, the preferences of the entrepreneur will typically induce deviations
of selected policies from value-maximizing policies. I now turn to the analysis of
leverage decisions under imperfect shareholder protection.
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5 Imperfect Shareholder Protection
This section analyzes the impact of imperfect shareholder protection on agency
costs and the firm’s financing and default policies. Because this section assumes
perfect creditor protection, the cash flow to shareholders in default is zero and
the functional form of the default threshold selected by the entrepreneur is the
same as the one reported in Proposition 1. In addition, for any given coupon
payment c, the entrepreneur’s ex ante utility is
W (x, c) = θV ∗(x, c) + θβE∗ (x, c) , (22)
that is, the sum of the value of his shareholdings in the firm (first term) and the
value of the private benefits he can extract from minority shareholders (second
term). Before solving for the financing policy that maximizes W (x, c), I impose
the following condition:
Condition 2 If the private benefits that the entrepreneur extracts from the firm
are not too high, in that
(1− δ)− (1− τ) (1 + β) > 0,
then it is optimal for the entrepreneur to issue some amount of debt.
I then have the following result (see the Appendix).
Proposition 3 Assume that Condition 2 is satisfied. Then, the values of debt
and equity under imperfect shareholder protection respectively satisfy
D (x, c) = D∗ (x, c) , (23)
and
E(x, c) = (1− ξ)E∗(x, c) , (24)
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where D∗ (x, c) and E∗ (x, c) are the values of corporate securities under perfect
investor protection. For any given financing policy, imperfect shareholder protec-
tion does not affect the firm’s default policy. The coupon payment selected by the
entrepreneur is given by
C (x) = x
(
γ + 1
γ
) (
r
r − µ
) [
1 + γ (1− δ) 1− (1− τ) (1− α)
(1− δ)− (1− τ) (1 + β)
]−1/γ
.
(25)
As in Proposition 1, the selected debt level described in Proposition 3 bal-
ances the benefits and costs of debt to the entrepreneur. Within the present
model, debt increases the utility of the entrepreneur by reducing taxes. At the
same time, issuing debt entails flotation and default costs and limits possible
cash flow extractions. Using the expression reported in Proposition 2 for the
selected coupon payment, it is immediate to show that the entrepreneur’s utility-
maximizing coupon payment displays the following properties (see the Appendix):
∂C (x)
∂τ
> 0,
∂C (x)
∂α
< 0, and
∂C (x)
∂δ
< 0. (26)
Thus, the entrepreneur’s utility-maximizing coupon payment increases with the
corporate tax rate and decreases with bankruptcy and flotation costs. In addition
to these standard comparative statics effects, the Appendix shows that I have
∂C (x)
∂η
> 0, and
∂C (x)
∂θ
> 0. (27)
That is, the utility-maximizing coupon payment increases with the degree of
shareholder protection as well as with the entrepreneur’s ownership. In particular,
when θ ↑ 1 or η ↑ ∞, the net private benefit β ↓ 0, and the coupon payment
selected by the entrepreneur converges to the value-maximizing coupon payment
C(x) ↑ C∗(x). By contrast, when θ < 1 and η is finite, the debt level selected by
the entrepreneur always is lower than the debt level that maximizes firm value.
The following proposition summarizes these results.
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Proposition 4 The coupon payment given in (25) is larger when shareholder
protection is stronger or the entrepreneur’s ownership is larger.
Using this model, I can also examine the impact of shareholder protection on
firm value and book leverage. Firm value is equal to the sum of the equity value
and the debt value, net of the issuance costs. I thus have
V (x, c) = V ∗(x, c)− ξ E∗(x, c), (28)
where V ∗(x, c) and E∗(x, c) are the firm and equity values derived under perfect
investor protection. Assume that debt is issued at par so that the book value of
debt equals its market value at the time of flotation. By definition, book leverage
is equal to the ratio of book debt over book assets:
B (x,C (x)) =
D (x,C (x))
K
. (29)
I then have the following result (see the Appendix for a proof).
Proposition 5 Firm value and book leverage are larger under stronger share-
holder protection and larger ownership, in that
∂V (x,C (x))
∂η
> 0, and
∂B (x,C (x))
∂η
> 0, (30)
and
∂V (x,C (x))
∂θ
> 0, and
∂B (x,C (x))
∂θ
> 0. (31)
Proposition 5 shows that when ownership is exogenous, book leverage in-
creases with both investor protection and ownership. This result is a direct
consequence of the impact of these two factors on the selected coupon payment.
Within the present model, debt financing imposes two costs on the entrepreneur.
First, it induces bankruptcy costs. Second, it reduces the value of the private
benefits of control for any level of cash flow extraction s that the entrepreneur
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selects. As the values of θ and η increase, the optimal level of private benefits s
decreases, making debt less costly to the entrepreneur. As a result, the selected
coupon payment increases with both θ and η.
Proposition 5 also reveals that when ownership is exogenous, firm value in-
creases with both investor protection and ownership. Within the present model,
these factors have two distinct effects on firm value. First, stronger investor pro-
tection and larger ownership imply a lower degree of private benefits and thus a
lower degree of inefficiency in the allocation of cash flows from the firm’s assets.
Second, as ownership or the degree of investor protection increase, the controlling
shareholder select a financing policy that is closer to the value maximizing one,
thereby increasing firm value.
6 Imperfect creditor protection
In this section, I extend the basic framework to allow for both imperfect credi-
tor and imperfect shareholder protection. The setting I consider is one in which
shareholders default strategically and try to extract some surplus from bond-
holders at the time of default. As before I presume that shareholders default on
their debt obligations the first time operating cash flows reach the (lower) level
y. At that time, claimholders bargain over the sharing of firm value. I consider
a Nash bargaining game in default and denote the bargaining power of creditors
in default by φ ∈ [0, 1]. Within the model, this quantity measures the degree of
creditor protection. The bargaining power of shareholders is then 1 − φ. I also
denote the proportional cost of renegotiation by κ and the proportional cost of
liquidation by α.
Because liquidation is socially more costly than reorganization (α > κ), there
is a surplus (α− κ)A(y) associated with renegotiation. The allocation of this
surplus between firm claimants can be determined as follows. If default leads to
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liquidation, equity is worthless upon default while the value of bondholders’ claim
is (1− α)A (y). By contrast, if claimants can renegotiate to avoid liquidation,
firm value in default is increased from (1−α)A(y) to (1−κ)A(y). Assuming that
the total renegotiation surplus is shared among firm claimants according to the
sharing rule ϕ, the incremental value accruing to bondholders is ϕ (α− κ)A (y)
whereas the incremental value accruing to shareholders is (1− ϕ) (α− κ)A (y).
Therefore the sharing rule for the renegotiation surplus upon default solves
max
ϕ
{(1− ϕ)1−φ ϕφ} (α− κ)A (y) ,
the solution to which is simply given by ϕ = φ. This equation shows that the bar-
gaining game allocates the surplus between financial stakeholders in proportion
to their bargaining power. Under perfect creditor protection, I have φ = 1, and
the cash flow to bondholders in default is (1− κ)A (y). This is the case studied
in Section 4.
Using (10), (11), (15), and (17) and the sharing rule ϕ = φ in default, I have
the following result (see the Appendix):
Proposition 6 Assume that Condition 2 is satisfied. Then, under imperfect
investor protection, the values of corporate debt and equity satisfy
D (x, c) =
c
r
+
[
(1− κ+ φ (α− κ))A (y)− c
r
](x
y
)−γ
, (32)
and
E(x, c) = (1− ξ) Ê(x, c), (33)
where
Ê (x, c) = A(x)− (1− τ) c
r
+
[
(1− τ) c
r
− (1− (1− φ) (α− κ))A(y)
](
x
y
)−γ
.
(34)
The default threshold y that maximizes U(x, c) is given by
y =
(
γ
γ + 1
)(
r − µ
r
)
c
1− (1− φ) (α− κ) , (35)
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and the coupon payment selected by the entrepreneur satisfies
C (x) = x
(
γ + 1
γ
) (
r
r − µ
)
(1− (1− φ) (α− κ)) Γ−1/γ , (36)
where Γ is given in (54).
Proposition 6 underlines several interesting features of imperfect creditor pro-
tection. First, for any given financing and default policies, creditor protection
affects the cash flows accruing to shareholders and bondholders in default, and
hence the value of their claims. Second, for any given financing policy, the
entrepreneur’s incentive to default decreases with creditor protection, in that
dy/dφ < 0. Indeed, when default leads to liquidation (φ = 1), the decision to de-
fault is irreversible and it is optimal for the entrepreneur to default when equity
is worthless. When it is possible to renegotiate the debt contract in default, the
decision to default no longer is irreversible and the entrepreneur has incentives to
default earlier in order to extract concessions from bondholders. That is, weak
creditor protection favors strategic default and hence encourages default.
Using the expressions reported in Proposition 6, I also find that the en-
trepreneur’s ex ante utility at the selected debt level is given by
W (x,C(x)) = θ (1 + β)
[
A(x) +
(
1− δ
(1 + β)(1− τ) − 1
)
(1− (1− φ) (α− κ))A(y)
]
(37)
where the default trigger y is given in Proposition 6. Recall that the entrepreneur’s
utility without any debt issuance is simply θ(1+β)A(x), proportional to all-equity
firm value. Equation (37) shows that the entrepreneur’s ex ante utility is larger
when there is a greater tax advantage of debt. Condition 2 ensures that there
the tax advantage is greater than the costs of debt from the entrepreneur’s per-
spective. If Condition 2 is not satisfied, in that 1 − δ < (1 − τ)(1 + β), then
the entrepreneur optimally chooses not to issue debt and W (x, 0) = U(x, 0) =
θ(1 + β)A(x).
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The next proposition characterizes the effects of shareholder protection, cred-
itor protection and ownership on the selected coupon payment C(x) (see the
Appendix for a proof).
Proposition 7 The coupon payment given in (36) is larger when shareholder
protection or creditor protection is stronger or the entrepreneur’s ownership is
larger, in that
∂C (x)
∂η
> 0,
∂C (x)
∂θ
> 0, and
∂C (x)
∂φ
> 0. (38)
Proposition 7 shows that the utility-maximizing coupon payment increases
with the degree of investor protection as well as with the entrepreneur’s owner-
ship. Notably, when φ ↑ 1 and θ ↑ 1 or η ↑ ∞, the coupon payment selected by the
entrepreneur converges to the value-maximizing coupon payment C(x) ↑ C∗(x).
By contrast, when either φ < 1, θ < 1, or η is finite, the debt level selected by
the entrepreneur always is lower than the debt level that maximizes firm value.
Thus, the debt level selected by the firm always increases with the degree of
investor protection.
This model also allows for a characterization of the impact of creditor protec-
tion on firm value and book leverage. Notably, I have the following result (see
the Appendix for a proof):
Proposition 8 Firm value and book leverage are larger under stronger creditor
protection in that
dV (x,C (x))
dφ
> 0 and
dB (x,C (x))
dφ
> 0. (39)
Proposition 8 shows that firm value increases with the degree of creditor
protection. Within the present model, creditor protection has two opposite effects
on firm value. First, better creditor protection decreases the likelihood of default.
Second, it increases the cost of default. At the selected debt level, the first
34
effect dominates, leading to a positive relation between firm value and creditor
protection. Consider next book leverage. Within the present model, the selected
coupon payment balances the benefits of debt with its cost. Thus, by reducing the
cost of default, better creditor protection increases the selected coupon payment
and book leverage.
7 Endogenous ownership
I so far have derived implications of imperfect investor protection for firm value
and financing decisions, assuming that both firm size K and the ownership of the
controlling shareholder θ were exogenously given. However, ownership concentra-
tion and the size of the capital markets typically are endogenously determined by
the degree of investor protection. For example, Kumar et al. (2001) report em-
pirical evidence suggesting that better shareholder protection is associated with
larger firms in terms of sales and assets. La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessens et
al. (2000) document a negative relation between ownership and legal protection.
In this section, I endogenize the capital stock K and ownership concentration θ
and show how these measures interact with the financing policy choices of the
entrepreneur.6
Let h be the initial endowment of the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur can
invest this wealth either in the current project or in alternative projects that
generate the risk-free rate of return r. I denote the dollar amount invested by
the entrepreneur in the project by Ke and the dollar amount invested by the
outside shareholders in the project by Ko. Therefore, the initial capital stock in
6Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) to analyze capital stock and ownership concentration in a
static environment using the Becker’s (1968) framework of crime and punishment. Lan and
Wang (2003) study the determination of firm size and ownership structure in a dynamic model
of investment.
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the firm is K = Ke + Ko. I assume that the entrepreneur issues outside equity
before floating debt. Then, the equity market equilibrium condition implies
Ko = (1− θ)V (K) , (40)
where  is the initial value of the market demand shock. The right hand side of
(40) is the time−0 market value of equity held by outside minority shareholders.
The left hand side is their contribution to the capital stock of the firm.
The entrepreneur chooses his initial investment Ke and ownership θ to maxi-
mize his lifetime utility:
J(Ke, θ) = h−Ke +W (K,C(K)) , (41)
subject to the equity market equilibrium condition (40). The first-order condition
(FOC) with respect to Ke is
∂
∂Ke
J(Ke, θ) = −1 + w (θ)  , (42)
where the normalized ex ante utility w (θ) = W (x,C(x))/x does not depend on
x. Thereafter, I assume that the initial productivity shock satisfies  > 1/w(θ)
so that the initial capital stock is positive. Using the FOC (42), I can see that
the entrepreneur invests all his wealth in the project (Ke = h), when his project
is sufficiently good ( > 1/w(θ)). Condition (40) leads to K = hm (θ), where
m (θ) =
1
1− (1− θ) v(θ)  (43)
and v(θ) = V (x,C(x))/x is also independent of x. I may interpret m(θ) as the
capital-stock multiplier. For each unit of the capital stock that the entrepreneur
contributes to the firm, the entrepreneur is able to raise (m(θ)− 1) units of
capital from the equity market. As a result, the firm’s total capital stock is m(θ)
times Ke = K. In order to rule out unrealistic situations in which the firm’s
project is so good that the firm is able to raise infinite amount of outside capital,
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I require that 1 − (1− θ) v(θ) > 0. Combining the restrictions on the initial
market demand shock , I have the following condition.
Condition 9 The initial market demand shock satisfies
1
w(θ)
<  <
1
(1− θ) v(θ) .
The lower bound ensures positive investment. The upper bound ensures finite
investment.
Before analyzing the impact of investor protection on firm size and the en-
trepreneur’s ownership, I first present the following result:
Proposition 10 The change in the entrepreneur’s normalized ex ante utility
w(θ) associated with an infinitesimal change in the entrepreneur’s ownership θ is
equal to the normalized firm value v(θ):
w′(θ) = v(θ) . (44)
Proof Total differentiation of w(θ) with respect to θ gives
dw(θ)
dθ
=
∂w(θ)
∂c
dc
dθ
+
∂w(θ)
∂θ
=
∂w(θ)
∂θ
= (v∗(θ) + β e∗(θ))−(ξ + β) e∗(θ) = v(θ) .
The entrepreneur’s objective is to maximize his lifetime utility in (41) by
selecting his ownership θ in the firm. His objective function can be written as
max
θ∈[0,1]
m (θ)w (θ) . (45)
Intuitively, the entrepreneur chooses his ownership θ by trading off the quantity
effect with the value effect. For any given amount of outside capital that he raises,
a larger θ implies a higher w(θ), ceteris paribus. For any given entrepreneur’s
valuation w of each unit of capital, a larger m implies a larger capital stock and
thus a higher lifetime utility. The first order condition associated with (45) is
w′(θ∗)
w(θ∗)
+
m′(θ∗)
m(θ∗)
= 0 . (46)
Solving this program yields the following result (see the Appendix):
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Proposition 11 Ownership is less concentrated and firm size is bigger under
stronger shareholder protection, in that
dθ∗
dη
< 0 and
dK
dη
> 0.
The result in Proposition 11 implies that endogenous ownership mitigates the
impact of investor protection on firm value and book leverage. Notably, I can
write the total effect of shareholder protection on the selected coupon payment
and firm value as follows:
df (x)
dη
=
∂f (x)
∂η
+
∂f (x)
∂θ
dθ∗
dη
for f = C, V.
It is immediate to see that while the first term on the right hand side of these
equations is positive, the second term is negative. Because the expression of θ∗ is
complex, it is not possible to sign these total effects. Below, I provide numerical
examples that are based on parameters representing standard U.S. firms.
Numerical application. Input parameter values for the numerical application
are provided in Table 1. I set the initial value of these cash flows at x = 1. (This
choice does not affect the results since optimal leverage ratios do not depend on
this parameter.) The risk free rate is taken from the yield curve on Treasury
bonds. The value of the volatility parameter has been chosen to match the
volatility of equity returns in the US economy. The growth rate of cash flows
has been selected to generate a payout ratio consistent with observed payout
ratios.7 The tax advantage of debt τ = 0.35 reflects recent estimates by Graham
7In the model, the firm’s payout ratio is given by: ((1− τ)x+ τc) /V (x, c) where c is the
selected coupon payment. In general, the payout ratio of a given firm reflects the sum of the
payments to bondholders and shareholders. Following Huang and Huang (2002), I empirically
estimate this quantity by taking the weighted averages between the average dividend yields (4%
according to Ibbotson and Associates) and the average historical coupon rate (close to 9%),
with weights given by the median leverage ratio of S&P 500 firms (approximately 20%).
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of the marginal tax rate for US corporations. Liquidation costs are defined as
the firm’s going concern value minus its liquidation value, divided by its going
concern value. Using this definition, Alderson and Betker (1995) and Gilson
(1997) report liquidation costs equal to 36.5% and 45.5% for the median firm
in their samples. Finally, I assume that the cost of renegotiation is low, relying
on the empirical estimates of Gilson, John, and Lang (1990). The cost of debt
issuance is fixed to 1.5% consistent with estimates of 1.09% found by Altinkhic
and Hansen (2000) and 1.29% found by Kim, Palia, and Saunders (2007).
Consistent with Proposition 9, Figure 1 shows that the endogenous ownership
selected by the entrepreneur is negatively related to the degree of shareholder
protection. Figure 1 also shows that the endogenous ownership is also negatively
related to the degree of bondholder protection. I assume that shareholder pro-
tection satisfies η ∈ [2, 10]. In addition, the bargaining power of bondholders
belongs to the closed interval φ ∈ [0.25, 0.75]. Additional input parameter values
are set as in Table 1.
Figure 2 plots the selected coupon payment C (x) as a function of the degree
of investor protection. The main conclusion I can draw from Figure 2 is that
endogenous ownership does not seem to reverse the positive relation between
investor protection and book leverage. For the selected input parameter values,
it also seems that shareholder protection has a larger impact on firm’s financing
policies than bondholder protection.
8 Conclusion
This paper examines the effects of shareholder and creditor protection on firm
financing decisions. For doing so, I develop a model in which cash flows to
claimholders depend not only on the cash flows rights of securities but also on
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the ability of investors to enforce those rights. Specifically, I consider a firm with
an exclusive access to a project that yields a random stream of cash flows. The
project can be financed by equity or debt. In equilibrium, the firm chooses to
issue some debt because debt financing protects operating profits from taxation.
However, leverage is limited because debt financing increases expected default
costs and affects the ability of the controlling shareholder to extract concessions
from minority shareholders.
In addition, in this framework, default can lead either to liquidation of firm’s
assets or to renegotiation of the debt contract. Since liquidation is costly and
debtholders bear liquidation costs, there is room for strategic default. Sharehold-
ers may thus extract concessions from bondholders by renegotiating outstanding
claims at the time of default.
In this environment, I analyze the impact of investor protection on assets
prices, firm financing choices and firm value. First, I demonstrate how the var-
ious determinants of leverage interact to determine capital structure decisions.
Second, I characterize the implications of the relation between investor protection
and valuations for financing decisions. Finally, I show that imperfect shareholder
and bondholder protection can help explain the level and cross-sectional variation
of observed leverage ratios.
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9 Appendix
Derivations of Results in Section 3
First consider the entrepreneur’s optimality over cash diversion s. Prior to de-
fault, the entrepreneur’s first-order optimality may be summarized by the HJB
equation:
r U(x, c) = sup
s
{
n (x− c) + µxUx(x, c) + σ
2
2
x2 Uxx(x, c)
}
. (47)
Because cash diversion only enters n, the cash diversion decision simply becomes
a static problem, in that the entrepreneur chooses s for each period to solve
max
s
θ (1− s) + s− η
2
s2.
The solution is given in (12). Similarly, at the point of default, the entrepreneur
solves an analogous cash diversion problem and derives the same solution (12).
Proof of Proposition 1
Because the value of equity and the value of corporate debt admit a similar
expression, I only report the derivation for the former. Within the present model,
the value of equity satisfies
E∗ (x, c) = (1− τ) Ex
[∫ T (z)
0
e−rt (Xt − c) dt
]
, (48)
where z is the trigger level associated with the hitting time. Using the strong
Markov property of Brownian motion (see e.g. Karatzas and Shreve (1991)), I
have:
Ex
[∫ T (z)
0
e−rt (Xt − c) dt
]
= G(x)− Ex
(
e−rT (z)
)
G(z) , (49)
where
G(w) = Ew
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt (Xt − c) dt
]
=
w
r − µ −
c
r
, (50)
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for any positive constant w. Standard results from stopping-time analysis (Har-
rison (1985)) imply
Ex
(
e−rT (z)
)
=
(x
z
)−γ
, x > z
where
γ =
1
σ2
(µ− σ2
2
)
+
√(
µ− σ
2
2
)2
+ 2rσ2
 . (51)
The default threshold is determined by condition (16). Differentiating firm
value with respect to c yields the desired expression for the value-maximizing
coupon payment.
Proof of Proposition 3
Next, I derive the optimal coupon payment from the perspective of the controlling
shareholder. First, differentiating the value of corporate debtD∗(x, c) in (18) with
respect to the coupon payment c gives
dD∗(x, c)
dc
=
1
r
[
1 + [(1− α) (1− τ) γ − (γ + 1)]
( x
z∗
)−γ]
.
Second, differentiating equity value E∗(x, c) in (19) with respect to coupon pay-
ment c, taking the dependence of trigger strategy z∗ of (20) on c into account,
gives
dE∗(x, c)
dc
= −1− τ
r
[
1−
( x
z∗
)−γ]
.
This is consistent with the intuition that equity value decreases in coupon pay-
ment, ceteris paribus. It is easy to show that E∗(x, c) is convex in c. The FOC
of W (x, c) with respect to c therefore is given by
dW (x, c)
dc
= θ (1− δ) dD
∗(x, c)
dc
+ θ (1 + β)
dE∗(x, c)
dc
= 0.
Solving the above equation gives (25). The second order condition for this opti-
mization problem is given by
d2W (x, c)
dc2
= −θ [γ (1− δ) (1− (1− τ) (1− α)) + (1− δ)− (1− τ) (1 + β)] γ
r
1
c
( x
z∗
)−γ
.
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Under Condition 1, this quantity is negative, ensuring the optimality of the so-
lution.
The entrepreneur’s utility-maximizing coupon payment satisfies
C (x) = x
(
γ + 1
γ
) (
r
r − µ
) [
1 + γ (1− δ) 1− (1− τ) (1− α)
τ − δ
]−1/γ
.
Taking the first order derivatives give
∂C (x)
∂τ
= (1− δ) 1− (1− α) (1− δ)
(τ − δ)2 Πx > 0
∂C (x)
∂α
= − (1− δ) 1− τ
τ − δ Πx < 0
where
Π =
(
γ + 1
γ
) (
r
r − µ
) [
1 + γ (1− δ) 1− (1− τ) (1− α)
τ − δ
]−(γ+1)/γ
> 0 . (52)
Proof of Proposition 4
The entrepreneur’s utility-maximizing coupon payment satisfies
C (x) = x
(
γ + 1
γ
) (
r
r − µ
) [
1 + γ (1− δ) 1− (1− τ) (1− α)
(1− δ)− (1− τ) (1 + β)
]−1/γ
.
Taking the first order derivatives give
∂C (x)
∂τ
= (1− δ) (1 + β)− (1− α) (1− δ)
[1− δ − (1− τ) (1 + β)]2 Πx > 0
∂C (x)
∂α
= − (1− δ) 1− τ
1− δ − (1− τ) (1 + β) Πx < 0
∂C (x)
∂δ
= −(1− τ) (1 + β) [1− (1− τ) (1− α)]
[(1− δ)− (1− τ) (1 + β)]2 Πx < 0
and
∂C (x)
∂η
= (1− δ) [1− (1− τ) (1− α)] (1− τ)
[(1− δ)− (1− τ) (1 + β)]2
β
η
Πx > 0
∂C (x)
∂θ
= (1− δ) [1− (1− τ) (1− α)] (1− τ)
[(1− δ)− (1− τ) (1 + β)]2
(
βη + 1− θ
θη
)
Πx > 0
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where
Π =
(
γ + 1
γ
) (
r
r − µ
) [
1 + γ (1− δ) 1− (1− τ) (1− α)
(1− δ)− (1− τ) (1 + β)
]−(γ+1)/γ
> 0 .
(53)
Proof of Proposition 5
I now proceed to sign the effect of investor protection on firm value. I have
dV (x, c)
dη
=
d
dη
[
V ∗(x, c)−
(
1− θ
η
)
E∗(x, c)
]
=
∂V ∗(x, c)
∂c
∂C (x)
∂η
+
(
1− θ
η2
)
E∗(x, c)−
(
1− θ
η
)
∂E∗(x, c)
∂c
∂C (x)
∂η
Since the coupon payment C (x) selected by the entrepreneur is less debt than
C∗ (x), I know that I have V ∗c (x, c) > 0 at c = C (x). Because E
∗
c (x, c) < 0 for
all c and ∂C (x) /∂η > 0, I have the desired result.
The effect of ownership on firm value is given by
dV (x, c)
dθ
=
∂V ∗(x, c)
∂c
∂C (x)
∂θ
+
1
η
E∗(x, c)−
(
1− θ
η
)
∂E∗(x, c)
∂c
∂C (x)
∂θ
Because V ∗c (x, c) > 0 at c = C (x), E
∗
c (x, c) < 0 for all c, and ∂C (x) /∂θ > 0, I
have the desired result.
The effect of investor protection on debt value is given by
∂D (x, c)
∂η
=
∂D∗ (x, c)
∂c
∂C (x)
∂η
.
Since E∗c (x, c) < 0 for all c, I have D
∗
c (x, c) > 0 at c = C (x), which yields the
desired result. Finally, a similar line of reasoning applies to the effect of ownership
on debt value.
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Proof of Proposition 6
Taking the endogenous relationship between coupon payment and default trigger
into account, I have
dD(x, c)
dc
=
1
r
[
1 +
[(
1− κ
1− (1− φ) (α− κ)
)
(1− τ) γ − (γ + 1)
](
x
y
)−γ]
.
Second, differentiating equity value Ê(x, c) with respect to coupon payment c,
taking the dependence of trigger strategy y on c into account, gives
dÊ(x, c)
dc
= −1− τ
r
[
1−
(
x
y
)−γ]
.
The optimal coupon payment c is chosen to set
dW (x, c)
dc
= θ
[
(1− δ) dD(x, c)
dc
+ (1 + β)
dÊ(x, c)
dc
]
= 0 .
The SOC can be verified using the same procedure as in the proof of Proposition
1.
Proof of Proposition 7
The entrepreneur’s utility-maximizing coupon payment is given by (36). Taking
the first order derivaties gives
∂C (x)
∂φ
= x
γ + 1
γ
r
r − µ (α− κ)
[
κΥΓ−(γ+1)/γ
[1− (1− φ) (α− κ)] + Γ
−1/γ
]
> 0
∂C (x)
∂η
= x
γ + 1
γ
r
r − µΓ
−(γ+1)/γΨΥ
(1− θ)2
2θη2 [(1− δ)− (1 + β) (1− τ)] > 0
∂C (x)
∂θ
= x
γ + 1
γ
r
r − µΓ
−(γ+1)/γΨΥ
(1− θ) (2η + (1− θ))
2θη2 [(1− δ)− (1 + β) (1− τ)] > 0
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where
Γ = 1 +
γ (1− δ)
(1− δ)− (1 + β) (1− τ)Ψ > 0 (54)
Ψ = 1− (1− τ)
(
1− κ
1− (1− φ) (α− κ)
)
> 0 (55)
Υ =
(1− δ) (1− τ)
[(1− δ)− (1 + β) (1− τ)] . (56)
Proof of Proposition 8
The effect of creditor protection on debt value is given by
∂D (x, c)
∂φ
=
∂D (x, c)
∂c
∂C (x)
∂φ
.
Since Ec(x, c) < 0 for all c, I have Dc(x, c) > 0 at c = C (x), yielding the desired
result.
I now proceed to sign the effect of creditor protection on firm value. I have
dV (x, c)
dφ
=
∂V (x, c)
∂c
∂C (x)
∂φ
+
∂V (x, c)
∂φ
Simple but lengthy calculations yield:
V (x, c) =
(
1− τ
r − µ
)
x+
τ − δ
r
c
−c
[
τ − δ
r
+
(
1− τ
r
)(
γ
γ + 1
)
κ+ δ (1− α + φ (α− κ))
1− (1− φ) (α− κ)
](x
z
)−γ
.
Using this expression, I can show that ∂V (x, c)/∂φ > 0. In addition, since the
entrepreneur underlevers the firm, I know that I have Vc(x, c) > 0 at c = C (x).
This result together with ∂C (x) /∂φ > 0 yields the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 11
I prove Proposition 11 by employing the implicit function theorem. I denote
F (θ; η) as the left-hand side of the FOC (46):
F (θ; η) =
w′(θ)
w(θ)
+
m′(θ)
m(θ)
. (57)
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Applying the implicit function theorem to (57) gives
dθ
dη
= −∂F (θ; η)/∂η
∂F (θ; η)/∂θ
= −Fη
Fθ
. (58)
I thus need to sign both Fη and Fθ in order to show how shareholder protection
determines the entrepreneur’s ownership.
Taking the derivative of the FOC (57) with respect to θ gives the following
SOC:
∂ F (θ; η)
∂ θ
=
w′′(θ)
w(θ)
− w
′(θ)2
w(θ)2
− m
′(θ)2
m(θ)2
+
m′′(θ)
m(θ)
, (59)
=
v′(θ)
w(θ)
− 2m
′(θ)2
m(θ)2
+
m′′(θ)
m(θ)
, (60)
=
v′(θ)
w(θ)
− m
′(θ)
m(θ)
[
−m
′′(θ)
m′(θ)
+
2m′(θ)
m(θ)
]
, (61)
=
v′(θ)
w(θ)
+
w′(θ)
w(θ)
[
−d log(−m
′(θ))
dθ
+
2 d log(m(θ))
dθ
]
, (62)
=
v′(θ)
v(θ)
v(θ)
w(θ)
+
v(θ)
w(θ)
[
−d log(v(θ)− (1− θ)v
′(θ))
dθ
]
, (63)
=
v(θ)
w(θ)
×
[
− d
dθ
log
(
1− (1− θ)v
′(θ)
v(θ)
)]
, (64)
where (60) follows from the FOC (46) and w′(θ) = v(θ) (Proposition 10); and
(63) in addition uses the result that m′(θ) = − [v(θ)− (1− θ)v′(θ)] m(θ)2 < 0 .
The monotonicity of the logarithmic transformation implies that the sign of
the SOC (64) is equal to that of
d
dθ
[
(1− θ) v
′(θ)
v(θ)
]
=
v′′(θ)(1− θ)− v′(θ)
v(θ)
− (1− θ)
(
v′(θ)
v(θ)
)2
< 0. (65)
The inequality in the above equation follows from v′(θ) > 0 (Proposition 5) and
v′′(θ) < 0, shown below.
Next, I show that v(θ) is concave in the entrepreneur’s ownership θ. The
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second-order effect of ownership on firm value is given by
d2V
dθ2
= V ∗cc
(
∂C(x)
∂θ
)2
+V ∗c
∂2C(x)
∂θ2
+
2
η
E∗c
∂C(x)
∂θ
−ξE∗cc
(
∂C(x)
∂θ
)2
−ξE∗c
∂2C(x)
∂θ2
.
(66)
Because V ∗c (x, c) > 0 and V
∗
cc(x, c) < 0, E
∗
c (x, c) < 0 and E
∗
cc(x, c) > 0, at
c = C (x), and ∂C (x) /∂θ > 0, and ∂2C(x)/∂θ2 < 0, I thus have the desired
result.
Next, I sign Fη by noting that
∂F (θ; η)
∂η
=
1
w
∂w′
∂η
− w
′
w2
∂w
∂η
+
1
m
∂m′
∂η
− m
′
m2
∂m
∂η
, (67)
=
v
w
∂ log v
∂η
− v
w
∂ logw
∂η
+
m′
m
∂ log(−m′)
∂η
− m
′
m
∂ logm
∂η
, (68)
=
v
w
[
∂ log v
∂η
− ∂ logw
∂η
− ∂
∂η
log
[
(v − (1− θ)v′) m2]+ ∂ logm
∂η
]
,
(69)
=
v
w
[
∂ log v
∂η
− ∂ logw
∂η
− ∂ logm
∂η
− ∂ log (v − (1− θ)v
′)
∂η
]
, (70)
=
v
w
[
− ∂
∂η
log
(
1− (1− θ)v
′
v
)
− ∂ log (wm)
∂η
]
. (71)
The equality (68) follows from envelope condition w′(θ) = v(θ), and (69) uses
FOC (46) and m′(θ) = (v(θ)− (1− θ)v′(θ)) m2(θ) < 0 .
The monotonicity of logarithmic transformation implies that
Sign
(
− ∂
∂η
log
(
1− (1− θ)v
′
v
))
= Sign
(
∂
∂η
(1− θ)v′
v
)
, (72)
where
∂
∂η
(1− θ)v′
v
=
(1− θ)
v
∂2v
∂θ∂η
− (1− θ)
v2
∂v
∂θ
∂v
∂η
< 0, (73)
using ∂v/∂θ > 0, ∂v/∂η > 0 and ∂2v/∂η∂θ < 0. Together with ∂ (wm) /∂η > 0,
I have ∂F (θ; η)/∂η < 0.
The SOC and the above result (∂F (θ; η)/∂η < 0) together imply that the
entrepreneur’s ownership decreases with the level of shareholder protection, in
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that dθ∗/dη < 0. The firm’s capital stock increases in shareholder protection, in
that
dK
dη
= m2(θ∗)
[
−v(θ)dθ
∗
dη
+ (1− θ) dv(θ)
dη
]
. (74)
I note that dθ∗/dη < 0 and dv(θ)/dη > 0 imply capital stock increases in share-
holder protection.
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Table 1: Base Case Parameter Values.
Table 1 reports base case input parameter values.
Parameter Choices
Risk free interest rate r = 0.06
Growth rate of cash flows µ = 0.01
Volatility of returns σ = 0.30
Tax advantage of debt τ = 0.35
Liquidation costs α = 0.40
Renegotiation costs κ = 0.05
Proportional flotation cost δ = 0.02
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Figure 1: Investor Protection and Endogenous Ownership.
Figure 1 plots ownership as a function of the degree of shareholders protection
for η ∈ [2, 10] and the degree of bondholders protection for φ ∈ [0.25, 0.75].
Additional input parameter values are set as in Table 1.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
η
θ
(a) Endogenous ownership θ as a function of the degree of
shareholders protection η
0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75
0.27
0.29
0.31
0.33
0.35
0.37
φ
θ
(b) Endogenous ownership θ as a function of the degree of
bondholder protection φ
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Figure 2: Investor Protection, Endogenous Ownership, and Financ-
ing Decisions.
Figure 2 plots the selected coupon payment C as a function of the degree of
shareholders protection for η ∈ [2, 10] and the degree of bondholders protection
for φ ∈ [0.25, 0.75]. Additional input parameter values are set as in Table 1.
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C
(a) Coupon C as a function of the degree of shareholders
protection η
0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75
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φ
C
(b) Coupon C as a function of the degree of bondholder
protection φ
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Chapter III
Dynamic Capital Structure
under Managerial Entrenchment:
Evidence from a Structural
Estimation
(with Erwan Morellec and Norman Schu¨rhoff)
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal paper by Jensen and Meckling (1976), economists have devoted
much effort to studying the effects of agency conflicts on firm’s financing decisions.
Because debt limits the flexibility of management (Jensen (1986)), a large fraction
of this literature argues that managers do not always adopt capital structures that
maximize shareholder wealth. This is particularly true when managers are not
under the pressure of a disciplining force since, by definition, entrenched managers
have discretion over their firm’s leverage choices. The capital structure of a firm
should then be determined not only by real market frictions, such as taxes or
bankruptcy costs, but also by the degree of managerial entrenchment. Despite the
substantial development of this literature, the magnitude of manager-shareholder
conflicts and their effects on financing decisions is still an open question.
Empirical researchers have used an array of methods to examine the relation
between managerial entrenchment and capital structure choices. For example,
Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996) identify security issue decisions that seem incon-
sistent with shareholder value maximization. Friend and Lang (1988), Mehran
(1992) and Berger, Ofek, and Yermak (1997) find in cross-sectional studies that
leverage levels are lower when CEOs do not face pressure from the market for
corporate control. Berger, Ofek, and Yermak also find that leverage increases in
the aftermath of shocks reducing the degree of managerial entrenchment or after
managers are subjected to greater performance incentives. Garvey and Hanka
(1999) find that firms protected by “second generation” state antitakeover laws
substantially reduce their use of debt, and that unprotected firms do the reverse.
Yet in another study, Kayhan (2005) confirms that entrenched managers prefer
low leverage.
In this paper, we use observed corporate financing choices to infer the degree
of managerial entrenchment and the effects of manager-shareholder conflicts on
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financing decisions. We begin by formulating a dynamic trade-off model that
emphasizes the role of manager-shareholder conflicts in shaping capital structure
choices. The model features corporate and personal taxes, refinancing costs,
and bankruptcy costs. In the model, each firm is run by a partially-entrenched
manager who sets the firm’s payout and financing policies. Managers act in their
own interests to maximize the present value of the cash flows they will take from
the firm’s operations. However, the policy choices of the manager are constrained
by the threat of control challenges by shareholders, who can replace the manager
at a cost. In this environment, we determine the optimal leveraging decision of
managers and examine the effects of managerial entrenchment on firms’ financing
decisions. Several important results follow from this analysis. First, we show
how the various determinants of leverage interact to determine capital structure
choices. Second, we derive implications relating managerial entrenchment to
the firm’s target leverage and the pace and size of capital structure changes.
Third, we take the model to the data and provide firm-specific estimates of the
degree of managerial entrenchment. Fourth, we show that the separation between
ownership and control can explain why some firms issue little or no debt – low-
and zero-leverage puzzles – despite the known tax benefits of debt (see Graham
(2000) and Strebulaev and Yang (2007)) as well as the dynamics of leverage ratios
through time.
As in prior dynamic capital structure models, our analysis emphasizes the
role of external financing costs in affecting the time-series of observed leverage
ratios. Due to capital market frictions, firms are not able to keep their leverage
at the target at all times. As a result, leverage is best described not just by a
number, the target, but by its entire distribution – including target and restruc-
turing (refinancing) boundaries. In contrast to prior work, our dynamic capital
structure model generates unique predictions relating managerial entrenchment
to the debt level selected by the manager, the frequency and size of capital struc-
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ture changes, and the likelihood of default. Notably, our model predicts that
high (low) managerial entrenchment leads to low (high) target leverage and less
(more) frequent capital structure rebalancings. Managerial entrenchment lowers
the firm’s target leverage and raises the debt issuance trigger. As a result, finan-
cial inertia becomes more pronounced and the range of leverage ratios widens as
the degree of managerial entrenchment increases.
The intuition underlying these predictions is that debt restructurings ad-
versely affect the manager’s rents as the benefits of restructuring accrue to share-
holders. Cash distributions are made on a pro rata basis to shareholders, so
that when new debt is issued management gets a small fraction of the distribu-
tions. Management’s stake in the firm, however, exceeds its direct ownership due
to entrenchment, rendering restructurings less favorable to management than to
shareholders. Debt also constrains managers by limiting the cash flows available
as hidden rents (as in Jensen (1986), Hart and Moore (1995) or Zwiebel (1996)).
As a remedy, entrenched managers restructure less frequently (lower refinancing
trigger) and issue less debt (lower target and default trigger) than optimal for
shareholders.
The paper also provides new evidence on the relation between governance
mechanisms and capital structure dynamics. Specifically, we take the model to
the data and use observed financing choices to provide firm-specific estimates of
the degree of managerial entrenchment, or, equivalently, of the cost of control
challenges. We exploit not only the conditional mean of leverage (as in a re-
gression) but also distributional tails – in short, the conditional moments of the
time-series distribution of leverage. This allows a characterization of managerial
responses to the incentives created by various governance mechanisms. Using
structural econometrics, we find that costs of control challenges of 2-7% on aver-
age (.8-5% at median) are sufficient to resolve the low- and zero-leverage puzzles
and explain the time series of observed leverage ratios. The variation in cost of
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control challenges, and hence agency conflicts, across firms is sizeable. This sug-
gests that while leverage ratios should revert to the (manager’s) target leverage
over time, the variation in the degree of managerial entrenchment should lead to
persistent cross-sectional differences in leverage ratios. We also find that agency
costs vary with business cycle conditions and with variables that one expects
to determine managerial incentives. Firms with large growth opportunities are
subject to more managerial resource diversion than other firms. External and in-
ternal governance mechanisms strongly affect managerial entrenchment and firms’
financing decisions.
The analysis in the present paper relates to the literature that analyzes the
relation between managerial discretion and financing decisions.1 The paper that
is closest to our is Zwiebel (1996) in that it also builds a dynamic capital struc-
ture model in which financing and payout policies are selected by a partially-
entrenched manager. However, while in Zwiebel’s model, firms are always at
their target leverage, in our model refinancing costs create some inertia and some
persistence in capital structure. Second, from a modeling perspective, this paper
relates to the dynamic contingent claims models of Fisher, Heinkel, and Zechner
(1989), Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001), or Strebulaev (2007). In this litera-
ture, conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders have been largely
ignored (see however the static models of Morellec (2004), or Lambrecht and
Myers (2008)). Third, our model also relates to the dynamic trade-off models
of Hennessy and Whited (HW 2005, 2007). Their models feature a richer tax
environment and consider the role of internally generated funds. However they
do not allow for default (HW, 2005) and ignore manager-shareholder conflicts.
1See Stulz (1990), Chang (1993), Hart (1993), Hart and Moore (1994, 1995), Zwiebel (1996),
or Barclay, Morellec and Smith (2006). While this literature has provided a rich intuition on
the effects of managerial discretion on financing decisions, it has been so far mostly qualitative,
focusing on directional effects.
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Another important difference is that our model allows us derive a closed-form
expression for the time series distribution of leverage ratios. We can then look at
all the moments of the leverage distribution (including target leverage, refinanc-
ing frequency, and default probability) instead of focusing on a limited number
of moments. Finally, our paper is related to the analysis in Lemmon, Roberts
and Zender (LRZ, 2008) who find that traditional determinants of leverage (such
as size, profitability, market-to-book, industry, ...) account for relatively little of
the variation in capital structure. Instead they show that the majority of the
variation in capital structures is driven by an unobserved effect (or determinant).
Our analysis reveals that the (unexplained) capital structure heterogeneity is
structurally related to a number of corporate governance mechanisms, thereby
providing an economic interpretation for their results.
This paper extends the literature on financing decisions in two important di-
mensions. First, we develop the first dynamic model of capital structure decisions
that includes taxes, bankruptcy costs, refinancing costs, and manager-shareholder
conflicts. This allows us to make clear predictions regarding the effects of these
various determinants of financing policies on target leverage and the pace and
size of capital structure changes. Second, our analysis adds to the literature by
providing firm-specific estimates of the degree of managerial entrenchment and
showing that the separation between ownership and control can explain the low-
and zero-leverage puzzles as well as the dynamics of leverage ratios. To the best
of our knowledge, our paper is the first that provides structural estimates of the
magnitude of manager-shareholder conflicts and their effects on dynamic capital
structure decisions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
model. Section 3 discusses the data and our empirical methodology. Section
4 provides firm-specific estimates of manager-shareholder conflicts and relates
these estimates to various corporate governance mechanisms. Section 5 concludes.
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Technical developments are gathered in Appendix A. In Appendix B, we show
that the results of regressions on simulated data from our model are consistent
with those reported in the empirical literature.
2 The Model
Most capital structure models make the simplifying assumption that managers
choose capital structure in the interests of shareholders. Recent research, how-
ever, has explicitly recognized that managers’ self interest can lead to finan-
cial policies that do not maximize shareholder wealth. This section presents a
model that extends the contingent claims framework to incorporate the impact
of manager-shareholder conflicts on dynamic capital structure choices.
2.1 Assumptions
The model closely follows Goldstein et al. (2001), Leland (1998), and Strebulaev
(2007). Throughout the paper, assets are continuously traded in complete and
arbitrage-free markets. The default-free term structure is flat with an after-tax
risk-free rate r, at which investors may lend and borrow freely. We consider an
economy with a large number of heterogeneous firms. Firms are infinitely lived
and have monopoly access to a set of assets, which are operated in continuous
time. The firm-specific state variable is the cash flow generated by the operation
of the firm’s assets, denoted by Xi. This operating cash flow is independent of
capital structure choices and governed, under the risk neutral probability mea-
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sure, by the process:2
dXit = µiXitdt+ σiXitdZit, Xi0 > 0, (1)
where µi < r and σi > 0 are constants and (Zit)t≥0 is a standard Brownian
motion. Equation (1) implies that the growth rate of cash flows from operations
is Normally distributed with mean µi∆t and variance σ
2
i ∆t over the time interval
∆t under the risk-neutral probability measure. It also implies that the mean
growth rate of cash flows is mi∆t = (µi + βiκ)∆t under the physical probability
measure, where βi 6= 0 and κ is the market risk premium.
Cash flows from operations are taxed at a constant rate τ c. As a result,
firms may have an incentive to issue debt to shield profits from taxation. To
stay in a simple time-homogeneous setting, we consider debt contracts that are
characterized by a perpetual flow of coupon payments ci and a principal Pi.
Debt is callable and issued at par. The firm’s initial debt structure remains fixed
without time limit until either the firm goes into default or the firm calls its debt
and restructures with newly issued debt. We consider that firms can adjust their
capital structure upwards at any point in time by incurring a proportional cost
2This corresponds to a model in which the firm is allowed to invest in new assets at any
time t ∈ (0,∞) and investment is perfectly reversible. To see this, assume that operation of
the firm’s assets produces output with the production function F : R+ → R+, F (kt) = kγt ,
where γ ∈ (0, 1) and that capital depreciates at a constant rate δ > 0. Define the firm’s after
tax profit function fit by
fit = max
k≥0
[(1− τ c)(Xitkγt − δkt)− rkt].
Solving this maximization problem for kt and replacing kt by its expression in the firm’s after-
tax profit function gives fit = (1−τ ci )Yit where (Yit)t≥0 is a (capacity-adjusted cash flow) shock
governed by
dYit = µY Yitdt+ σY YitdWt, Yi0 = AXi0 > 0,
where µY = ϑµi + ϑ(ϑ− 1)σ2i /2, σY = ϑσi, and (A, ϑ) ∈ R2++ are constant parameters.
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λ, but that they can reduce their indebtedness only in default.3 A restructuring
occurs if the cash flow shock reaches a level XU (> X0) prior to default. Default
occurs if the cash flow shock falls to a level XB (< X0) prior to the calling of debt.
The personal tax rate on dividends τ d and on coupon payments τ i are identical
for all investors. These features are shared with numerous other capital structure
models, including Leland (1998), Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001), Hackbarth,
Miao, and Morellec (2006), or Strebulaev (2007).
We are interested in building a model in which financing choices reflect not
only the trade-off between the tax benefit of debt and contracting costs, but
also agency conflicts. Agency conflicts between the manager and shareholders
are introduced by considering that each firm is run by a partially-entrenched
manager who sets the firm’s payout and financing policies. Managers act in their
own interests to maximize the present value of the cash flows they will take from
the firm’s operations. However, the policy choices of the manager are constrained
by the threat of control challenges by shareholders, who can replace the current
manager at a cost.4 As in Lambrecht and Myers (2008) and Kuhnen and Zwiebel
(2008) (and in contrast to Stulz, 1990, Zwiebel, 1996, or Morellec, 2004), we
do not assume that managers always want to expand. Rather, our model gives
managers the possibility to capture cash flow within the limits imposed by the
costs of control challenges.
Specifically, we consider that the cost of control challenges implies that the
firm’s net income is reduced by a constant factor φ after a control challenge. That
is, the net payoff to investors when they take control is max[V ∗(X, c)−B(X, c)−
φF ∗(X, c); 0], where φ ∈ (0, 1), V ∗(X, c) is the value of the firm under perfect
3While in principle management can both increase and decrease future debt levels, Gilson
(1997) finds that transaction costs discourage debt reductions outside of renegotiation.
4As in Lambrecht and Myers (2008), we do not allow for ex post renegotiation by considering
that the manager is removed if he does not bring enough value to shareholders.
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shareholder protection (i.e. absent manager-shareholder conflicts), B(X, c) is the
value of outstanding debt, and F ∗(X, c) is the present value of the firm’s net
income under perfect shareholder protection.5 In our analysis, φ represents the
cost of a control challenge or, equivalently, the degree of managerial entrenchment.
This cost must be interpreted as the cost that shareholders must face to replace
the manager, due to the specific human capital of the manager, legal challenges,
search costs, or any other type of replacement costs. In our model, the threat of
a control challenge constrains the manager, but the cost of control challenges φ
creates the space for managerial rents. Our objective in this paper is to estimate
the magnitude of φ.
In addition to the cash flows they receive when the firm is in operation,
shareholders may obtain a fraction of firm value in default. In the analysis that
follows, we assume that default can lead either to liquidation or to the renegotia-
tion. We denote the proportional cost of renegotiation and liquidation by κ and
α, respectively. Because liquidation is typically more costly than reorganization,
there exists a positive surplus associated with renegotiation.6 In our model, this
surplus represents a fraction α − κ of the value of the firm’s assets in default.
Following Fan and Sundaresan (2000), we consider a Nash bargaining game in
default that leads to a debt-equity swap. We denote the bargaining power of
shareholders by η ∈ [0, 1]. Assuming that the renegotiation surplus is shared
according to some sharing rule $, the generalized Nash bargaining solution is
5In the static version of our model, this specification implies that shareholders can realize
a fraction 1− φ of equity value if they mobilize to remove management (see Appendix A 6.2).
Hence this specification can be seen as the dynamic counterpart of that in Lambrecht and
Myers (2008). While other specifications are possible, we show below that this specification is
also similar to that used in the law and finance literature, in which controlling shareholders can
extract part of the firm cash flows as private benefits.
6In our model default always lead to renegotiation. The model can be extended to incorpo-
rate an exogenous probability of liquidation, as in Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007).
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simply given by $ = η. The Nash bargaining solution implies that sharehold-
ers get a fraction η (α− κ) of the firm’s assets in default. In addition to the
estimation of φ, the paper also provides a structural estimation of η.
2.2 Model Solution
In this section we solve for the financing policy selected by the manager. We do
so in the following three steps. First, we determine the values of debt and equity,
taking the firm’s financing and default policies as given. Second, we solve for
the firm’s default policy, taking financing as given. Third, we derive the selected
financing policy, that is the amount of debt issued and the call policy. In our
model, the value of equity depends on the payout policy p(Xt) selected by the
manager, which in turn depends on the cost of control challenges. In the analysis
that follows, we consider that the manager can capture a fraction φ of net income
as private benefits, so that the cash flows to shareholders at any time t are given
by (1 − φ)(1 − τ c)(Xt − c).7 We show below that this payout policy implies
that the “control challenge constraint” is always binding (i.e. equity value equals
V ∗(X, c)−B(X, c)− φF ∗(X, c)).
Consider first the valuation of corporate securities. In our model, the firm’s
initial debt structure remains fixed until either the cash flow shock reaches XB
and the firm goes into default or the cash flow shock reaches XU and the firm calls
its debt. Let e (X) denote the present value of the cash flows to shareholders over
7This tunneling of funds toward socially inefficient usage may take a variety of forms such
as excessive salary, transfer pricing, employing relatives and friends who are not qualified for
the jobs in the firm, and perquisites, just to name a few. Importantly, while we emphasize
conflicts between managers and shareholders, our model is observationally equivalent to the
models that emphasize agency conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders (see e.g.
La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2002) or Albuquerque and Wang (2008)), in
which controlling shareholders face a convex cost function for cash diversion and extract part
of the firm cash flows as private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders.
67
one refinancing cycle (i.e. for the period over which the firm does not change its
debt policy). At each time t, shareholders receive the cash flows from operations
minus the coupon payment c to debtholders, the fraction of cash flows captured
by the manager, and the taxes paid on corporate and personal income. As a
result, the value of shareholders’ claim over one refinancing cycle is given by
e (X) = EQ
[∫ T
t
e−r(s−t) (1− τ) (1− φ) (Xs − c) ds
∣∣∣∣Xt = X] , (2)
where the tax rate τ = 1 − (1− τ c) (1 − τ d) reflects corporate and personal
taxes, Q denotes the risk neutral probability measure and T = inf {TU , TB}
with Ti = inf {t ≥ 0 : Xt = Xi}, i = U,B. This expression gives the value of
shareholders’ claim over one refinancing cycle as the present value of the cash
flows that they receive until either the firm increases its debt level to shield
more profits from taxation or defaults on its debt obligations (i.e. until time T ).
Importantly, this value does not incorporate any of the cash flows that accrue
to shareholders after a debt restructuring. These cash flows belong to the next
financing cycle and will be incorporated in the total value of equity.
Denote by ξ and ν the positive and negative roots of the quadratic equation
1
2
σ2β (β − 1)+µβ−r = 0 and let Π (X) represent the present value of a perpetual
stream of cash flows (1− τ) (1− φ)Xt starting at Xt = X:
Π(X) = EQ
[∫ ∞
t
e−r(s−t) (1− τ) (1− φ)Xs ds
∣∣∣∣Xt = X] = (1− τ)(1− φr − µ
)
X.
(3)
In addition, let pU (X) denote the present value of $1 to be received at the time
of refinancing, contingent on refinancing occurring before default, and let pB (X)
denote the present value of $1 to be received at the time of default, contingent
on default occurring before refinancing. Using this notation, we can write the
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solution to equation (3) as:
e (X) = Π (X)− pU (X) Π (XU)− pB (X) Π (XB)
−(1− τ) (1− φ)c
r
[1− pU (X)− pB (X)], (4)
where [see e.g. Revuz and Yor (1999, pp. 72) and Appendix A 6.3]
pB (X) =
Xξ −XνXξ−νU
XξB −XνBXξ−νU
and pU (X) =
Xξ −XνXξ−νB
XξU −XνUXξ−νB
.
Equation (4) incorporates only the cash flows that accrue to shareholders until
date T . In this expression, we have pU (X) = 1 and pB (X) = 0, for X ≥ XU .
Similarly, we have pU (X) = 0 and pB (x) = 1, for X = XB. That is, if the cash
flow shock reaches XB or XU , the firm changes its capital structure and starts a
new financing cycle.
Consider next the total value of equity’s claim to cash flows from operations,
denoted by F (x). As discussed above, when the cash flow shock reaches XU prior
default, debt will be retired at par value and a new debt will be issued. The time
at which debt is called is termed a restructuring point. We show in Appendix
A 6.1 that in the static model in which the firm cannot restructure, the default
threshold XB is linear in the coupon payment c. In addition, the selected coupon
rate c is linear in X. This implies that if two firms i and j are identical except
that X i0 = θX
j
0 , then the selected coupon rate and default threshold c
i = θcj and
X iB = θX
j
B, and every claim will be larger by the same factor θ. For the dynamic
model, this scaling feature implies that at the first restructuring point, all claims
are scaled up by the same proportion ρ ≡ XU/X0 that asset value has increased
(i.e. it is optimal to choose c1 = ρc0, X1B = ρX
0
B, X
1
U = ρX
0
U). Subsequent
restructurings will again scale up these variables by the same ratio. If default
occurs prior to restructuring, firm value is reduced by a constant factor η (α− κ) γ
with γ ≡ XB/X0 and all claims are scaled down by the same proportion η(α−κ)γ.
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As a result, we have over the region XB ≤ X ≤ XU :
F (X) = e (X) + pU (X) ρF (X0) + pB (X) η(α− κ)γF (X0) . (5)
This equation shows that the value of shareholders’ claim over all the financing
cycles is equal to the cash flows they get until the next restructuring plus the
value of the cash flows they get after the restructuring (last two terms on the right
hand side). Since a restructuring can happen in default or when the state variable
has increased sufficiently, the formula takes into account these two possibilities.
Using this expression, we can solve for the total value of equity’s claim to cash
flows from operating assets at the initial date as:
F (X0) =
e (X0)
1− pU (X0) ρ− pB (X0) η (α− κ) γ . (6)
Since managers capture a fraction φ of net income, we also have that F (X) ≡
(1−φ)F ∗(X) where F ∗(X) is the total value of equity’s claim to cash flows from
operations in the absence of manager-shareholder conflicts.
The same arguments apply to the valuation of corporate debt. Consider first
the value B (X) of the debt issued at time t = 0. Since the issue is called at par
if the firm’s cash flows reach XU before XB, the current value of corporate debt
satisfies at any time t ≥ 0:
B (X) = b (X) + pU (X)B (X0) , (7)
where
b (X) =
(1− τ i) c
r
[1− pU (X)− pB (X)] + pB (X) [1− (κ+ η (α− κ))] Π (XB) ,
(8)
represents the value of corporate debt over one refinancing cycle, i.e. ignoring
the value of the debt issued after a restructuring or after default. The first term
on the right hand side of equation (8) represents the present value of the coupon
70
payments accruing to debtholders until the firm defaults or restructures. The
second term represents the cash flow to initial debtholders in default. These
debtholders get the value of the firm’s assets minus renegotiation costs and the
fraction of the renegotiation surplus captured by shareholders.
As in the case of equity, the total value of corporate debt D (X) includes
not only the cash flows accruing to debtholders over one refinancing cycle, i.e.
b (X), but also the new debt that will be issued in default or at the time of a
restructuring. As a result, the value of the total debt claim, incorporating all
future coupon flows, is given by
D (X0) =
b (X0)
1− pU (X0) ρ− pB (X0) η (α− κ) γ , (9)
This equation shows that, because the value of the firm is reduced by a constant
factor η (α− κ) γ in default, so is the value of corporate debt that will be issued
at that time.
Because flotation costs are incurred each time the firm adjusts its capital
structure, the total value of the firm at the restructuring date is
V (X0) =
e (X0) + b (X0)− λB (X0)
1− pU (X0) ρ− pB (X0) η (α− κ) γ , (10)
Finally, since firm value satisfies V (X) = E (X)+B (X), the total value of equity
is given by:
E (X) = e (X) + pU(X)[ρV (X0)−B (X0)] + pB(X)η (α− κ) γV (X0) . (11)
Denote by V ∗(X) the value of the firm value when there are no manager-shareholder
conflicts. The payout policy p(X) = (1 − φ)(1 − τ c)(X − c) implies that the
manager captures the rents φF ∗(X). As a result, we have for any given fi-
nancing policy V ∗ (X) = V (X) + φF ∗(X).8 This in turn implies that E(X) =
8In the Appendix, we show that if a control challenge occurred off-equilibrium, the replace-
ment manager would implement the same financing policy as the incumbent.
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V ∗ (X)−B (X)− φF ∗(X), confirming our earlier claim that the aforementioned
payout policy will be implemented by the manager.
Consider next financing decisions. In this paper, we follow Zwiebel (1996),
Morellec (2004), and Lambrecht and Myers (2008) by considering that the man-
ager has decision rights over financing policy. When selecting the coupon payment
c and the restructuring threshold XU , the objective of management is to maxi-
mize the value of its claims. In the analysis below, we assume that the manager
owns a fraction ϕ of the firm’s equity and that the proceeds from the debt issue
are distributed on a pro rata basis to shareholders. The present value of the man-
ager’s cash flows, denoted by M(X), is then given by the sum of the proceeds
from the debt issue and the present value of the cash flows received from the firm
once debt has been issued. As a result, we can express the value of the manager’s
claims as M(X) = ϕV (X) + φF ∗(X) or
M(X) = ϕV ∗(X)︸ ︷︷ ︸ + φ (1− ϕ)F ∗(X)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Equity stake PV of managerial rents
(12)
In equation (12), ϕ represents the fraction of the firm’s equity owned by the man-
ager and φ represents the fraction of the firm’s net income that can be captured
by the manager.
When determining the firm’s financing policy, the objective of the manager
is to choose {c, ρ} to maximize the present value of the cash flows received from
the firm, i.e M(X). Since F ∗(X) decreases with c, equation (12) implies that,
whenever φ > 0, the efficient choice of debt (optimal for shareholders) differs from
the entrenchment choice (optimal for managers). In particular, the model predicts
that the coupon payment decreases with φ and that the debt level selected by
the manager is always lower than the debt level that maximizes firm value. In
addition, the model predicts that some firms will be unlevered despite the tax
benefit of debt. Finally, the selected default threshold results from a tradeoff
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between continuation values outside of default and the values of claims in default.
Our model implies that all claims are scaled down by the same factor in default
so that the manager and shareholders agree on the firm’s default policy.9 The
selected default threshold can then be determined by solving the smooth-pasting
condition satisfied at X = γX0 as in Leland (1998).
2.3 Model Predictions
The comparative statics for the dynamic model with agency costs are reported
in Table 2. Input parameter values for our base case environment are set as
follows: the risk-free interest rate r = 4.21%, the initial value of the cash flow
shock X0 = 1, the growth rate and volatility of the cash flow shock µ = 1%
and σ = 25%, the corporate tax rate τ c = 35%, the tax rate on dividends
τ d = 11.6%, the tax rate on coupon payments τ i = 29.3%, liquidation costs
α = 50%, renegotiation costs κ = 5%, shareholders’ bargaining power η = 50%,
managerial incentives ϕ = 7%, and the cost of control challenges φ = 1%. These
parameter values are discussed in section 3 below.
The numerical results reported in Table 2 show that managerial entrenchment
affects the selected debt level, the refinancing trigger, and the default trigger –
and hence the frequency of capital structure changes and the likelihood of default.
Specifically, high (low) managerial entrenchment leads to low (high) leverage and
less (more) capital structure rebalancings. Figure 3 illustrates the comparative
statics for the model-implied time-series distribution of leverage depending on
various firm characteristics. Managerial entrenchment, measured by φ, lowers
9This follows from the fact that manager-shareholder conflicts are unaffected by default and
that managers stay in control after default. The latter assumption allows us to reflect the
fact that managers stay in control after debt is renegotiated privately or after court supervised
debt renegotiation under Chapter 11 of the U.S. bankruptcy code (see e.g. Gilson (1989) for
empirical evidence).
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both the target leverage and the debt issuance trigger while it raises the default
trigger. As a result, the range of leverage ratios widens with the degree of man-
agerial entrenchment. We will use this property of the time-series distribution of
leverage to identify φ in the data.
The intuition underlying this result is simple. In the dynamic model, debt
restructurings adversely affect the manager’s rents as the benefits of restructuring
accrue to the shareholders. Cash distributions are made on a pro rata basis, so
that when new debt is issued management gets a fraction ϕ of the distributions.
Management’s stake in the firm, however, exceeds direct ownership ϕ due to
entrenchment φ, rendering restructurings less favorable to management than to
shareholders. Debt also constrains managers by limiting the cash flows available
as hidden rents (as in Jensen (1986), Zwiebel (1996), or Morellec (2004)). As
a remedy, entrenched managers issue less debt (lower target and default bound-
ary) and restructure less frequently (higher refinancing trigger) than optimal for
shareholders.
High bargaining power leads to accelerated default, as shareholders capture a
larger fraction of the surplus in default. Higher bargaining power also results in
costlier debt as bondholders anticipate shareholders’ strategic action in default
and require a higher premium. An increase in the bargaining power of share-
holders therefore decreases target leverage and the low and high restructuring
bounds. As a result, the leverage distribution shifts to the left. Figure 3 also
reveals that the cost of debt issuance affects predominantly the low leverage tail
and has qualitatively similar effects as entrenchment on the distribution of lever-
age. The drift of cash flows affects neither the target nor the bounds but the
dispersion in leverage. The volatility of cash flows impacts mainly the support of
the distribution, with lower volatility narrowing the support (the option value of
waiting to default or restructure being lower).
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3 Empirical Analysis
In this section we take the model derived in Section 2 to the data. Specifically,
we use observed financing choices to obtain firm-specific estimates of the degree
of managerial entrenchment (as reflected by φ) and of shareholder’s bargaining
power in default (as reflected by η). In a second stage, we also show how these
estimates vary across firms and economic conditions. Our objective is to em-
pirically assess whether agency conflicts can explain the low- and zero-leverage
puzzles as well as the time series of observed leverage ratios
The standard approach in the empirical capital structure literature is to spec-
ify in reduced form how cross-sectional determinants affect the conditional mean
of leverage, including various proxies for internal and external governance mech-
anisms (see however Leary and Roberts (2005)). Observed leverage ratios, how-
ever, exhibit highly nonlinear behavior, including heteroskedasticity, asymmetry,
fat tails, and truncation. These features are difficult to capture in standard lin-
ear regression studies – rendering standard least-squares estimates inconsistent.
An additional complication is that the target leverage ratio, the main quan-
tity of economic interest in most studies, typically does not correspond to the
(un)conditional mean of leverage that is estimated in a standard regression. Fi-
nally, debt-to-equity ratios generally represent the cumulative result of years of
separate decisions. Hence, cross-sectional tests based on a single aggregate are
likely to have low power (see also Welch (2006)).
In this paper, we take a different route. Specifically, we exploit the structural
restrictions of the dynamic model derived in Section 2. Our objective is to esti-
mate from real data the degree of managerial entrenchment (or equivalently the
cost of control challenges) that best explains observed financing behavior (a sim-
ilar approach is used for example in Hennessy and Whited (2007)). In a second
stage, we examine whether these estimates are related to a number of variables
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reflecting the quality of a firm’s governance structure.
3.1 Estimation Strategy
Our identification strategy exploits the panel nature of the data and the model’s
predictions for different moments of leverage. For an individual firm, the model
implies a specific time-series behavior of the firm’s leverage ratio. The policy
predictions include (but are not restricted to) the target leverage, the refinancing
frequency, and default probability. In addition to the time-series predictions, the
model yields comparative statics of the leverage distribution that predict how
leverage varies in the cross-section of firms. We exploit both types of predic-
tions to identify the parameters in the data and to disentangle cross-sectional
heterogeneity from the impact of inertia on leverage.
The structural estimation we perform is based on the Maximum Likelihood
principle. (Simulated) maximum likelihood estimation of the model parameters
is more efficient than the simulated method of moments techniques (used for
instance in Hennessy and Whited, 2007), but it is often practically infeasible.
In our setting SML is tractable since for the model described in Section 2 we
can derive an explicit expression for the (conditional and stationary) distribution
function of financial leverage (see Appendix A 6.3).
In the analysis, each firm i is characterized by a set of parameters θ ∈ Θ that
determine the growth rate and volatility of the firm’s cash flows, the firm’s sys-
tematic risk exposure, as well as the cost of control challenges and the bargaining
power of shareholders in default. The likelihood function L of the parameters θ
given the data is based on the probability of observing the leverage ratio yit for
firm i at date t. Assume there are N firms in the sample and let ni be the number
of observations for firm i. The observations within the same firm are correlated
due to autocorrelation in the cash flow process given by equation (1). Across
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firms, the model parameters are allowed to vary with observable characteristics,
denoted by xit, and with an unobserved firm-specific random effect i that varies
randomly, with distribution f(i|θ). We show below (section 4.4) that the mea-
sure of managerial entrenchment constructed from our empirical estimates of the
parameters governing driving the distribution of i is structurally related to a
number of governance mechanisms.
Given these assumptions, the joint probability of observing the leverage ratios
yit for firm i at time t and the firm-specific unobserved effects i, given the
observable characteristics xit, for t = 1, . . . , ni, is given by
f (yi, i|θ, xi) = f (yi|i; θ, xi) f (i|θ) (13)
=
(
f(yi1|i; θ, xi)
ni∏
t=2
f(yit|yit−1, i; θ, xi)
)
f (i|θ) .
We obtain the (marginal) log-likelihood by integrating out the random effects
from the joint likelihood f (y, |θ, x) = ∏Ni=1 f (yi, i|θ, xi). We get:
lnL (θ; y, x) = ln
∫

f (y, |θ, x) d (14)
=
N∑
i=1
ln
∫
i
(
f(yi1|i; θ, xi)
ni∏
t=2
f(yit|yit−1, i; θ, xi)
)
f (i|θ) di,
since i is drawn independently across firms from the distribution f (i|θ).
For the model described in Section 2, explicit expressions for the stationary
and conditional densities f(yit|θ, xi) and f(yit|yit−1, i; θ, xi) can be derived (see
Appendix A 6.3). We evaluate the integral in equation (14) using Monte Carlo
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simulations.10 The simulated maximum likelihood estimator is now defined as11:
θ̂ = arg max
θ
lnL(θ).
This estimator answers the following question: What magnitude of agency costs
best explains observed financing patterns?
3.2 Empirical Specification
The main focus of inference in the estimation is on the firm-specific estimates
of the cost of control challenges φ. In the empirical specification, we allow φ to
depend on both the observable characteristics xit and the firm-specific unobserved
determinants i. In addition to φ, we also estimate shareholders’ bargaining power
in default, η.
In the empirical implementation, we need to specify the functional forms for
(φit, ηit) ∈ [0, 1]. Our empirical specification of the key parameters is as follows:
φit = h(x
′
itβφ + 
φ
i ), and ηit = h(x
′
itβη + 
η
i ), (15)
where h = Φ ∈ [0, 1] is the cumulative standard normal distribution function.12
The explanatory variables xit capture observable determinants of φ and η, while
the i are bivariate random variables capturing the firm-specific unobserved het-
erogeneity. For all firms i = 1, ..., N , the firm-specific random effects are dis-
10The empirical analog to the log-likelihood can be expressed as
lnL (θ) =
k∑
i=1
ln
1
S
S∑
si=1
(
f(yi1|sii ; θ, xi)
ni∏
t=2
f(yit|yit−1, sii ; θ, xi)
)
,
where S is the number of random draws per firm and sii is the realization in draw si for firm i.
11The results reported in the paper are based on the stationary density. Results based on
the conditional density are similar and omitted for saving space.
12Alternatively, we have used the inverse logit transformation for h. The results are very
similar and omitted.
78
tributed  φi
ηi
 ∼ N
0,
 σ2φ σφη
σφη σ
2
η
 . (16)
Across firms, the (φi , 
η
i ) are assumed independent for all i. This setup is suffi-
ciently flexible to capture cross-sectional variation in the parameter values while
imposing the model-implied structural restrictions on the domains of the param-
eters.
3.3 Data
Estimating the model derived in Section 2 requires merging data from various
sources. We collect financial statements from Compustat, managerial compen-
sation data from ExecuComp, stock price data from CRSP, analysts forecasts
from I/B/E/S, governance data from IRRC (governance, directors and block-
holders), and institutional ownership data from Thomson Financial. Following
the literature, we remove all regulated (SIC 4900−4999) and financial firms (SIC
6000 − 6999). Observations with missing SIC code, total assets, market value,
sales, long term debt, debt in current liabilities are also excluded from the final
sample. In addition, we restrict our sample to firms that have total assets over
10 millions. As a result of these selection criteria, we obtain a panel dataset with
13, 159 observations for 809 firms, for the time period between 1992 and 2004 at
the quarterly frequency.
The main parameters describing the firm characteristics are (m,µ, σ). The
Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) provides analysts forecasts for
the long-term growth rate mi. We proxy the firm-specific growth rate of cash
flows mi by the mean long-term growth rate per industry, where we use SIC level
2 to define industries. For robustness, we also use the firm-specific five-year least
squares annual growth rate of operating income before depreciation provided by
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Compustat. The results are unchanged to the specification of m.
The firm’s cash flow volatility can be written as σit = σ
E
it
∂Et
∂Xt
Xt
Et
, where σEit
is the volatility of the firm’s stock price and ∂Et
∂Xt
is computed using equation
(11). Stock returns are obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) database. For each firm, equity volatility is computed as the standard
deviation of monthly equity returns over the past five years. We use the Capital
Asset Pricing Model to obtain an estimate of µit. We obtain estimates of market
betas from CRSP monthly equity returns. The firm- and time-specific estimates
are based on 60 months rolling-window regressions. To capture any measure-
ment error we specify a linear relation between the true parameter value and its
empirical proxy, instead of equalizing them. We have the following specification:
σit = ασ + βσσ̂it, mit = αm + βmm̂it, and µit = mit − β̂itκ̂t, (17)
where κ̂t is the risk premium.
ExecuComp provides data on managerial compensation schemes, allowing us
to measure the extent to which managerial incentives are aligned with share-
holders’ interests (as reflected by the parameter ϕ in our model). We construct
firm-specific measures for the five highest paid executives. Following Core and
Guay (1999), we construct the managerial delta – the sensitivity of option value
to a one percent change in the stock price – and the managerial vega – the sen-
sitivity of the option value to a one percent change in stock price volatility. In
addition, following Jensen and Murphy (1990), we construct a managerial in-
centives measure, defined as the change in managerial wealth per dollar change
in the wealth of shareholders. Our incentives measure thus accounts for both a
direct component, managerial share ownership, and an indirect component, the
pay-performance sensitivity due to options awards. A detailed description of the
managerial incentives measure is provided in Appendix A 6.5.
The remaining parameters are standard. The risk free rate is based on the
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yield curve on Treasury bonds. The risk premium is set to the consensus value of
6%. The relevant tax rates are based on estimates of Graham (1996). We use the
mean over the sample period for the tax rate on dividends and interest income, τd
and τi, respectively. The tax rate on corporate income, τc, is set to 35%. Gilson
and Lang (1990) find that renegotiation costs are economically insignificant. We
thus fix renegotiation costs, κ, to zero and check for robustness by varying κ
across specifications. Following Berger, Ofek, and Swary (1996), we define firm-
and time-specific liquidation costs, αit, as:
αit = 1− (Tangibilityit + Cashit)/Total Assetsit. (18)
In equation (18), Berger, Ofek, and Swary (1996) estimate tangibility as:
Tangibilityit = 0.715 ∗Receivablesit + 0.547 ∗ Inventoryit + 0.535 ∗ Capitalit.
The model is written in terms of debt issuance cost as a fraction of total debt
outstanding (λ). Several empirical studies provide estimates for issuance costs
as a function of the amount of debt issued. It is easy to show that in the model
the cost of debt issuance as a fraction of the issue size is given by ρ
ρ−1λ, where ρ
is the restructuring threshold multiplier. Since our estimates yield a mean value
of 2 for ρ, we set the cost of debt issuance parameter to 0.5%. This number is
consistent with the debt issuance cost estimates of 1.09% found by Altinkhic and
Hansen (2000) and 1.29% found by Kim, Palia, and Saunders (2007). We also
check for robustness by varying λ across specifications.
Tables 3 and 4 provide detailed definitions and descriptive statistics of the
variables of interest.
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4 Estimation Results
4.1 Dynamic Capital Structure without Agency Conflicts
Figure 4 plots the distribution of leverage across Compustat firms in our sample.
Depending on the leverage measure, the peak of the distribution is between 0%
and 20% and the distribution is highly skewed to the right. This illustrates that
firms typically choose very low leverage ratios, but occasionally exhibit very high
leverage ratios.
The classical dynamic trade-off theory proposed by Fischer, Heinkel, and
Zechner (1989) and Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001) is a competing explana-
tion to the agency theory for the conservative leverage observed in the data. In
particular, as illustrated by Figure 3, an increase in refinancing costs has similar
effects as an increase in agency costs on the times series distribution of financial
leverage (it widens the support of the distribution and reduces its mean). Since
the models mentioned above are nested in ours if we set φit = 0 and ηit = 0, we
can readily estimate the level of refinancing costs necessary to explain observed
leverage choices using the procedure described in section 3. Figure 5 shows the
histogram of the predicted cost of debt issuance, Ê(λit|yit, xit; θ), in the dynamic
capital structure model without agency conflicts. We obtain the predicted values
from a separate structural estimation in which φit = 0, ηit = 0 and λit is allowed
to vary across firms as follows:
λit = h(x
′
itβλ + 
λ
i ),
where λi is a firm-specific unobserved determinant of λit.
The histogram in Figure 5 plots the cost of debt issuance for each firm-quarter
as a fraction of the total debt outstanding. The estimates reveal that the cost
of debt issuance would have to be in the order of 15% to 60% of the issue size,
with typical value at around 25%. These numbers are unreasonably high and
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inconsistent with empirically observed values. Thus, while the dynamic capital
structure theories that ignore agency conflicts can reproduce qualitatively the
financing patterns observed in the data (see Strebulaev (2007)), they do not
provide a reasonable quantitative explanation for firms’ financing policies. In
that respect, our results are in line with the recent study by LRZ (2008), who
find that the traditional determinants of capital structure explain little of the
observed variation in leverage ratios. The next section investigates whether the
dynamic trade-off theory augmented by agency costs performs better than the
standard explanations exclusively based on financing frictions.
4.2 The Estimated Cost of Control Challenge and Bar-
gaining Power
We now turn to the estimation of the model with agency conflicts. Table 5 pro-
vides estimates of the structural parameters underlying the empirical specification
described in section 3.2. The parameters representing the degree of managerial
entrenchment and the bargaining power of shareholders in default are well iden-
tified in the data. The variance estimates for the random effects are economically
and statistically significant. This suggests sizeable variation in the degree of man-
agerial entrenchment and in the bargaining power of shareholders across firms.
(We show in section 4.4 below that our measure of the degree of managerial en-
trenchment constructed from these parameter estimates is structurally related to
a number of corporate governance mechanisms.) Moreover, the cross-sectional
covariation between the degree of managerial entrenchment and shareholders’
bargaining power is negative, suggesting that shareholders can extract a greater
surplus from bondholders in default when managers and shareholders’ interests
are more aligned.13 The auxiliary parameters capture the volatility and growth
13In unreported tests, we find that the bargaining power of shareholders decreases with R&D
or the firm’s market-to-book ratio and increases with asset size. These results are consistent
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rate of cash flows. Our empirical proxy of cash flow volatility, σ̂it, performs well.
The parameter βσ is close to one and statistically significant while ασ is economi-
cally and statistically insignificant. The growth rate of cash flows is more difficult
to estimate. This is reflected in the estimate of βm close to zero.
Using the structural parameter estimates, we can construct firm-specific mea-
sures of the degree of managerial entrenchment and of shareholders’ bargaining
power in default. In Appendix A 6.4, we show that the conditional expectations
of the cost of control challenges φit and shareholders’ bargaining power ηit, given
the data (yit, xit), satisfy:
E[φit|yit, xit; θ] =
∫
ηi
∫
φi
h(x′itβφ + 
φ
i )f(yit|φi , ηi , xit; θ)f(φi , ηi |xit; θ)dφi dηi∫
ηi
∫
φi
f(yit|φi , ηi , xit; θ)f(φi , ηi |xit; θ)dφi dηi
(19)
and
E[ηit|yit, xit; θ] =
∫
ηi
∫
φi
h(x′itβη + 
η
i )f(yit|φi , ηi , xit; θ)f(φi , ηi |xit; θ)dφi dηi∫
ηi
∫
φi
f(yit|φi , ηi , xit; θ)f(φi , ηi |xit; θ)dφi dηi
. (20)
In these equations, f(yit|φi , ηi , xit; θ) is the distribution of leverage implied by the
model and given in Appendix A 6.3, f(φi , 
η
i |xit; θ) is a bivariate normal density,
and θ are the estimated parameters. Equations (19) and (20) provide estimates of
the cost of control challenges and of shareholders’ bargaining power for each firm
in our sample. We evaluate these expectations using Monte Carlo integration.
We present in Figure 6 histograms of the predicted cost of control challenges,
E[φit|yit, xit; θ], and the predicted bargaining power of shareholders in default,
E[ηit|yit, xit; θ] for each firm-quarter. The results reported in Figure 6 imply
sizeable variation in the degree of managerial entrenchment across firms. Hence,
while our dynamic capital structure model suggests that leverage ratios should
with those of prior studies by Betker (1995) or Franks and Torous (1989). In Table 8 below,
we show that these right hand side variables have the opposite effects on the manager’s private
benefits of control .
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revert to the (manager’s) target leverage over time, the differences in the degree
of managerial entrenchment observed in Figure 6 should lead to persistent cross-
sectional differences in leverage ratios.
Table 7 provides summary statistics for the predicted values of φit and ηit.
In the basic specification, the mean (median) cost of control challenges is 5%
(2.6%). Its distribution is strongly positively skewed and exhibits sizeable vari-
ance and kurtosis. The coefficient of variation is around one. The mean (median)
predicted bargaining power of shareholders is 55% (55%). Given the magnitude
of bankruptcy and renegotiation costs, this implies that shareholders can capture
25% of firm value by renegotiating outstanding claims in default. Importantly,
the distribution of shareholders’ bargaining power is bimodal, negatively skewed,
and exhibits less variation and lower kurtosis than that of φit.
Overall the results suggest that small conflicts of interests between managers
and shareholders are sufficient to resolve the leverage puzzles identified in the
empirical literature and to explain the time series of observed leverage ratios. This
in turn suggests that the trade-off theory augmented with agency costs performs
orders of magnitude better than the standard explanations based exclusively on
financing frictions.
4.3 Robustness Checks
In Table 5 we perform a set of robustness checks. First, we use the alternative
definition of leverage and re-estimate the model. Second, we vary the cost of debt
issuance and set it to 1%. This produces a cost of debt issuance representing 2%
of the issue size, corresponding to the upper range of the values found in the em-
pirical literature. Third, we set managerial incentives, ϕ, equal to management’s
equity ownership, neglecting option compensation. Fourth, we set the renegotia-
tion cost of debt to 15% (Andrade and Kaplan (1997) estimate financial distress
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cost to be 10% to 20% of firm value).
The estimates reported in Table 5 exhibit similar features as in the base
case. The parameters for the cost of control challenges are economically and
statistically significant, and the cross-sectional variation in the bargaining power
of shareholders is about three times the variation in the cost of control challenges.
The correlation between the two parameters is negative except in the case of
κ = 15%. We do not have a clear explanation for this difference. Finally, cash
flow volatility is well captured. The likelihood function is the highest in the base
case, corroborating our choice of parameters.
Table 7 reports the predicted cost of control challenges, E[φit|yit, xit; θ], and
the predicted bargaining power of shareholders, E[ηit|yit, xit; θ] under the alterna-
tive specifications. The estimates of the degree of managerial entrenchment are
larger under the alternative definition of leverage (which produces lower leverage
ratios) and under the alternative ownership definition. The estimates are lower
under larger restructuring and renegotiation costs since an increase in these costs
lowers the predicted leverage ratios. The estimates of shareholders’ bargaining
power are larger under the alternative definition of ownership and renegotiation
costs and lower under the alternative definition of leverage and restructuring
costs. Overall, the variation across specifications is small and the order of mag-
nitude remains unchanged, suggesting that our measures are robustly estimated.
In Appendix B, we report some additional empirical tests based on simulated
data from the model that provide further support for our dynamic capital struc-
ture model with agency conflicts. Specifically, we simulate a number of dynamic
economies and replicate the empirical analysis conducted by cross sectional cap-
ital structure studies. We show that the results of regressions on simulated data
are consistent with those reported in the empirical literature.
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4.4 The Determinants of entrenchment and financing de-
cisions
Many studies have identified a number of factors that purport to explain variation
in corporate capital structures. However, as shown by LRZ (2008), little of
the (cross-sectional and time-series) variation in observed capital structures is
captured by traditional determinants of financing decisions (such as size, market-
to-book, profitability, ...). Instead, LRZ find that the majority of the variation in
leverage ratios is driven by an unobserved firm-specific effect. This paper argues
that one potential explanation for these findings is that managers have discretion
over financing decisions, so that leverage ratios should determined not only by
real market frictions but also by the degree of managerial entrenchment. In this
section, we provide a test of this hypothesis by examining which factors affect the
firm-specific estimates of the degree of managerial entrenchment obtained in the
structural estimation. We classify the determinants of entrenchment into three
groups: governance mechanisms, firm characteristics, and economic conditions.
The definition and construction of the dependent and explanatory variables is
summarized in Table 3. Table 4 provides the sample-wide means and standard
deviations of these variables.
To relate our estimates of entrenchment (as reflected by φit) to the firms’
governance structure, we use the data provided by the Investor Responsibility
Research Center (IRRC) on various governance mechanisms. We use the data
from IRRC to construct the Entrenchment index of Bebchuk, Cohen and Farell
(2004), Eindex. The Eindex is based on six provisions followed by IRRC that de-
scribe shareholder rights.14 One would expect firms with anti-takeover provisions
14These six provisions are staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, super-
majority requirements for mergers, supermajority requirements for charter amendments, poison
pills and golden parachutes.
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(high Eindex) to have higher costs of control challenges and less debt. IRRC
Blockholders provides data on blockholder ownership, an additional determinant
of private benefits of control. In the analysis we use both the number of indepen-
dent blockholders and their ownership share as governance indicators. As argued
by Shleifer and Vishny (1986), the existence of large independent shareholders
makes a takeover or a proxy contest easier. Thus, we expect the cost of control
challenges to be negatively correlated with both of these measures. Finally, IRRC
Directors provides data on directors’ characteristics.
We build two proxies for board governance – board independence and board
committees. Board independence represents the proportion of independent di-
rectors. Board committees is the sum of four dummy variables capturing the
existence and independence (more than 50% of committee directors are indepen-
dent) of audit, compensation, nominating, and corporate governance committees.
These two measures are motivated by the SOX Act. Institutional ownership is
another important governance mechanism. We collect data on institutional own-
ership from Thomson Financial. Our proxy for CEO power is CEO tenure, which
we obtain from Execucomp.
In addition to these corporate governance variables, we include in our regres-
sions standard control variables for other firm attributes. To control for company
profitability, we use a returns on assets (ROA) variable defined as EBITDA di-
vided by total assets at the start of the year. We measure firm size as the natural
log of sales. Two variables are included to measure the uniqueness of assets:
R&D (R&D expenses divided by total assets) and tangibility (PP&E net divided
by total assets). Table 8 reports estimation results for the second stage regres-
sion of the predicted cost of control challenges, Ê[φit|yit, xit; θ], expressed in basis
points, on various explanatory variables. Most of the control variables have signs
in line with accepted theories and, to conserve space, we confine our discussion to
those variables related to the hypothesis about the relation between managerial
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entrenchment and leverage.
External governance mechanisms, represented by institutional ownership and
outside blockholder ownership, are negatively related to the cost of control chal-
lenges in Table 8, suggesting that independent outside monitoring of manage-
ment is effective. In addition, the results suggest that institutional ownership
and board blockholders act as monitoring complements. Anti-takeover provi-
sions are another important external mechanism in governing corporate control.
We employ the Eindex for anti-takeover provisions to construct dummy regressor
“Eindex - Dictatorship”, which equals one if the Eindex is above its mean, zero
otherwise. In addition, we add the Inverse Mills Ratio to the regression speci-
fication – following Heckman’s (1979) approach to control for endogeneity. The
coefficient on Eindex - Dictatorship is positive and significant.15 This is consistent
with the notion that anti-takeover provisions lead to greater entrenchment.
Internal governance mechanisms are captured in Table 8 by different man-
agerial characteristics and characteristics of the board of directors. CEO tenure
intuitively proxies for CEO entrenchment. Across estimations, we consistently
find a positive relation of CEO tenure with entrenchment. Not surprisingly, board
independence – proxied by the number of independent directors or by the exis-
tence of independent audit, compensation, nominating, and corporate governance
committees – is negatively related to the cost of control challenges. This is con-
sistent with the intuition that a more independent board of directors is a stronger
monitor of management.
The effect on private benefits of control of managerial delta, a proxy for man-
agerial incentive alignment, is U-shaped and on average positive.16 This is consis-
15We have run the regressions also with dummy “GIM index - Dictatorship”. The coefficient
estimates are mostly insignificant and available upon request from the authors.
16If having debt in the firm’s capital structure increases shareholder wealth, one would expect
leverage ratios to increase with managerial ownership. However, to the extent that managerial
89
tent with the incentives versus entrenchment literature [see Claessens, Djankov,
Fan, and Lang (2002)]. Table 8 also reveals that, consistent with economic intu-
ition, managerial entrenchment (proportionally) increases with firm performance,
market-to-book ratio, research and development expenses, and tangibility and
(proportionally) decreases with firm size. Economic conditions also affect the
magnitude of manager-shareholder conflicts. The slope of the yield curve is pos-
itively and the credit spread is negatively related to managerial entrenchment.
Overall, two facts emerge from this analysis. First, we find that our estimates
of the degree of managerial entrenchment are structurally related to a number of
corporate governance mechanisms. Variables associated with stronger monitoring
have negative connections with our firm-specific estimates of the cost of control
challenges. Institutional ownership, anti-takeover provisions, and market-to-book
have the largest impact on managerial entrenchment and, hence, on capital struc-
ture decisions. Second, the adjusted R-square from a regression of the predicted
degree of managerial entrenchment on a number of firm specific and governance
variables is 47%, highlighting the importance of accounting for governance and
entrenchment measures in empirical tests of leverage ratios.
5 Conclusion
This paper uses structural econometrics to estimate the magnitude of conflicts
of interests between managers and shareholders and their effects on financing
ownership protects management against outside pressures (Stulz (1988)), one would expect the
cost of control challenge to increase and leverage to decrease with managerial ownership. To
test this relation, we have performed the analysis on two subsamples, low (lowest quartile) and
high (highest quartile) managerial delta. In the low managerial delta subsample, we find that
an increase in delta yields lower entrenchment [coefficient -25.51 (2.63)]. In the high managerial
delta subsample, an increase in delta yields higher entrenchment [coefficient 8.09 (10.81)]. The
results are omitted for brevity and available upon request.
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decisions. We build a dynamic contingent claims model in which financing policy
results from a trade-off between tax benefits, agency conflicts, and contracting
frictions. In our setting, managers do not act in the best interest of shareholders,
but rather pursue private benefits at the expense of shareholders. Managers have
discretion over financing and dividend policies. However, shareholders can remove
the manager at a cost. Our analysis demonstrates that entrenched managers
restructure less frequently and issue less debt than optimal for shareholders.
The paper provides new evidence on the relation between governance mech-
anisms and capital structure dynamics. Specifically, we take the model to the
data and use observed financing choices to provide firm-specific estimates of the
degree of managerial entrenchment, or, equivalently, of the cost of control chal-
lenges. We exploit not only the conditional mean of leverage (as in a regression)
but also distributional tails – in short, the conditional moments of the time-
series distribution of leverage. We find that costs of control challenges of 2-7%
on average (.8-5% at median) are sufficient to resolve the low- and zero-leverage
puzzles and explain the time series of observed leverage ratios. Our estimates of
the agency costs vary with variables that one expects to determine managerial
incentives. Governance mechanisms significantly affect the value of control and
firms’ financing decisions. This suggests that part of the heterogeneity in capital
structures documented in Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) may be driven
by the observed variation in the governance structure of firms.
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6 Appendix A: Proofs and data definitions
6.1 Scaling property
We denote the values of equity and corporate debt by E (X) and B (X) respec-
tively and assume that the net payoff to outside investors when they take control
of the levered firm is (1 − φ) max[V (X) − B(X); 0]. Assuming that the firm
has issued debt with coupon payment c, the cash flow accruing to sharehold-
ers over each interval of time of length dt under the conjectured payout policy
is: (1− τ) (1 − φ)(X − c)dt. In addition to this cash flow, shareholders receive
capital gains of E[dE] over each time interval. The required rate of return for
investing in the firm’s equity is r. Applying Itoˆ’s lemma, it is then immediate to
show that the value of equity satisfies for X > XB:
rE =
1
2
σ2X2
∂2E
∂X2
+ µX
∂E
∂X
+ (1− τ) (1− φ) (X − c) .
The solution of this equation is
E(X) = AXξ +BXν + Π (X)− (1− τ) (1− φ)c
r
,
where Π (X) is defined in (3) and ξ and ν are the positive and negative roots
of the equation 1
2
σ2y(y − 1) + µy − r = 0. This ordinary differential equation is
solved subject to the following two boundary conditions:
E (X)|X=XB = η (α− κ) Π (XB) , and limX→∞[E (X) /X] <∞.
The first condition equates the value of equity with the cash flow to shareholders
in default. The second condition is a standard no-bubble condition. In addition to
these two conditions, the value of equity satisfies the smooth pasting condition:
∂E/∂X|X=XB = η (α− κ) ΠX (XB) at the endogenous default threshold (see
Leland (1994)). Solving this optimization problem yields the value of equity in
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the presence of manager-shareholder conflicts as
E(X, c) = Π (X)− (1− τ) (1− φ)c
r
−{
[1− η (α− κ)] Π (XB)− (1− τ)(1− φ)c
r
}(
X
XB
)ν
In these equations, the tax rate τ = 1− (1− τ c) (1− τ d) reflects both corporate
and personal taxes and the default threshold XB satisfies
XB =
ν
ν − 1
r − µ
r
c
1− η (α− κ) .
Taking the trigger strategy XB as given, the value of corporate debt satisfies in
the region for the cash flow shock where there is no default
rB =
1
2
σ2X2
∂2B
∂X2
+ µX
∂B
∂X
+
(
1− τ i) c.
This equation is solved subject to the no-bubbles condition limX→∞B(X) =
c/r and the value-matching condition B (X)|X=XB = [1− κ− η (α− κ)] Π (XB).
Solving this valuation problem gives the value of corporate debt as
B (X, c) =
(1− τ i) c
r
−{
(1− τ i)c
r
− [1− α + (1− η) (1− φ) (α− κ)] Π (XB)
}(
X
XB
)ν
.
Using the above expressions for the values of corporate securities, it is immediate
to show that the present value M(X) of the cash flows that the manager gets
from the firm satisfies:
M (X) = [ϕ+ φ(1− ϕ)]Π(X) + (1− τ
f )c
r
−
[
(1− τ f )c
r
+ ζΠ (XB)
](
X
XB
)ν
,
where ζ = ϕκ+φ [1− ϕ− (1− φϕη) (α− κ)] measures the net cost of default for
the manager (including the reduction in managerial rents occurring at the time
of default). Plugging the expression for the default threshold in the manager’s
value functionM(X), it is immediate to show thatM (X) is concave in c. As a
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result, the selected coupon payment can be derived using the first order condition:
∂M (X0) /∂c = 0. Solving this FOC yields
c = X0
(
ν − 1
ν
)
r [1− η (α− κ)]
r − µ
[
1− ν − 1− τ
1− τ f
νζ
1− η (α− κ)
] 1
ν
.
These expressions demonstrate that in the static model the default threshold XB
is linear in c. In addition, the selected coupon rate c is linear in X. This implies
that if two firms i and j are identical except that X i0 = θX
j
0 , then the optimal
coupon rate and default threshold ci = θcj and X iB = θX
j
B, and every claim will
be larger by the same factor θ.
6.2 Off-equilibrium restructurings
Index by n the managers over the lifetime of the firm. Assume that the cost of
a control challenge in round n is proportional to the present value of cash flows
F ∗n (X) and equal to
Costn(X) = (φn − φn+1)F ∗n (X) ,
where φn, n ∈ N, are constant coefficients. For the cost to be positive, we require
0 < φn+1 < φn < 1. If the cost coefficient φn decreases by a constant fraction δ
every round, we can also write Costn(X) = φnδF
∗ (X). In general, an increase
in managerial ownership implies a better alignment of managers’ incentives with
shareholders’ interests as well as an increased cost of removing management.
To capture this intuition, we let the cost of collective action be proportional to
managerial ownership (relative to ownership by outsiders) in the following way:
φn = χ
(
ϕn
1− ϕn
)
for all n,
where χ is a positive constant and ϕ denotes management’s share ownership.
Denote by ψn(X) the fraction of cash flows diverted by management. We now
guess and verify that the manager optimally steals a constant fraction ψn(X) =
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φn of cash flows. Under this conjecture, shareholders in round n realize
En(X) = V
∗
n (X)−Bn (X)− φnF ∗n (X) . (21)
Managerial rents in round n are given by
Rn(X) = ϕnV
∗
n (X) + φn (1− ϕn)F ∗n (X) = ϕn [V ∗n (X) + χF ∗n (X)] .
Since the weights on V ∗ and F ∗ are the same for all n, the leverage and the
restructuring policies (cn, γn, ρn) chosen by every manager will be identical and
independent of n. We then have V ∗n (X) = V
∗
n+1 (X), Bn (X) = Bn+1 (X), and
F ∗n (X) = F
∗
n+1 (X) for all n and X.
Upon a control challenge in round n, shareholders realize in round n+ 1
V ∗n+1 (X)−Bn+1 (X)−ψn+1(X)F ∗n+1 (X)−Costn(X) = V ∗ (X)−B (X)−φnF ∗ (X) ,
where again management diverts a constant fraction ψn+1(X) = φn+1 of cash
flows. This expression coincides for all X with the equity valuation (21) before
a control challenge. Shareholders are therefore indifferent between keeping and
replacing the current manager for all X. The manager cannot extract more rents
because of the threat of being fired but the manager does not want to extract less
rents either. The conjectured policy of capturing a constant fraction ψn(X) = φn
for all X and n is therefore optimal.
6.3 Time-Series Distribution of Leverage
In the following we derive the time-series distribution of the leverage ratio yt.
The leverage ratio yt being a monotonic function of the interest coverage ratio
xt ≡ Xt/ct, we can write yt = L (xt) with L : R+ → R+ and L′ < 0. The process
for xt follows a Brownian Motion with drift µ and volatility σ, that is regulated
at both the lower boundary xB and the upper boundary xU . The process xt is
reset to the target level xS ∈ (xB, xU) whenever it reaches either xB or xU . The
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target leverage ratio can be expressed as L (xS). Denote the restructuring date
by τ = min (τB, τU), where for i = B,U the random variable τi is defined by
τi = inf {t ≥ 0 : xt = xi}. Let fx (x) be the density of the interest coverage ratio.
The density of leverage can be written in terms of fx and the Jacobian of L
−1 as
follows:
fy (y) = fx
(
L−1 (y)
) ∣∣∣∣ ∂∂yL−1 (y)
∣∣∣∣ = fx (L−1 (y))
∣∣∣∣∣
(
∂y
∂L−1 (y)
)−1∣∣∣∣∣ . (22)
To compute the time-series distribution of leverage, we need the functional form
of the density of the interest coverage ratio fx. The latter can be determined as
follows.
Stationary density
To determine fx we first need to derive the distribution of occupation times of
the process xt in closed intervals of the form [xB, x], for any x ∈ [xB, xU ]. For
every Borel set B ∈ B(R), we define the occupation time of B by the Brownian
Z path up to time t as
Γt ([xB, x]) ,
∫ t
0
1B (Zs) ds = meas {0 ≤ s ≤ t : Zs ∈ B}
where meas denotes Lebesgue measure. We will be interested in the occupation
time of the closed interval [xB, xU ] by the interest coverage ratio x given by
Γt ([xB, x]). Let G (x, x0), with initial value x0 equal to the target value xS for
the interval [xB, x], be defined by:
G (x, x0) = EQx0 [Γτ ([xB, x])].
Using the strong Markov property of Brownian motion, we can write
G (x, x0) = EQx0
[∫ ∞
0
1[xB ,x] (xs) ds
]
−
∑
i,j=U,B,i6=j
EQx0 [1τi<τj ] E
Q
xi
[∫ ∞
0
1[xB ,x] (xs) ds
]
.
To compute G (x, x0), we will use the following lemma (Karatzas and Shreve
(1991) pp 272).
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Lemma 12 If f : R→ R is a piecewise continuous function with∫ +∞
−∞
|f (x+ y)| e−|y|
√
2γdy <∞;∀x ∈ R,
for some constant γ > 0, and (Zt, t ≥ 0) is a standard Brownian motion, then
the resolvent operator of Brownian motion, Kγ (f) ≡ E[
∫ +∞
0
e−γtf (Zt) dt], equals
Kγ (f) =
1√
2γ
∫ +∞
−∞
f (y) e−|y|
√
2γdy.
Let b = 1
σ
(µ− σ2
2
), ϑ = −2b
σ
, and h(x, y) = ln(x/y). Using the above Lemma,
we obtain after simple but lengthy calculations the following expression for the
occupation time measure (similar calculations can be found e.g. in Morellec
(2004)):
G (x, x0) =

1
2b2
[
eϑh(x0,x) − eϑh(x0,xB)]− pB
bσ
ln
(
x
xB
)
− pU
2b2
[
eϑh(xU ,x) − eϑh(xU ,xB)] , for x ≤ x0,
1
2b2
[
1− eϑh(x0,xB)]+ 1
bσ
ln
(
x
x0
)
− pB
bσ
ln
(
x
xB
)
− pU
2b2
[
eϑh(xU ,x) − eϑh(xU ,xB)] , for x > x0,
(23)
where
pB =
xϑ0 − xϑU
xϑB − xϑU
and pU =
xϑ0 − xϑB
xϑU − xϑB
. (24)
The stationary density function of the interest coverage ratio xt is now given by
fx(x) =
∂
∂x
G (x, x0)
G (xU , x0)
. (25)
Conditional density
To implement our empirical procedure, we also need to compute the conditional
distribution of leverage at time t given its value at initial date 0 (in the data we
observe leverage ratios at quarterly frequency). To determine this conditional
density, we first compute the conditional density of the interest coverage ratio
xt = Xt/ct at time t given its value x0 at time 0, P(xt ∈ dx|x0), and then
97
apply the transformation (22). For ease of exposition, introduce the regulated
arithmetic Brownian motion Wt =
1
σ
ln (xt) with initial value w =
1
σ
ln (x0), drift
b = 1
σ
(µ − σ2
2
) and unit variance, and define the upper and lower boundaries as
H = 1
σ
ln(xU) and L =
1
σ
ln(xB), respectively. Denote the first exit time of the
interval (L,H) by
τL,H = inf{t ≥ 0 : Wt /∈ (L,H)}.
The conditional distribution Fx of the interest coverage ratio x is then related to
that of the arithmetic Brownian motion W by the following relation:
Fx(x|x0) = P(Wt ≤ 1
σ
ln(x)|W b0 = w). (26)
Given that the interest coverage ratio is reset to the level xS whenever it reaches
the boundaries, W is regulated at L and H, with reset level at S = 1
σ
ln(xS) and
we can write its dynamics as
dWt = bdt+ dZt + 1{Wt−=L} (S − L) + 1{Wt−=H} (S −H) .
We would like to compute the cumulative distribution function of the process W
at some horizon t:
G(w, y, t) ≡ P(Wt ≤ y|w) = Ew[1{Wt≤y}], (w, y, t) ∈ [L,H]2 × (0,∞) . (27)
Rather than trying to compute this probability directly, consider its Laplace
transform in time (for notational convenience we drop the dependence of L on
λ):
L(w, y) =
∫ ∞
0
e−λtG(w, y, t)dt
=
∫ ∞
0
e−λtEw[1{Wt≤y}]dt = Ew[
∫ ∞
0
e−λt1{Wt≤y}dt]. (28)
The second equality in (28) follows from the boundedness of the integrand and
Fubini’s theorem. Since the process is instantly set back at S when it reaches
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either of the barriers, we must have that
L(H, y) = L(L, y) = L(S, y) for all y. (29)
Now let W 0t = w + bt + Zt denote the unregulated process. Using the Markov
property of W and the fact that W and W 0 coincide up to the first exit time of
W 0 from the interval [L,H], we deduce that the function L satisfies
L(w, y) = Ψ(w, y) + L(S, y)Φ(w), (30)
where we have set
Ψ(w, y) = Ew[
∫ τL,H
0
e−λt1{W 0t ≤y}dt] and Φ(w) = Ew[e
−λτL,H ].
Setting w = S and solving for L(S, y) we obtain
L(S, y) =
Ψ(S, y)
1− Φ(S) . (31)
Plugging this back into the equation for L shows that the desired boundary
condition is satisfied.
We now have to solve for Φ and Ψ. The Feynman-Kac formula shows that
the function Ψ is the unique bounded and a.e. C1 solution to the second order
differential equation
1
2
∂2
(∂w)2
Ψ(w, y) + b
∂
∂w
Ψ(w, y)− λΨ(w, y) + 1{w≤y} = 0 (32)
on the interval (H,L) subject to the boundary condition Ψ(H, y) = Ψ(L, y) = 0.
Solving this equation, we find that the function Ψ is given by
Ψ(w, y) =
 Λ(w) + AL(y)∆L(w), if w ∈ [L, y],AH(y)∆H(w), if w ∈ [y,H], (33)
where we have set
Λ(w) =
1
λ
[1− e(υ+b)(L−w)], and ∆L,H(w) = e(υ−b)w[1− e2υ((L,H)−w)], (34)
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with υ = υ(λ) =
√
b2 + 2λ. Because the function 1{w≤y} is (piecewise) continuous,
the function Ψ(w, y) is piecewise C2 (see Theorem 4.9 pp. 271 in Karatzas and
Shreve, 1991). Therefore, Ψ(w, y) is C0 and C1 and satisfies the continuity and
smoothness conditions at the point w = y. This gives
Λ(y) + AL∆L(y) = AH∆H(y), and Λ
′(y) + AL∆′L(y) = AH∆
′
H(y).
Solving this system of two linear equations, we obtain the desired constants as
AL = AL(y, λ) =
Λ(y)∆′H(y)− Λ′(y)∆H(y)
∆H(y)∆′L(y)−∆L(y)∆′H(y)
, (35)
AH = AH(y, λ) =
Λ(y)∆′L(y)− Λ′(y)∆L(y)
∆H(y)∆′L(y)−∆L(y)∆′H(y)
. (36)
Let us now turn to the computation of Φ. The Feynman-Kac formula shows
that the function Φ is the unique bounded and a.e. C1 solution to the second
order differential equation
1
2
Φ′′(w) + bΦ′(w)− λΦ(w) = 0 (37)
on the interval (H,L) subject to the boundary condition Φ(H) = Φ(L) = 1.
Solving this equation, we find that the function Φ is given by
Φ(w) = BL∆L(w) +BH∆H(w), (38)
where
BL = BL(λ) = − e
(υ+b)H
e2υL − e2υH , and BH = BH(λ) =
e(υ+b)L
e2υL − e2υH . (39)
The conditional density function g(w, y, t) = ∂
∂y
G(w, y, t) can be obtained by
differentiating the Laplace transform (28) with respect to y. We obtain
∂
∂y
L(w, y) =
∫ ∞
0
e−λtg(w, y, t)dt
=
∂
∂y
Ψ(w, y) +
Φ(w)
1− Φ(S)
∂
∂y
Ψ(S, y), (40)
100
where
∂
∂y
Ψ(w, y) =
 A′L(y)∆L(w), if w ∈ [L, y],A′H(y)∆H(w), if w ∈ [y,H],
and
A′L(y) =
(
AH(y)∆
′′
H(y)− AL(y)∆′′L(y)− Λ′′(y)
∆H(y)∆′L(y)−∆L(y)∆′H(y)
)
∆H(y), (41)
A′H(y) =
(
AH(y)∆
′′
H(y)− AL(y)∆′′L(y)− Λ′′(y)
∆H(y)∆′L(y)−∆L(y)∆′H(y)
)
∆L(y). (42)
The last step involves the inversion of the Laplace transform (40) for g(w, y, t)
using standard numerical methods.
Jacobian of L−1
Quasi-market leverage is defined by
yt ≡ D (X0)
D (X0) + E (Xt)
,
where the book value of debt equals D (X0) and the market value of equity at
time t for Xt = X is given by equation (11).We now have
∂yt
∂L−1 (yt)
= −D (X0) [D (X0) + E (X)]−2∂E (X)
∂X
,
with
∂E (X)
∂X
=
∂e (X)
∂X
+
[
XU
X0
V (X0)−D (X0)
]
∂pU (X)
∂X
+
XB
X0
η (α− κ)V (X0) ∂pU (X)
∂X
.
6.4 Conditional Predictions of the Structural Parameters
Leverage is denoted yit, the explanatory variables are xit and the parameter
vector is θ; subscript i refers to a firm and t to a date. Conditional expectations
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of shareholders’ bargaining power given the data (yit, xit) satisfy:
E[ηit|yit, xit; θ] = E[h(x′itβη + ηi )|yit, xit; θ] (43)
=
∫
ηi
∫
φi
h(x′itβη + 
η
i )f(
φ
i , 
η
i |yit, xit; θ)dφi dηi
=
∫
ηi
∫
φi
h(x′itβη + 
η
i )
f(φi , 
η
i , yit|xit; θ)
f(yit|xit; θ) d
φ
i d
η
i
=
∫
ηi
∫
φi
h(x′itβη + 
η
i )f(yit|φi , ηi , xit; θ)f(φi , ηi |xit; θ)dφi dηi∫
ηi
∫
φi
f(yit|φi , ηi , xit; θ)f(φi , ηi |xit; θ)dφi dηi
,
where f(yit|φi , ηi , xit; θ) is given by (22) and f(φi , ηi |xit; θ) is a bivariate normal
distribution. The conditional expectation of the manager’s private benefits of
control satisfies a similar expression with η replaced by φ. Given parameter
estimates for θ obtained in a first stage SML estimation, the expression in (43)
can be evaluated using Monte-Carlo integration.
One can show that these conditional expectations are unbiased. Let zit be
omitted explanatory variables. Then
E[git|yit, xit, zit; θ] = E[git|yit, xit; θ] + eit,
where g ∈ {φ, η} with the following moment condition on the error eit:
E(eit|yit, xit; θ) = E(E(git|yit, xit, zit; θ)− E(git|yit, xit; θ)|yit, xit; θ)
= E(E(git|yit, xit, zit; θ)|yit, xit; θ)− E(E(git|yit, xit; θ)|yit, xit; θ)
= 0.
6.5 Data Definitions
Managerial pay-performance sensitivity delta and vega
We compute both the delta – the sensitivity of the option value to a change in
the stock price – and the vega – the sensitivity of the option value to a change in
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stock price volatility – based on the Black-Scholes (1973) formula for European
call options, as modified to account for dividend payouts by Merton (1973):
Call = Se−dTN(Z)−Xe−rTN(Z − σT 1/2),
where Z = [ln (S/X) + (r − d+ σ2/2)T ] / (σT 1/2), S is the price of the under-
lying stock, X the exercise price of the option, T the time-to-maturity of the
option in years, r the risk-free interest rate, d the expected dividend yield on
the underlying stock, σ expected stock return volatility, and N is the standard
normal probability distribution function.
We follow the methodology of Core and Guay (1999) to compute delta and
vega. There are four type of securities: new option grants, previous unexercisable
options, previous exercisable options and portfolio of stocks. In order to avoid
double counting of the new option grants, the number and realizable value of
previous unexercisable options is reduced by the number and realizable value
of new option grants. If the number of new option grants is greater than the
number of previous unexercisable options, then the number and realizable value
of previous exercisable options is reduced by the difference between the number
and realizable value of new option grants and previous exercisable options.
Managerial delta is computed as the sum of delta of new option grants, delta of
previous unexercisable options, delta of previous exercisable options and delta of
portfolio of stock. Managerial vega is computed as the sum of vega of new option
grants, vega of previous unexercisable options and vega of previous exercisable
options where we define:
1. New option grants: S, K, T , d, and σ are available from ExecuComp.
The risk-free rate r is obtained from the Federal Reserve, where we use
one-year bond yield for T = 1, two-year bond for 2 ≤ T ≤ 3, five-year bond
yield for 4 ≤ T ≤ 5, seven year bond yield for 6 ≤ T ≤ 8 and ten-year bond
yield for T ≥ 9.
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2. Previous unexercisable options: S, d, σ and r are obtained as ex-
plained above. The strike price K is estimate as: [stock price - (realizable
value/number of options)]. Time-to-maturity, T , is estimated as one year
less than time-to-maturity of new options grants or nine years if no new
grants are made.
3. Previous exercisable options: S, d, σ and r are obtained as explained
above. The strike price K is estimated as: K = [stock price - (realizable
value/number of options)]. Time-to-maturity, T , is estimated as three years
less than the time-to-maturity of unexercisable options or six years if no
new grants are made.
4. Portfolio of stocks: delta is estimated by the product of the number of
stocks owned and one percent of stock value. vega is assumed to be zero.
Managerial incentive alignment ϕ
Managerial incentives are defined as the change in managerial wealth per dol-
lar change in the wealth of shareholders. Incentives are thus composed of a
direct component, managerial ownership and an indirect component, the pay-
performance sensitivity generated by options awards. Following Jensen and Mur-
phy (1990), we define managerial incentives, ϕ, as:
ϕ = ϕE + delta
shares represented by options awards
shares outstanding
,
where ϕE represents managerial ownership and delta is computed as above.
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7 Appendix B: Simulated Evidence
The objective of this Appendix is to analyze the cross-sectional properties of
leverage ratios in our dynamic economy with agency conflicts. We follow the sim-
ulation approach of Berk, Green and Naik (1999) and Strebulaev (2007) among
others. Specifically, we simulate a number of dynamic economies and replicate
the empirical analysis conducted by cross sectional capital structure studies. One
important innovation in this section is that we base our simulation on the pa-
rameter estimates of section 4 instead of using “calibrated” parameter values as
in previous studies.17
The simulation procedure is defined as follows. The initial input parameter
values are based on the structural estimation of section 4. The cost of control
challenges, φ, and bargaining power of shareholders, η, are determined by a single
draw of the unobserved heterogeneity random effect. At date zero all firms are
at their target leverage. We then simulate 75 years of quarterly data. The
first 40 years of data are dropped in order to minimize the impact of initial
conditions. The resulting dataset represents a single simulated economy. We
run the tests analyzing the cross-sectional properties of leverage ratios on this
simulated economy. Finally, we simulate 1000 economies, each characterized by
a different draw of the unobserved heterogeneity random effect. The results that
we report are means over those 1000 economies. We now turn to the comparison
of the results of regressions on simulated data to the results of empirical cross-
sectional research.
17In fact Strebulaev (2007, pp1763) notes “An important caveat is that for most parameters
of interest, there is little evidence permitting precise estimation of sampling distributions or
even their ranges [...] Overall then, the parameters used in the simulations must be regarded
as ad hoc and approximate.”
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7.1 Leverage Inertia
We start by investigating the link between capital structure and stock returns.
Welch (2004) documents that firms do not rebalance their capital structure in
order to offset the mechanistic effect of stock price movements on firms’ leverage
ratios. He shows that for short horizons the dynamics of leverage ratios are
solely determined by stock returns. While this effect attenuates with time, it still
remains the main driving force behind leverage ratio changes.
We investigate to what extend this mechanistic effect is reflected in our model.
To do so, we replicate Welch’s analysis on the simulated data. We run a Fama-
MacBeth regression of leverage on past leverage and the implied debt ratio (IDR).
The IDR indicates how much leverage should be if no corporate issuance takes
place, or how much leverage should change only due to changes in equity. More
formally, we estimate the following model:
Lt = α0 + α1Lt−k + α2IDRt−k,t + t
where L is the Leverage ratio and k denotes the time horizon in years. In this
equation, IDR is the implied debt ratio that comes about if the firm does not
issue debt or equity (and let leverage ratios change with stock price movements).
If α1 is equal to 1, firms perfectly offset stock price movements by issuing debt
or equity. If α2 is equal to 1, firms do not readjust their capital structure at all
following stock price movements.
Table 9 reports our results. We observe that the estimates based on the
simulated data from our model closely match Welch’s estimates based on real
data. For 1 year time horizon, the ADR coefficient is close to 1. For longer time-
horizons, this coefficient is monotonically decreasing. We also observe that our
estimates are slightly higher and better replicate real data than those reported by
Strebulaev (2007). This was expected since, in our model, managerial entrench-
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ment leads to less frequent capital structure rebalancing and thus more inertia in
leverage dynamics.
7.2 Mean Reversion in Leverage
Mean-reversion is another well documented pattern of leverage ratios [see Fama
and French (2002) and Flannery and Rangan (2006)]. Following Fama and French
(2002), we perform a Fama-MacBeth estimation of the partial-adjustment model:
Lt − Lt−1 = α + λ1TLt−1 + λ2Lt−1 + t
where L is Leverage and TL is firm’s Target Leverage. If λ1 is equal to 1, firms
perfectly readjust leverage to the target. If λ2 is equal to -1, firms are completely
inactive. The partial-adjustment model predicts that λ1 and λ2 are equal in
absolute value and measures the speed of adjustment by λ1. In this specification,
TL is determined in a preliminary step by estimating the following equation
Lm = a0 + a1pi
m + a2σ + a3α + a4η + a5ϕ+ a6φ+  (44)
where L is the leverage ratio, pi is profitability and remaining independent vari-
ables are firms specific characteristics. In our setup, profitability is defined as:
pit = [Xt + ∆At] /At−1, where X is cash flows from operation and A is the book
value of assets. Following Strebulaev (2007), we assume that the book value
of assets and cash flows from operation have the same drift under the physical
measure. Table 10 reports our results.
As shown in Table 10, leverage is mean-reverting at the speed of 6% per year,
which is close to the mean-reversion coefficient of 7% reported by Fama-French
(2002) for dividend payers. As in Fama and French, the average slopes on lagged
leverage are similar in absolute value to those on target leverage and are therefore
consistent with the partial adjustment model.
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Table 2: Comparative statics for the dynamic model.
Table 2 reports the main comparative statics of the dynamic model regarding
the firm’s financing and default policies, the recovery rate in default, corporate
spreads and the tax benefit of debt (TAD). The TAD is defined as the percentage
increase in firm value due to the tax savings associated with debt financing. Input
parameter values are set as in the base case environment.
Quasi-Market Leverage at Target
Restructuring Target Default Spread Recovery TAD
Benchmark 12.85 27.80 87.53 125.23 42.22 8.77
λ = 0.0025 14.96 27.20 87.42 130.55 42.39 9.40
λ = 0.0075 11.33 27.95 87.63 120.45 42.04 8.23
φ = 0.005 20.54 37.11 86.23 208.19 46.06 11.69
φ = 0.015 2.74 10.13 89.41 35.11 37.51 1.74
ϕ = 0.05 4.18 13.33 89.08 47.89 38.24 3.35
ϕ = 0.10 18.16 34.49 86.65 180.32 44.78 10.92
η = 0.25 15.06 32.45 94.09 129.45 42.30 10.49
η = 0.75 10.65 23.16 80.17 120.41 41.94 7.07
α = 0.45 13.34 28.83 89.05 126.22 42.25 9.16
α = 0.55 12.36 26.77 85.97 124.22 42.17 8.39
κ = 0.00 15.02 31.81 85.39 151.33 46.44 10.53
κ = 0.10 11.41 25.01 89.36 109.13 38.72 7.62
τc = 0.30 1.02 5.75 89.15 19.74 39.16 0.13
τc = 0.40 20.73 36.21 86.69 207.66 42.13 17.43
µ = 0.005 12.73 27.55 87.80 134.14 41.58 7.64
µ = 0.015 12.99 28.07 87.24 117.30 42.71 10.37
σ = 0.20 16.12 32.03 86.19 80.85 47.26 9.22
σ = 0.30 10.61 24.66 88.58 179.14 38.24 8.62
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Table 3: Data Definitions.
Table 3 presents definitions and source of data used.
Variable (Data Source) Variable Definition
Financial Indicators (Compustat):
Book debt Liabilities total (item 181) + Preferred stock (item 10)
- Deferred taxes (item 35)
Book debt II Long term debt (item 9) + Debt in current liabilities (item 34)
Book equity Assets total (item 6) - Book debt
Book equity II Assets total (item 9) - Book debt II
Leverage Book Debt/(Assets total (item 6) - Book equity
+ Market value (item 25 * item 6))
Leverage II Book Debt II/(Assets total (item 6) - Book equity II
+ Market value (item 25 * item 6))
Return on assets (EBIT (item 18) + Depreciation (item 14))/Assetstotal (item 6)
Market-to-Book (Market value (item 25 * item 6) + Book debt)/Assetstotal (item 6)
Tangibility Property, plant and equipment total net (item 8)/Assetstotal (item 6)
Size log(Sales net (item 12))
R&D Research and development expenses (item 46)/Assets total (item6)
Earnings Growth (I/B/E/S):
EBIT growth rate Mean analysts forecast for long-term growth rate per SIC-2 industry
Volatility and Beta (CRSP):
Equity volatility Standard deviation of monthly equity returns over the past 5 years
Market model beta Market model regression beta on monthly equity returns over past 5 years
Executive Compensation (ExecuComp):
Managerial incentives see Appendix A 6.5
Managerial ownership Shares owned/Shares outstanding for the 5highest paid executives
Managerial delta see Appendix A 6.5
Managerial vega see Appendix A 6.5
CEO tenure Current year - year became CEO
EBIT growth rate II 5-year least squares annual growth rate of
operating income before depreciation
Blockholders (IRRC blockholders):
Blockholder ownership Fraction of stock owned by outside blockholders
Directors (IRRC directors):
Board independence Number of independent directors/Total number of directors
Board committees Sum of 4 dummy variables for existence of independent (more that 50% of
committee directors are Independent) audit, compensation, nominating
and corporate governance committee
Anti-Takeover Provisions (IRRC governance):
GIM index 24 anti-takeover provisions index by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003)
Eindex 6 anti-takeover provisions index by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Farell (2004)
Institutional Ownership (Thompson Financial):
Institutional ownership Fraction of stock owned by institutional investors
Economy indicators (FED):
Yield curve slope Difference between 10 year and 1 year Government bond yield
Credit risk spread Difference between corporate yield spread (all industries)
of Moody’s BAA and AAA rating
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics.
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the estima-
tion. The sample is based on Compustat quarterly Industrial files, ExecuComp,
CRSP, I/B/E/S, IRRC governance, IRRC blockholders, IRRC directors, and
Thompson Financial. Table 3 provides a detailed definition of the variables.
Mean S.D. 25% 50% 75% Obs
Leverage (y) 0.32 0.20 0.16 0.29 0.46 13,159
Leverage II (y) 0.20 0.19 0.04 0.16 0.31 13,159
EBIT Growth Rate (m̂) 0.20 0.06 0.15 0.19 0.23 13,159
EBIT Volatility (σ̂) 0.29 0.13 0.19 0.26 0.35 13,159
CAPM Beta (β̂) 1.06 0.51 0.70 1.01 1.34 13,159
Liquidation Costs (α̂) 0.51 0.12 0.45 0.50 0.58 13,159
Financial Characteristics:
Return on Assets 4.47 2.41 2.93 4.19 5.69 13,159
Market-to-Book 2.05 1.27 1.23 1.64 2.39 13,159
Tangibility 0.34 0.22 0.16 0.28 0.47 13,159
Firm Size 5.58 1.20 4.74 5.50 6.35 13,159
R&D 0.22 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 13,159
Ownership Structure:
Institutional Ownership 0.60 0.17 0.49 0.62 0.73 11,727
Blockholder Ownership 0.09 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.16 13,159
Managerial Characteristics:
Managerial Incentives (ϕ) 0.07 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.08 13,159
Managerial Ownership (ϕE) 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.05 13,159
Managerial Delta 7.13 13.00 1.11 2.88 7.20 10,895
Managerial Vega 1.83 2.88 0.35 0.86 2.06 11,003
CEO Tenure 8.67 8.78 2.42 5.92 11.90 13,159
Anti-Takeover Provisions:
GIM index 9.31 2.77 7.00 9.00 11.00 10,853
Eindex 2.35 1.35 1.00 2.00 3.00 10,828
Board Structure:
Board Independence 0.61 0.18 0.50 0.63 0.75 8,665
Board Committees 2.49 1.10 2.00 2.00 3.00 6,504
Economy indicators:
Yield Curve Slope 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 13,159
Credit Risk Spread 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 13,159
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Table 5: Structural Estimates: Model Parameters.
The structural parameters characterizing the cost of collective action, φ, the
bargaining power of shareholders, η, the drift and volatility of cash flows, m and
σ respectively, are defined as:
φit = h(αφ + 
φ
i ),
ηit = h(αη + 
η
i ),
σit = ασ + βσσ̂it,
mit = αm + βmm̂it,
where h = Φ ∈ [0, 1] is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, 
is a bivariate normal random variable capturing firm-specific unobserved hetero-
geneity, (
φi
ηi
)
∼ N (0,
[
σ2φ σφη
σφη σ
2
η
]
).
Across firms i, (φi , 
η
i ) are assumed independent. m̂it and σ̂it are estimates of the
growth rate and volatility of cash flows, respectively. Values of t-statistics are
reported in parenthesis.
Coef. t-Stat
Structural Parameters:
αφ -2.65 (-148.48)
αη -0.08 (-0.41)
σφ 1.26 (44.41)
ση 2.86 (3.82)
σφη -1.24 (-4.71)
Auxiliary Parameters:
ασ 0.01 (0.19)
βσ 0.72 (6.59)
αm 0.34 (1.06)
βm 0.00 (0.00)
Log-likelihood 8,938
Observations 13,159
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Table 6: Robustness: Alternative Leverage Measure & Renegotia-
tion Costs.
This table reports parameter estimates for the model in Table 5 under alternative
specifications. Values of t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.
y = leverage II λ = 0.01 ϕ = ϕE κ = 0.15
Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat
Structural Parameters:
αφ -2.61 (-240.40) -2.35 (-141.22) -3.33 (-256.15) -3.09 (-64.20)
αη -0.02 (-0.09) -0.02 (-0.04) -0.08 (-0.23) -0.09 (-0.11)
σφ 1.24 (34.53) 0.95 (33.69) 1.81 (56.56) 1.10 (13.81)
ση 2.75 (2.54) 2.83 (2.63) 2.90 (3.18) 3.95 (1.12)
σφη -0.85 (-2.43) -1.47 (-2.15) -0.58 (-0.81) 1.11 (0.68)
Auxiliary Parameters:
ασ 0.00 (0.12) 0.00 (0.04) 0.00 (0.04) 0.01 (0.15)
βσ 0.95 (9.75) 0.72 (3.86) 0.81 (5.04) 0.64 (5.92)
αm 0.69 (0.62) 0.39 (0.94) 0.38 (0.82) 0.37 (1.01)
βm 0.10 (0.02) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Log-likelihood -60,809 8,756 8,011 8,802
Observations 13,159 13,159 13,159 13,159
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Table 7: Model-Implied Cost of Collective Action and Bargaining
Power.
Table 7 reports distributional characteristics of the predicted cost of collec-
tive action, Ê(φit|yit, xit; θ), and the predicted bargaining power of shareholders,
Ê(ηit|yit, xit; θ).
Mean S.D. Skew Kurt. 5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
Panel A: Basic specification
φ̂ 0.050 0.054 2.037 7.568 0.008 0.014 0.026 0.070 0.164
η̂ 0.552 0.198 -0.256 2.094 0.199 0.406 0.549 0.733 0.832
Panel B: Alternative measure of leverage
φ̂ 0.069 0.066 1.970 7.338 0.010 0.021 0.053 0.088 0.221
η̂ 0.536 0.164 -0.002 2.471 0.262 0.432 0.516 0.661 0.809
Panel C: Restructuring cost = 1%
φ̂ 0.039 0.040 2.393 9.520 0.008 0.013 0.023 0.049 0.124
η̂ 0.549 0.196 -0.376 2.074 0.200 0.398 0.574 0.723 0.812
Panel D: Alternative ownership measure ϕE
φ̂ 0.061 0.068 1.741 6.067 0.008 0.014 0.025 0.098 0.196
η̂ 0.579 0.199 -0.354 2.396 0.203 0.445 0.574 0.757 0.861
Panel E: Renegotiation costs = 15%
φ̂ 0.021 0.030 2.657 10.602 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.024 0.088
η̂ 0.607 0.181 -0.528 2.614 0.299 0.473 0.635 0.751 0.857
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Table 8: The Determinants of the Cost of Collective Action.
Table 8 summarizes parameter estimates from a regression on various determi-
nants of cost of collective action. The dependent variable are the predicted values
of managerial entrenchment, Ê(φit|yit, xit; θ), expressed in basis points. Values of
t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. All regressions include industry dummies.
(1) (2) (3)
Institutional Ownership -273.33 -113.80 -62.09
(7.48) (2.96) (1.49)
Blockholder Ownership -109.30 -159.54 -144.36
(2.43) (3.52) (2.92)
Eindex - Dictatorship 563.97 621.92 537.79
(4.20) (4.24) (3.36)
Board Independence - -236.06 -
- (6.23) -
Board Committees - - -36.27
- - (6.16)
CEO Tenure 10.70 9.66 9.72
(13.42) (10.29) (9.65)
Managerial Delta 7.92 8.07 7.86
(10.45) (9.97) (9.41)
Managerial Vega -20.94 -18.95 -16.06
(8.60) (7.37) (6.16)
Return on Assets 22.33 22.21 20.51
(7.39) (6.61) (5.62)
Market-to-Book 182.53 177.45 167.64
(22.44) (19.95) (17.70)
Tangibility 49.74 142.02 172.16
(1.14) (2.76) (2.96)
Size -130.93 -138.04 -130.60
(19.17) (17.84) (15.99)
R&D 23.24 15.98 15.40
(2.24) (1.52) (1.43)
Yield Curve Slope 17.98 18.82 4.61
(2.74) (2.26) (0.50)
Credit Risk Spread 45.15 65.94 138.10
(1.54) (1.75) (3.11)
Observations 8,035 6,251 4,959
R2 0.47 0.47 0.48
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Table 9: Simulation Evidence: Leverage Inertia.
Table 9 reports parameter estimates from Fama-MacBeth regressions on leverage
in levels. The basic specification is as follows:
Lt = α0 + α1Lt−k + α2IDRt−k,t + t
where L is the Leverage ratio, IDR is the Implied Debt Ratio and k is the time
horizon. Coefficients reported in Panel A are means over 1,000 simulated datasets.
Panel B shows IDR coefficients reported by Welch (2004) and Strebulaev (2007).
The remaining rows report the 5% and 95% quantiles of IDR coefficients from
our model simulations.
Lag k in years
1 3 5 10
Panel A: Coefficient estimates in simulated data
Constant 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02
Lt−k -0.09 0.01 0.08 0.20
IDRt−k,t 1.06 0.93 0.84 0.68
R2 0.98 0.94 0.92 0.87
Observations 13,159 13,159 13,159 13,159
Panel B: IDRt−k,t coefficients in the literature
Welch 1.01 0.94 0.87 0.71
Strebulaev 1.03 0.89 0.79 0.59
5% in simulated data 1.05 0.92 0.82 0.66
95% in simulated data 1.07 0.95 0.86 0.70
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Table 10: Simulation Evidence: Leverage Mean-Reversion.
Table 10 reports parameter estimates from Fama-MacBeth regressions on leverage
changes. The basic specification is as follows:
Lt − Lt−1 = α + λ1TLt−1 + λ2Lt−1 + t
where L is the Leverage ratio and TR is the Target Leverage Ratio. TL is
determined on a previous step by running a cross-sectional regression of leverage
on determinants. Coefficients are means over 1,000 simulated datasets.
(1)
Constant 0.00
TLt−1 0.06
Lt−1 -0.06
R2 0.03
Observations 13,159
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Figure 3: Comparative Statics: Firm-Specific Leverage Distribution.
Figure 3 shows comparative statics for the time-series distribution of financial
leverage. We vary the cost of collective action φ, shareholders’ bargaining power
η, and the refinancing cost λ.
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Figure 4: Empirical Leverage Distribution.
Figure 4 plots the empirical distribution of financial leverage. The solid line
uses the standard definition of financial leverage. The dashed line corresponds
to the alternative definition of leverage. Table 3 provides a detailed definition
of the variables. The data are quarterly observations on industrial firms from
Compustat between 1992 and 2004.
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Figure 5: Firm-Specific Predictions of Refinancing Cost in a Dy-
namic Capital Structure Model Without Managerial Entrench-
ment.
Figure 5 shows a histogram of the predicted cost of debt issuance, Ê(λit|yit, xit; θ),
in the dynamic capital structure model without agency conflicts (φit = 0 and ηit =
0). The prediction is based on a structural estimate of the model’s parameters.
The histogram plots the cost of debt issuance for each firm-quarter as a fraction
of the total debt outstanding.
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Figure 6: Firm-Specific Predictions of Shareholders’ Cost of Col-
lective Action and Bargaining Power.
Figure 6 shows histograms of the predicted cost of collective ac-
tion, Ê(φit|yit, xit; θ), and the predicted shareholders’ bargaining power,
Ê(ηit|yit, xit; θ), in the dynamic capital structure model. The prediction is based
on a structural estimate of the model’s parameters. The histograms plot the
predicted parameters for each firm-quarter.
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(a) Predicted cost of collective action (left) and shareholders’ bargaining power (right).
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
(b) Predicted cost of collective action (left) and shareholders’ bargaining power (right)—
estimated from alternative measure of leverage.
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Chapter IV
Cash Holdings and Competition
(with Erwan Morellec)
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1 Introduction
In perfect capital markets, firms can fund all positive NPV expenses and there is
no role for internal capital. In the presence of market frictions, such as costs of
raising funds, investment or survival may depend on a firm’s cash holdings. That
is, when other sources of funds are costly, limited, or unavailable, firms can use
their cash holdings to fund capital expenditures or unexpected operating losses.
Consistent with this view, several studies report that firms with greater difficulties
in obtaining external capital accumulate more cash and/or save a greater fraction
of their cash flow as cash.
While there exists a rich literature that examines the relation between cash
holdings and investment, Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (OPSW, 1999)
find little evidence that excess cash has a large short run impact on capital expen-
ditures or acquisition spendings. Instead, they document that the main reason
why firms experience large changes in excess cash is the occurrence of operating
losses. In this paper, we thus look at the other side of the profitability spectrum
and explore the possibility that cash holdings may be used to fund operating
losses and avoid inefficient closure or asset sales. In addition, since a monopolist
is less likely to face financial difficulties than a firm facing cutthroat competition,
we also examine whether the market structure in which a firm operates has an
effect on its cash holdings.
A prerequisite for our analysis is a model that captures in a simple fashion
the effects of product market competition and cash holdings on firms’ closure
policies. In this paper, we construct a stylized real options model in which the
managers of the firm can abandon its business if product demand falls to a suffi-
ciently low level. The profitability of assets in place depends on the intensity of
competition, and so does the firm’s abandonment decision. The managers may
abandon voluntarily, or may be forced to do so because of financing constraints.
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We analyze the manager’s behavior absent financing constraints and then exam-
ine what happens if a firm may be forced to abandon assets because of a cash
flow shortage. Because the firm cash flows are uncertain and the decision to
foreclose is irreversible, there exists a valuable option of waiting. As a result,
managers should only abandon assets when operating costs exceed revenues by
a potentially large option premium. We show that holding cash may allow firms
to finance operating losses and prevent inefficient asset sales or closure. We also
demonstrate that the value of the option of waiting increases with both uncer-
tainty and competition so that a firm’s propensity to hold large cash balances
should be highest when it operates in more competitive and riskier industries.
To test the predictions of the model, we examine the cash holdings of Com-
pustat firms over the 1980 to 2005 period. We find that corporate cash holdings
are associated with the intensity of product market competition. Specifically, our
results show that a firm is more likely to hold cash reserves when the price-to-cost
margin of the firm is low or when the number of firms in the industry is large.
These results hold after controlling for profitability, size, and a host of other con-
trol variables. Furthermore, we find that the association between competition
and cash holdings is more important in riskier industries (as measured by cash
flow volatility) and for firms facing greater financing constraints. Because the
precautionary motive for holding cash matters more when cash flow risk is more
important, these findings suggest that it is this motive that drives our results.
It is well known that there has been a secular increase in cash holdings (see
e.g. Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2006)).1 Our analysis shows that the increase
in cash holdings over the 1980-2005 period can be explained by the increase in
idiosyncratic volatility reported by Irvine and Pontiff (2007) (this complements
Harford, 1999, who finds in a cross-sectional analysis that cash holdings are pos-
itively associated with industry cash flow volatility). Moreover, and as predicted
1See also “Unlike consumers, companies are piling up cash,” March 4 2008, New York Times.
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by our theory, we find that there is no time trend in cash holdings for firms that
do not face competitive pressure as measured by the price-to-cost margin or the
number of firms in the industry. For firms that do face competitive pressure, the
mean cash ratio doubles from 1990 to 2005 and the median triples during that
same time period. These results suggest that as volatility increases, the likelihood
and cost of inefficient closure for firms in competitive markets increase so that
these firms optimally respond by hoarding more cash.
Our paper contributes in four ways to the literature on corporate financial
policies. First, we increase understanding of how firms’ policy choices are related
to their product market environment by developing a theory of cash holdings
relying on competitive pressure and financing constraints. Following Bolton and
Scharfstein (1990), most of this literature has either tried to examine the effects of
financial policies on predatory behavior (see e.g. Chevalier, 1995, Kovenock and
Phillips, 1997, or Campello, 2003) or, more recently, whether firms take actions
in response to predation risk (see e.g. Haushalter, Klasa, and Maxwell, 2007).
Our analysis provides insights into why a firm’s product environment impacts
its financing decisions, even in the absence of predatory risk (i.e. we focus on
competitive rather than concentrated industries).
Second, our paper contributes to understanding the role of corporate cash
reserves and why cash holdings have significantly increased over the past decade.
Specifically, we show that this increase has been mostly observed in competitive
industries and for firms facing financing constraints. In addition, our analy-
sis reveals that the increase in cash holdings can be related to the increase in
idiosyncratic volatility and in the competition in these industries. Hence, our re-
sults suggest that this increase in cash holdings can be at least partly attributed
to the possibility to use cash reserves to cover unexpected operating losses.
Third, our analysis complements prior research on the relation between cash
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holdings and financing constraints. Most of this literature has ignored the effects
of competition on this relation. Moreover, most of this work has focused on the
effects of cash holdings on investment. In this paper, we focus instead on the
other side of the profitability spectrum and examine the relation between cash
holdings and a firm’s ability to remain active (when optimal to do so).
Finally, our paper also contributes to the line of research that uses real-options
models to examine the relation between product market competition and financ-
ing decisions by considering the effects of competition on cash holdings. Several
papers quantify the possible effects of competition on debt financing in duopolies
(see e.g. Lambrecht (2001) or Morellec and Zhdanov (2008)) or in perfectly com-
petitive industries (see Miao (2005)). However, to the best of our knowledge,
there is no paper that examines the relation between competition, foreclosure,
and cash holdings.
The remainder of paper is organized as follows. Section two describes the
model and derives our main testable hypotheses. Section three describes the
data. Section four presents our empirical results. Section five concludes.
2 Model
This section introduces testable hypotheses that establish how cash holdings are
related to product market competition. To generate these hypotheses, we build
a stylized real options model in which the managers of the firm can abandon its
business if product demand falls to a sufficiently low level. In the model, the
closure decision depends on the intentisty of product market competition. It also
depends on the financing constraints faced by the firm. A simple model of optimal
cash holdings and abandonment decisions is developed under these assumptions.
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2.1 Assumptions
Throughout the paper, agents are risk neutral and discount cash flows at a con-
stant rate r. We consider an industry composed of n infinitely-lived firms pro-
ducing output with their capital stock and variable factors of production. Each
firm i has a fixed amount of capital ki. Each unit of capital produces one unit of
output at a cost Ci(ki) = cki+F , where c is a constant marginal and F is a fixed
cost of production.2 The produced good is non-storable, so that output equals
demand. The output price depends on total industry output Q = Σni=1ki and an
industry-wide shock X. Specifically, we assume that for any realization x of the
shock X, the price for any one firm’s unit of output is given by p (x) = xQ−1/γ,
where γ > 1 is the (constant) elasticity of demand. In the following analysis, we
consider that the industry shock is governed by the process:
dXt = µXt dt+ σXt dZt, X0 > 0. (1)
In equation (1), µ < r and σ > 0 are constant parameters and (Zt)t≥0 is a
standard Brownian motion. Below, we assume that all firms have the same
production capacity ki = k and we let K = nki denote the industry capacity.
The instantaneous cash flow of any firm i ∈ [1, n] at time t is then given by:
pii(K, x) =
1
n
[
xK(γ−1)/γ − cK]− F,
with ∂pii(K, x)/∂n < 0.
Although their assets may be operated forever, firms can also choose to aban-
don them. We assume for simplicity that the firms’ assets have no resale value
so that firm value upon closure is zero.3 Different environments will lead to
2In the Appendix, we present an extension of the model in which firms can choose their
output. All of our predictions go through in this more general setting.
3Introducing asset sales prior to closure would not affect any of the results derived in the
paper. Morellec (2001) examines the effects of asset liquidity on asset sales and firms’ closure
policies.
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alternative closure triggering cash flows. For firms that do not face financing
constraints, abandonment will be initiated endogenously when shareholders will
no longer be willing to raise additional equity to meet the fixed costs of operation
and there will be no role for cash holdings. For financially constrained firms, the
abandonment decision will be determined by a liquidity constraint and there will
be a role for cash holdings.
2.2 Firm value and optimal abandonment
Before analyzing the effects of cash holdings on firm value, it will be useful to
identify the sources of value within the firm. When shareholders have the option
to abandon operations, the value of the firm is given by the sum of a perpetual
stream of cash flows from assets in place and the value of the abandonment
option. Assume for now that the firm has no cash on hands and denote by Vi (x)
the value of firm i. As long as it is in operation, the firm delivers a cash flow
stream pii(K, x). In addition to this cash flow stream, investors also get capital
gains E [dVi] over each interval dt. The required rate of return for investing in the
firm’s assets is r. As a result, in the region for the industry shock where there is
no abandonment, firm value satisfies the equilibrium condition
rVi(x)dt =
[
1
n
(
xK(γ−1)/γ − cK)− F] dt+ E [dVi] .
The left hand side of this equation represents the rate of return required by
investors. The right hand side corresponds to the realized return, which comes
in the form of a cash flow stream and capital gains. Applying Itoˆ’s lemma to the
second term on the right hand side of this equation, we can rewrite the above
equilibrium condition as:
rVi(x) =
1
n
(
xK(γ−1)/γ − cK)− F + µxV ′i (x) + 12σ2x2V ′′i (x). (2)
When the firm does not face any financing constraint, shareholders inject
funds in the firm as long as firm value is positive. This implies that shareholders
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abandon the firm’s assets the first time firm value is equal to zero. As a result,
for firms that are not financially constrained, equation (2) is solved subject to
the following value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions at the endogenous
closure threshold xE: Vi(xE) = 0, and V
′
i (xE) = 0. The ordinary differential
equation (2) is also subject to the no-bubbles condition limx→∞(Vi(x)/x) <∞.
Denote by Πi (K, x) the present value of a perpetual stream of cash flows
pii(K, ·) starting at X0 = x:
Πi(K, x) = E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtpii(K,Xt) dt
∣∣X0 = x] = 1
n
{
x
r − µK
(γ−1)/γ − cK + nF
r
}
.
Solving shareholders’ optimization problem yields the following expression for the
value of the firm (the proof is standard and omitted):
Vi(K, x) = Πi(K, x)− Πi(K, xE)
(
x
xE
)ξ
, for x > xE, (3)
where ξ < 0 is the negative root of the quadratic equation 1
2
σ2y(y−1)+µy−r = 0
and the value-maximizing closure threshold xE is given by:
xE =
ξ
ξ − 1
r − µ
r
ck + F
k(γ−1)/γ
n1/γ. (4)
Equation (3) shows that value of the firm is the sum of two terms. First, it
incorporates the value of a perpetual entitlement to the current flow of income,
given by the first term on the right hand side of equation (3). Second, it re-
flects the value of shareholders’ option to abandon the firm’s assets, which is the
product of the surplus created by this option (−Πi(K, xE) > 0) and a stochastic
discount factor, given by xξx−ξE . The endogenous closure threshold xE reflects the
degree of competition through the factor n1/γ as well as the option value of wait-
ing to exit through the factor ξ/(ξ− 1). If this option had no value, shareholders
would follow the simple NPV rule, according to which one should abandon assets
as soon as net worth is negative (i.e. as soon as x < (r−µ)(cK+nF )K−(γ−1)/γ/r).
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From this expression it is immediate to see that the firm’s cash flows are nega-
tive upon closure and that the greater competition, the greater the likelihood of
abandonment.
Let us now turn to the case of the financially constrained firm. When the
firm is financially constrained, it has no (or limited) access to outside funds and
closure is triggered by the firm’s inability to fund operating losses. Let us denote
the value of the closure threshold associated with the financing constraint by xL.
This threshold solves the equation
1
n
[
xLK
(γ−1)/γ − cK] = F,
the solution to which is given by
xL =
ck + F
k(γ−1)/γ
n1/γ. (5)
This expression reveals that the greater product market competition (i.e. the
larger the number of firms in the industry), the higher the closure threshold and
the greater the likelihood of abandonment. In order to examine the effects of
varying financing constraints on firm value, we define
xL (φ) = φxL, for φ ∈ [φ, 1],
where φ = ξ (r − µ) / [r (ξ − 1)] reflects the strength of the financing constraint
faced by the firm. When φ = φ, there are no financing constraints as the firm
follows the value-maximizing abandonment policy. As φ increases, the distortions
in the firm’s closure policy increase.
Assume for now that φ = 1. An examination of equations (4) and (5) reveals
that financial constraints lead to early abandonment of the firm’s assets. This
early abandonment leads in turn to a reduction in firm value. In particular, denote
by V (K, x;xi) the value of the firm when the selected abandonment threshold is
135
xi for i = E,L. The reduction in firm value due to financing constraints is given
by ∆V (x) = V (K, x;xE)− V (K, x;xL) or:
∆V (x) =
{
µ (ck + F )
r (r − µ) +
ck + F
r (1− ξ)
(
xL
xE
)ξ}(
x
xL
)ξ
. (6)
In this expression, both the term in the curly brackets and the stochastic discount
factor (x/xL)
ξ increase with the volatility of the demand shock (since ∂ξ/∂σ <
0). As a result, the cost of financing constraints increases with volatility. In
addition, equation (6) reveals that the effects of financing constraints on firm
value are greater when operating leverage is higher (i.e. when x is lower or F is
greater). Finally, the reduction in firm value due to financing constraints increases
with product market competition (i.e. ∂ (∆V (x)) /∂n = −ξ∆V (x) /(γn) > 0)
implying that the benefits of holding cash increase with competition.
2.3 Optimal cash holdings
Consider now that when setting up the firm, the owners raise additional equity
in order to have some cash holdings (alternatively, the firm may use retained
earnings to build up its cash reserve). In addition, assume that there is a cost
of holding cash. As noted by Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (OPSW,
1999), the cost of holding cash includes the lower rate of return on these assets
because of a liquidity premium and tax disadvantages (Graham, 2000, finds that
cash retentions are tax-disadvantaged because corporate tax rates generally ex-
ceed tax rates on interest income). Also, as argued by Shyam-Sunders and Myers
(1999), if there was no cost of holding cash no firm would ever distribute funds
to shareholders.
Following OPSW (1999), we assume that the marginal cost of holding cash
is constant. Specifically, we consider that if the firm has cash holdings α, the
value of these funds held as liquid assets within the firm is (1− θ)α. In such
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circumstances, the value V (x) of the old shareholders’ claims at the time of
issuance is given by the value of the firm ignoring cash holdings plus the proceeds
from the equity issue net of the costs of holding funds. Since the value of the
new shares is equal to the proceeds from the equity issue, the objective of old
shareholders when choosing the level of cash holdings is to maximize:
Vold(K, x;x (α, φ)) = Πi(x)− θα− Πi(x (α, φ))
(
x
x (α, φ)
)ξ
, (7)
where x (α, φ) is the firm’s closure threshold when the level of cash holdings is α.
To examine the effects of cash holdings on firm value in the simplest possible
setting, we assume that if the firm holds an amount α of cash, its abandonment
threshold is given by
x (α, φ) =
α
κ+ α
xE +
κ
κ+ α
φxL,
where κ > 0 is a positive constant. This specification implies that as the amount
of cash holdings increases, the firm’s abandonment policy gets closer to first best.
In particular, we have x(0, 1) = xL,
∂x(α,φ)
∂α
< 0, limα→∞ x (α, φ) = xE, and
limφ→φ x (α, φ) = xE.
Replacing x (α, φ) by its expression in equation (7) yields:
Vold(K, x;x (α, φ)) = Πi(x)− θα− n−ξ/γA(α)ck + F
r
(
xk(γ−1)/γ
ck + F
)ξ
, (8)
where A(α) is defined by
A(α) =
{
r
r − µ
α
κ+ α
[
ξ (r − µ)
r (ξ − 1) +
κ
α
φ
]
− 1
}{
α
κ+ α
[
ξ (r − µ)
r (ξ − 1) +
κ
α
φ
]}−ξ
.
This expression shows we have ∂A(α)/∂φ > 0. That is, financing constraints
reduce firm value by distorting closure policy. Also, since cash holdings improve
the firm’s abandonment policy, we have ∂A(α)/∂α < 0. Finally, since firm value
is concave in the selected closure threshold x (α, φ) (because of the concavity of
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the option to abandon assets), we have that ∂2A(α)/∂α2 < 0. We will use these
results below when analyzing the value-maximizing level of cash holdings.
When deciding whether the firm should have cash holdings, shareholders max-
imize the value of their claims, given by Vold(K, x;x (α, φ)). As shown by equation
(8), cash holdings entails both benefits and costs. The benefit is the improvement
in the firm’s abandonment policy. This benefit is captured by the third term on
the right hand side of equation (8). This benefit is offset by the costs of holding
liquid funds, which are captured by the second term on the right hand side of
equation (8). Interestingly, this equation suggests that the benefits of cash hold-
ings depend on the value of the option to abandon assets. As a result, the optimal
level of cash holdings should depend on the factors that affect the value of this
abandonment option. In particular, we expect that a change in the moneyness of
the option to abandon operations, due to changes in x and F , or in the volatility
of the cash flow shock σ, will lead to changes in the value-maximizing level of
cash holdings α∗.
Given that firm value is concave in the firm’s closure threshold, the value-
maximizing amount of cash holdings is given by the solution to the first order
condition
∂Vold(K, x;x (α, φ))
∂α
= 0. (9)
Solving the first order condition (9) yields:
− n−ξ/γA′(α∗)
(
xk(γ−1)/γ
ck + F
)ξ
= θ. (10)
The left hand side of this equation represents the marginal benefit of holding
cash. The right hand side represents the marginal cost of holding cash. Figure 7
shows the marginal cost curve of being short of cash and the marginal cost curve
of holding cash. The marginal cost curve of being short of cash is downward
sloping and convex as the value of the firm is an increasing and concave function
138
of the selected abandonment threshold. The marginal cost of holding cash is
constant, given by θ.
From equation (10), it is immediate to see that the value-maximizing level of
cash holdings α∗ depends on firm characteristics in the following way:
∂α?
∂n
> 0,
∂α?
∂c
> 0,
∂α?
∂x
< 0,
∂α?
∂φ
> 0,
∂α?
∂σ
> 0, and
∂α?
∂k
< 0.
These equations show that an increase in competition, in financing constraints,
or in volatility shifts the marginal cost curve of being short of cash to the right
and increases the level of optimal cash holdings. Consider first the effects of com-
petition. As the intensity of product market competition increases (as reflected
by an increase in the number of firms in the industry n), the profitability of as-
sets in place decreases and the risk of inefficient closure increases. As a result,
firms optimally have larger cash holdings to reduce this risk. We thus have the
following testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Cash holdings increase with product market competition.
In addition, the optimal policy for the firm is to have no cash holdings when
it does not face any financing constraint and the value-maximizing amount of
cash holdings increases with the strength of the financing constraints φ faced by
the firm. When there is no financing constraint, the firm abandons assets at
the value-maximizing trigger xE and, hence, has no need for cash holdings. As
financing constraints increase, distortions in the firm’s closure policy increase.
Firms optimally respond by having greater cash holdings. This leads to the
following testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Competition affects cash holdings only when the firm faces
financing constraints. When the firm is financially constrained, optimal cash
holdings increase with the intensity of the financing constraints.
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A third implication of our model is that the optimal amount of cash holdings
increases with the moneyness of the firm’s option to abandon assets, as reflected
by x. In our model, the decision to hold cash balances the cost of holding cash
with the change in the firm’s abandonment policy due to cash holdings. As
the option to exit the industry becomes more valuable (because of a decrease in
x), the benefits of holding cash increase and so does the optimal level of cash
holdings. It is also immediate to see from equation (10) that an increase in the
firm’s asset base, as reflected by k, reduces the optimal amount of cash holdings.
We thus have the following testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Cash holdings decrease with firm size.
Finally, as volatility increases, the value of the firm’s abandonment option
increases (being a real option). This implies that the cost of the liquidity con-
straint and, hence, the benefits of holding cash increase with the volatility of the
cash flow shock. This leads to the following testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: Cash holdings increase with volatility.
To get more insights on the determinants of cash holdings, Figure 8 plots the
optimal amount of cash holdings α? as a function of the cost of holding liquid
funds θ, the volatility of the industry shock σ, the severity of financing constraints
φ, and the strength of product market competition n. Input parameter values for
the base case environment are set as follows:4 the risk-free interest rate r = 5%,
the volatility and the growth rate of cash flow shock: σ = 25% and µ = 1%,
the cost of holding cash θ = 5%, the strength of the product market competition
n = 10, and the costs of production c = 1 and F = 10. Consistent with the above
4The risk free rate is taken from the yield curve on Treasury bonds. The growth rate of
cash flows has been selected to generate a payout ratio consistent with observed payout ratios
(4% according to Ibbotson and Associates). Similarly, the value of the volatility parameter is
chosen to match the (leverage-adjusted) asset return volatility of an average S&P 500 firm’s
equity return volatility.
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discussion, Figure 8 reveals that the optimal amount of liquid funds increases
with the volatility of the industry shock σ, the intensity of competition n, and
the degree of financing constrains φ. It decreases with the cost of holding liquid
funds and with the size of the firm x.
Figure 9 plots the value-maximizing amount of cash holdings α? as a function
of the intensity of product market competition, n, for low, medium, and high
intensity of the financial constraint φ (i.e. for φ = 1, φ = (1 + φ)/2, and φ = φ
in panel A) and as a function of the intensity of the financial constraint, φ, for
for low, medium, and high intensity of competition n (i.e. for n = 1, n = 5, and
n = 10 in panel B). Input parameter values are set as in Figure 8.
Figure 9 shows that, in the absence of financing constraints, the firm would
not hold any cash. It also reveals that the effects of product market competition
on the value-maximizing level of cash holdings get reinforced by financing con-
straints. Similarly, the effects of financing constraints on the value-maximizing
level of cash holdings are stronger in more competitive environments.
3 Data and Methodology
In this section we discuss how the samples are formed, the methodology used to
test the hypotheses derived in section 2, and how the variables of interest are
calculated.
3.1 Sample
The sample of firms is based on Compustat Industrial Annual files. Following
Bates, Kahle and Stulz (BKS, 2006), we examine firms over the 1980-2005 period.
We remove firms from regulated industries (SIC 4900-4999) and financial firms
(SIC 6000-6999). In addition, following Clarke (1989), we remove firms with 4-
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digit SIC codes ending either by 0 or 9 that group firms with not well defined
industry. Observations with missing SIC code, total assets, cash and short term
investments, sales and operating income are deleted. The final sample consists
of 62,644 firm-year observations, in which industries are defined by their 4-digit
SIC code.
3.2 Methodology
We now turn to the methodology used for testing the hypotheses derived in
section 2. We run a series of cross-sectional regressions:
Cashi,t = β0 + β1λi,t−1 + β2φi,t−1 + β3Λi,t−1 + β4σi,t−1 + β5Xi,t−1 + i,t, (11)
with i = 1, ..., nt and t = 1980, ..., 2005, where i and t are firm and time indices,
respectively. Equation (11) relates cash holdings to the intensity of product mar-
ket competition, λ, the intensity of financing constraints, φ, firm size, Λ, and
cash flow volatility, σ. The set of control variables X includes variables that are
commonly believed to affect cash holdings [see BKS (2006) and OPSW (1999)].
The definition and construction of the dependent and explanatory variables are
summarized in Appendix B. Fama-MacBeth (1973) parameter estimates are ob-
tained by averaging the coefficients across estimation years. The t-statistics are
adjusted for the possibility of first-order autocorrelation. 5
In equation (11), cash holdings are measured as cash and short term invest-
ments deflated by book assets, as suggested by BKS. The cash ratio may be
defined in various ways. OPSW use cash deflated by book assets minus cash.
Haushalter et al. (2007) use the log of the OPSW measure. The drawback of
using these measures is that they both generate extreme outliers. Unreported
robustness results show that our conclusions are unaffected by the definition of
5Gaspar and Massa (2006) use a similar setup to analyze the link between idiosyncratic
volatility and product market competition.
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the dependent variable. Volatility is computed as the mean of standard devia-
tions of operating income before depreciation (item 13) deflated by total assets
(item 6) over 10 years for firms in the same industry, as defined by the 4-digit
SIC code. Firm size is defined as the log of net sales (item 12). We describe
below the measures used to reflect the intensity of competition measures and the
severity of financing constraints.
In a second step, we estimate the specification in equation (11) when splitting
the full sample in two subsamples comprising either financially constrained firms
or unconstrained firms. This allows us to assess the effects of financing constraints
on the relation between cash holdings and product market competition.
3.3 Intensity of competition measures
We construct two measures to reflect the intensity of product market competition.
First, we use the excess price-cost margin (EPCM) [see e.g. Lindenberg and Ross
(1981), Nickell (1996), Aghion et al. (2005), or Gaspar and Massa (2006)]. The
price-cost margin (PCM) is defined as operating income (before depreciation)
over sales. EPCM is defined as the difference between a firm’s PCM and the
average PCM of its industry. We control for industry PCM in order to account
for inter-industry differences unrelated to market power. In this specification, we
assume that marginal and average costs are equivalent [see Carlton and Perloff
(1989)]. The price-cost margin is used in most of the industrial organization (IO)
literature and refers to the ability of the firm to price above marginal cost [see
Lerner (1934)]. A greater value of EPCM indicates a greater ability to extract
profits and, hence, a lower intensity of competition.
Second, we use the number of firms per industry (see Tirole, 1988, pp222).
The number of firms in an industry affects the ability of a given firm to influence
prices. In a monopoly, the single firm has market power and can fix prices. In
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a perfectly competitive environment, firms are price takers. The most common
industrial organization structure that we observe in practice, the oligopoly, lies
somewhere in between these two cases. We can reasonably think that the intensity
of competition is not linear in the number of firms. For example, the entry of a
firm in an economy of 2 or 22 firms will have a different impact on the competition
among firms. Thus, we use the logarithm of the number of firms to measure the
intensity of product market competition.
The Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is a commonly used measure of indus-
try concentration. The HHI is reported by the Census Bureau every 5 years for
manufacturing firms. This index measures the degree of concentration in an in-
dustry. Until 1997, the data on manufacturing firms were organized and classified
by the Standard Industry Classification (SIC) system. Since 1997, the data are
organized and classified by the North American Industry Classification System
(NAICS). This industry definition change prevents us from using this measure in
an analysis over a sufficiently long time period. More importantly, the structural
break in the measurement of this index prevents us from analyzing the effects of
competition on the time-trend of cash holdings. (Note however that the HHI is
correlated with the number of firms in an industry because its lower bound when
there are n firms is 1/n. In addition, the HHI is 1/n when all firms in an industry
have equal market shares.)6
3.4 Intensity of financing constraint measures
The intensity of firm financing constraint is unobserved. As a result, the literature
has proposed an array of methods to measure the severity of financial constraints
facing firms. Since there is no agreement on which measure is the best proxy for
6Note that in our model, the number of firms is n, the HHI index is 1/n, and the EPCM is
decreasing in n since ∂p(x)/∂n = −(1/γ)x(nk)−(1+γ)/γ < 0.
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financial constraints, we rely on four different measures that complement each
other.
Payout policy. The literature on financing constraints argues that a firm’s
payout ratio may be used to measure financial constraints [see Fazzari, Hubbard
and Petersen (1988)]. Thus, for every year in our sample, we rank firms based on
their payout ratio. Financially constrained (unconstrained) firms are identified
as being in the bottom (top) three deciles of the annual payout ratio distribution.
Payout ratio is defined as total distributions (dividends and stock repurchases)
deflated by operating income.7
Firm size. The second measure we use to proxy for firms’ financing constraints
is firm size [see Gilchrist and Himmerlberg (1995) and Erickson and Whited
(2000)]. Small firms are typically young, less known, and more vulnerable to
capital market imperfections and, thus, are more likely to face financing difficul-
ties. In addition, larger, more established firms are more likely to have a well
functioning treasury department and well established relations with financial in-
stitutions rendering access to capital markets easier. For every year, we rank
firms based on their size. Financially constrained (unconstrained) firms are iden-
tified as being in the bottom (top) three deciles of the annual size distribution.
Similar results are obtained if we use firm age instead of firm size.
Bond rating. We use the market assessment of firms’ credit risk as third mea-
sure of firms’ financing constraints [see e.g. Whited (1992), Gilchrist and Him-
melberg (1995) and Lemmon and Zender (2004)]. We collect data on firms credit
rating and categorize firms as financially constrained if the credit rating is either
7All firms having the same payout ratio are assigned to the same group. This may lead to
unequal constrained and unconstrained groups. For example, more than 30% of firms have zero
payout ratio but all are considered as constrained.
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missing or non investment grade. Financially unconstrained firms are firms with
an investment grade rating. All unlevered firms are considered as unconstrained.
Similar results are obtained if we use instead commercial paper rating.
Whited and Wu financial constraints index. We use Whited and Wu fi-
nancial constraints index as fourth measure. Whited and Wu (2006) construct
an index (WW index) of firms’ external finance constraints and show that this
index does a better job than the Kaplan and Znigales index at isolating firms
with characteristics associated with financing constraints.8 Firms with high WW
index are small firms, that rely mainly on equity financing, exhibit low growth
and have low cash flows. Formally, the index is defined as follows:
WW= −0.091CF−0.062DIVPOS+0.021TLTD−0.044LNTA+0.102ISG−0.035SG
where CF is cash flows from operations, DIVPOS is a dummy variable equal to
1 if the firm pays dividends, TLTD is long term debt over assets, LNTA is the
natural logarithm of total assets, ISG is the three-digit SIC industry sales growth
rate and SG is the firm sales growth rate. We compute firms’ WW index every
year. Financially constrained (unconstrained) firms are then identified as being
in the top (bottom) three deciles of the WW index annual distribution.
Table 11 reports the number of firm-year observations classified as constrained
or unconstrained for the four financial constraints criteria. For example, there
are 30,859 constrained firm-year observations and 17,695 unconstrained according
to the payout ratio criterion. Table 11 shows that the 4 criteria are positively
but not perfectly correlated. Indeed, out of the 30,859 payout constrained firm-
year observations, 13,832 are considered constrained and 4,162 unconstrained
with respect to the size criterion. The remaining observations are considered as
8We do not use Kaplan-Zingales index as Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) document
that this index is negatively related to financial constraints. We do not to use Cleary index due
to endogeneity problems. Indeed, one of the determinants of this index is cash holdings.
146
neither constrained nor unconstrained. Each of the four measures thus conveys
incremental information, which contributes to the robustness of the analysis.
4 Empirical results
We now investigate whether cash holdings are related to measures of product
market competition and firms’ financing constraints in a way consistent with the
predictions of the model. To this end, we first describe the data that we use in
our empirical tests to confirm that they exhibit the same general patterns that
have been reported previously in the literature. We then present the results of
the tests of the hypotheses derived in the model. The new evidence in this section
is strongly supportive of the model’s predictions regarding the relation between
cash holdings, financing constraints, and product market competition.
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 12 presents descriptive statistics of the sample. Our sample exhibits char-
acteristics similar to those in prior studies. Mean cash holdings are 0.15 with a
standard deviation of 0.19. Figure 10 (panel a) plots firms’ cash holdings over
the sample period. At the beginning of the sample period in 1980, the average
cash ratio for the firms in our sample is 10%. At the end of the sample period in
2005, this ratio doubles to 20%.
The mean excess price-cost margin (EPCM), our main proxy for the intensity
of competition, is -0.14 with a standard deviation of 0.37. The results on EPCM
are in line with those reported by Aghion et al. (2005) or Gaspar and Massa
(2006). Figure 10 (panel b) illustrates the time trend in EPCM. We observe a
sharp decrease in EPCM consistent with an increase of competition intensity [see
also Gaspar and Massa (2006)]. This time-trend in EPCM can be attributed to
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market deregulation – which reduces barriers to entry that enable market power
[see Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001)] – and market globalization [see Ryan
(1997) and Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2005)].
Figure 11 illustrates the effects of product market competition on cash hold-
ings. Cash holdings increase for firms that are in a competitive environment since
the risk of inefficient closure is greater for these firms. Intuitively, the increase
in cash holdings is a natural response to the increase of competition intensity in
product markets as shown in Figure 10. Consistent with our model, we observe
also that cash holdings remain stable over time for firms enjoying market power.
We turn now to the formal testing of the model.
4.2 Hypothesis testing
We turn now to testing hypothesis (1) through (4) derived in the model. In
order to do so, we estimate the specification in equation (11). To simplify the
interpretation of results, we scale all regressors by their standard deviation. Thus,
regression coefficients can be interpreted as the response of the dependent variable
to a one standard deviation change in the regressor.
Table 13 reports the estimation results. Consistent with hypothesis (1), we
find that cash holdings increase with the intensity of competition as proxied either
by EPCM or by the number of firms per industry. A one standard deviation
change in the intensity of competition leads to a change of cash holdings of 0.9%.
Consistent with model hypothesis (2), we find that a one standard deviation
change in the severity of financing constraints, as proxied either by firm size,
bond rating or dividends, leads to a change of cash holdings in the range of
0.9% to 3.2%.9 In addition, we find that cash holdings decrease with firm size
9We do not include WW index as independent variable because this index is correlated with
some of the control variables.
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and increase with cash flow volatility, consistent with hypothesis (3) and (4),
respectively. A one standard deviation change in firm size or cash flow volatility
leads to a change of cash holdings in the range of 0.9% to 1.4% or 1.5% to 1.8%,
respectively. All coefficients are significant at the 1% level.
Across specifications, control variables have consistently signs in line with
those predicted by the empirical literature [see BKS (2006) and OPSW (1999)].
Specifically, we obtain positive coefficients on market-to-book ratio and R&D and
negative coefficients on net working capital, capital expenditures, leverage and
acquisitions. Taken together, these first results provide strong evidence that the
intensity of product market competition affects cash holdings. In the following,
we further characterize the nature of this “competition effect”.
Hypothesis (2) states that cash holdings increase with the intensity of firm
financing constraint. In addition, according to hypothesis (2) the intensity of
competition is an insignificant determinant of cash holdings for financially un-
constrained firms and a significant determinant of financially constrained firms.
In order to test this refinement of hypothesis (2), we estimate model (11) by
splitting the sample into two groups: constrained and unconstrained firms.
Table 14 reports the estimation results for constrained and unconstrained
firms. We observe that the set of constrained firms displays significant coeffi-
cients on EPCM, while unconstrained firms show insignificant coefficients. The
inclusion of instruments for (the absence of) financing constraints markedly in-
creases (decreases) the effects of competition on cash holdings. In particular,
one standard deviation change in EPCM leads to a change of cash holdings in
the range of 0.9% to 2% for financially constrained firms (twice as high as in
Table 13). In addition, this coefficient becomes insignificant for firms that are
not financially constrained. The coefficients on size, volatility, and the control
variables are overall unaffected by these sample splits. Table 15 presents robust-
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ness checks with the alternative proxy of intensity of competition. The results
are qualitatively similar.10 Thus, we observe that results on the relation between
cash holdings and the intensity of competition are robust.
The model predicts that firms in riskier industries hold more cash (Hypothesis
4). In addition, the model predicts that risk exacerbates the link between cash
holdings and competition, because the cost of financing constraints increases with
volatility. To assess the impact of risk on the relation between cash holdings and
competition, we estimate a modified version of model (11) in which we allow the
effect of competition on cash holdings to be different for firms in low and high
volatility industries. Low (high) volatility industries are identified as being in the
bottom (top) three deciles of the annual volatility distribution. The new model
is:
Cashi,t = β0 + β
L
1 λi,t−11[σ<σL] + β
H
1 λi,t−11[σ>σH ] + β2Zi,t−1 + i,t (12)
where λi,t is the intensity of competition, σ is the industry volatility and σL and
σH are the 30%- and 70%-tiles of the annual volatility distribution, respectively.
The control variables Zi,t are the same as in model (11).
11 Ultimately, we want
to test if βL1 6= βH1 . Table 16 reports estimated coefficients and a difference test.
Consistent with the predictions of the model, the link between cash holdings
and competition is magnified by volatility. Coefficients on intensity of competi-
tion are roughly 5 times larger for high volatility industries than for low volatility
10The coefficient on competition is barely significant for unconstrained firms and insignificant
for constrained firms based on the WW index when competition is measured by the number of
firms in the industry. The coefficients turn insignificant and significant for financially uncon-
strained and constrained firms, respectively, if financially (un)constrained firms are identified
as being in the (bottom) top two (instead of the top three) deciles of the WW index annual
distribution.
11The new setup assumes that the effect of control variables is unchanged across industry
volatility levels. Unreported results show that results are robust to relaxing this hypothesis.
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industries. In addition, for low volatility industries, the competition effect is in-
significant. Finally, we observe that the precautionary motive for holding cash
is strong for high volatility industries and small or even insignificant for low
volatility industries.
4.3 Cash holdings time trend
As shown in Figure 9, the intensity of competition has significantly increased
during the sample period. In this section, we want to test if the time trend of
competition is related to the time trend of cash holdings documented by Bates,
Kahle and Stulz (2006). Specifically, we want to assess how the link between cash
holdings and competition behaves through time by combining cross-sectional and
time-series regressions.
To implement this test, we use a two-step approach. The first step of our
procedure consists of estimating model (11) for constrained and unconstrained
firms every year. This yields time-series of coefficients for every independent
variable. We collect the coefficients on competition (i.e. β1) and build a time-
series vector Ψt. In a second step, we use Ψt as dependent variable and regress
it on a constant and a time trend:12
Ψt = η + ρTrend+ ut (13)
Table 17 reports time trend coefficients (ρ) for constrained and unconstrained
firms. We observe that there is an economically and statistically significant time
effect on the link between cash holdings and competition for financially con-
strained firms. In particular, we observe that the coefficient on competition ex-
hibits an increase in the range 0.0013 to 0.0023 in absolute value for every year.
We do not find evidence of time effect for unconstrained firms. Hence, our results
12Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) use a similar estimation procedure to assess the
impact of economic activity and time trend on cash flow sensitivities of cash.
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suggest that the increase in cash holdings can be at least partially attributed to
a competition effect.
5 Conclusion
This paper examines the effects of product market competition on firms cash pol-
icy in the presence of financial constraints. We build a stylized real options model
in which the firm managers can abandon its business if product demand falls to a
sufficiently low level. The managers may abandon voluntarily, or may be forced
to do so because of financing constraints. In our model, financing constraints
lead to inefficient early closure. However, managers can use cash holdings to
cover operating losses and avoid inefficient closure. The risk of inefficient closure
increases with product market competition. In addition, the cost of inefficient
closure increase with volatility. Consequently, firms operating in riskier and more
competitive industries hold more cash.
We take the model to the data and find that firms operating in more com-
petitive industries hold more cash. Moreover, competition affects cash holdings
only in the presence of financing constraints. We also observe that volatility ex-
acerbates the effect of competition on firms’ cash holdings. Finally, we document
a time trend in the intensity of product market competition. This increase in
competition pressure can at least partially explain the secular time trend in cash
holdings documented by Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2006).
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6 Appendix
6.1 Symmetric Cournot game
Consider a simple extension of the basic model, in which each unit of installed
capital can produce one unit of output at a cost Ci(qi) = cqi + F where c is a
constant marginal cost of production. At any time t, each firm chooses its out-
put to maximize current profits. This choice of output qi is constrained by the
installed capacity ki and depends on current demand. Thereafter, we will focus
on a symmetric Nash equilibrium in which all firms have the same production ca-
pacity. Let K = nKi denote the industry capacity. The instantaneous operating
cash flow of firm i at time t in a Cournot equilibrium is given by:
pii(K, x) = max
0≤qit≤K/n
[
(xQ
−1/γ
t )qit − cqit − F
]
, (14)
the solution to which is given by
pii(K, x) =

1
n
{(
c
nγ−1
)
[A(n, γ)]−γ xγ
}
− F, for x < A(n, γ)K1/γ
1
n
(
xK(γ−1) − cK)− F for x > A(n, γ)K1/γ (15)
where A(n, γ) = nγc/(nγ − 1).
The required rate of return for investing in the firm’s equity is r. Applying
Itoˆ’s lemma, it is then immediate to show that the value of the equity project
satisfies:
• In the region x ≤ A(n, γ)K1/γ,
rVi(x) =
1
n
{(
c
nγ − 1
)
[A(n, γ)]−γ xγ
}
−F+µxV ′i (x)+
1
2
σ2x2V ′′i (x). (16)
• In the region x ≥ A(n, γ)K1/γ,
rVi(x) =
1
n
(
xK(γ−1) − cK)− F + µxV ′i (x) + 12σ2x2V ′′i (x). (17)
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The left hand side of this equation represents the rate of return required by
investors. The right hand side corresponds to the realized return, which comes
in the form of a cash flow stream and capital gains.
Solving this optimization problem yields the following expression for firm
value:
Vi(K, x) (18)
=

1
n
[
K(γ−1) x
r−µ − cK+nFr
]
+ AHx
ν +BHx
ξ, for x > A(n, γ)K1/γ
1
n
{(
c
nγ−1
)
[A(n,γ)]−γxγ
r−γµ−γ(γ−1)σ2/2
}
− F
r
+ ALx
ν +BLx
ξ, for x < A(n, γ)K1/γ
where AH , BH , AL, and BL are constant parameters and ν > 0 and ξ < 0 are the
positive and negative roots of the quadratic equation 1
2
σ2y(y − 1) + µy − r = 0.
When the firm is not financially constrained, shareholders inject funds in the
firm as long as firm value is positive. This condition implies that shareholders
abandon the firm’s assets the first time firm value is equal to zero. As a result,
for firms that are not financially constrained, the above ODE is solved subject to
the following boundary conditions:
Vi(xE) = 0 (19)
V ′i (xE) = 0 (20)
lim
x↓A(n,γ)K1/γ
Vi(x) = lim
x↑A(n,γ)K1/γ
Vi(x) (21)
lim
x↓A(n,γ)K1/γ
V ′i (x) = lim
x↑A(n,γ)K1/γ
V ′i (x) (22)
The first two boundary conditions are the value-matching and smooth-pasting
conditions at the endogenous abandonment threshold xE. Because the firm cash
flows are given by a (piecewise) continuous Borel-bounded function, Vi (·) is piece-
wise C2 (see Theorem 4.9 pp. 271 in Karatzas and Shreve, 1991). Therefore, Vi (·)
is C0 and C1 and satisfies the continuity and smoothness conditions (21) and (22).
Finally, firm value satisfies the no-bubbles condition: limx→∞[Vi(x)/x] < +∞,
which implies AH = 0.
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Define ρ(γ) by ρ(γ) ≡ r−γµ−γ(γ−1)σ2/2. Plugging the expression for firm
value (given by equation (18)) in the boundary conditions (19) through (22) yields
the constant parameters BH , AL, and BL as well as the value of the endogenous
closure threshold:
xξE =
1
(ν − ξ)BL
{
ν
F
r
− ν − 1
n
[(
c
nγ − 1
)
[A(n, γ)]−γ xγE
ρ(γ)
]}
,
BL = −x
−ξ
E
ξ
{
1
n
[(
c
nγ − 1
)
γ [A(n, γ)]−γ xγE
ρ(γ)
]
+ νALx
ν
E
}
,
AL =
(
A(n, γ)K1/γ
)−ν
ξ − ν
{
c (ξ − 1)
n (nγ − 1)
[
nγKγ−1+1/γ
r − µ −
K
ρ(γ)
]
− ξ
n
cK
r
}
,
BH = BL +
(
A(n, γ)K1/γ
)−ξ
ν − ξ
{
ν
n
cK
r
− c (ν − 1)
n (nγ − 1)
[
nγKγ−1+1/γ
r − µ −
K
ρ(γ)
]}
.
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6.2 Data Definitions
Variable Variable Definition
Dependent Variable:
Cash Cash and Short-Term Investments (item1)/ Assets - Total (item6)
Intensity of Competition:
PCM Operating Income Before Deprec. (item 13)/Sales net (item 12)
EPCM PCM - Industry Value-Weighted PCM
Log Number of Firms log(Number of Firms per Industry)
Intensity of Financial Constraint:
Payout (Dividends - Common (item 21) + Purchase of Common and Pref. Stock
(item 115))/Operating Income Before Deprec. (item 13)
Size log(Sales net (item 12))
Bond Rating Dummy 1 if (item 280) missing or non-investment grade, 0 otherwise
Whited & Wu index See Section 3.4
Control Variables:
Volatility See Section 3.2
Book Debt Long term debt (item 9) + Debt in current liabilities (item 34)
Book Equity Assets total (item 6) - Book debt
Market-to-Book (Market value (item 25 * item 199) + Book debt)/Assets - Total (item 6)
Return on Assets (Operating Income Before Deprec. (item 13))/Assets - Total (item 6)
Net Working Capital (Working Capital (item 179) - Cash and Short-Term Investments (item1)/
Assets - Total (item 6)
Capex Capital Expenditures (item 128)/Assets - Total (item 6)
Leverage Book Debt/(Assets Total (item 6) - Book equity
+ Market value (item 25 * item 199))
R&D Research and development expenses (item 46)/Assets total (item6)
Acquisitions Acquisitions (item 129)/Assets - Total (item 6)
Dividends Dummy dummy variable equal to 1 if Dividends - Common (item 21) reported
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Table 12: Descriptive Statistics
Table 12 presents descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the es-
timation. The sample is based on Compustat Annual Industrial files over the
1980-2005 period. Appendix B provides a detailed definition of the variables.
Mean S.D. 25% 50% 75% Obs
Dependent Variable:
Cash 0.15 0.19 0.02 0.08 0.22 62,644
Intensity of Competition:
EPCM -0.14 0.37 -0.13 -0.03 0.02 62,644
Log Number of Firms 3.47 1.14 2.64 3.47 4.25 62,644
Intensity of Financial Constraint:
Payout 0.11 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.11 58,937
Size 4.49 2.32 2.84 4.38 6.01 62,644
Bond Rating 0.93 0.26 1.00 1.00 1.00 62,644
Whited & Wu index -0.21 0.13 -0.30 -0.21 -0.13 60,435
Control Variables:
Volatility 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.10 62,644
Market-to-Book 1.78 2.17 0.76 1.11 1.88 62,644
Net Working Captial 0.09 0.31 -0.02 0.11 0.26 61,561
Capex 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.10 62,644
Leverage 0.26 0.25 0.03 0.18 0.41 62,644
R&D 0.05 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.05 62,644
Aquisitions 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 62,644
Dividends Dummy 0.30 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 62,644
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Table 13: Cash holdings, Competition and Financing Constraint
Table 13 presents results of yearly cross-sectional regressions of cash holdings
on the intensity of competition, intensity of financing constraint and control
variables. The sample is based on Compustat Annual Industrial files over the
1980-2005 period. The parameter estimates shown are time-series averages of
the individual cross-sectional parameter estimates. Fama-MacBeth t-statistics,
adjusted for first-order autocorrelation, are reported in parenthesis.
(1) (2)
EPCM -0.009 -
(2.77) -
Number of firms - 0.009
- (2.94)
Bond Rating 0.032 0.029
(5.94) (6.15)
Size -0.009 -0.014
(2.73) (5.36)
Dividend -0.017 -0.015
(4.35) (4.52)
Volatility 0.018 0.015
(12.46) (16.76)
Market-to-Book 0.011 0.012
(4.38) (4.61)
NWC -0.031 -0.031
(8.97) (8.89)
Capex -0.028 -0.031
(34.89) (21.59)
Leverage -0.060 -0.059
(27.82) (30.58)
R&D 0.014 0.016
(3.82) (3.71)
Aquisitions -0.012 -0.013
(12.27) (12.08)
Constant 0.182 0.176
(17.25) (13.19)
Observations 50,805 50,805
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.29
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Table 14: Cash holdings and Competition for Constrained vs. Un-
constrained Firms
Table 14 presents results of yearly cross-sectional regressions of cash holdings
on the intensity of competition, as measured by the excess price-cost margin
(EPCM), and control variables for constrained and unconstrained firms. We use
four criteria to classify firm-year observations as constrained (C) or unconstrained
(U). The sample is based on Compustat Annual Industrial files over the 1980-2005
period. The parameter estimates shown are time-series averages of the individ-
ual cross-sectional parameter estimates. Fama-MacBeth t-statistics, adjusted for
first-order autocorrelation, are reported in parenthesis.
Payout Firm Size Bond Rating WW index
(U) (C) (U) (C) (U) (C) (U) (C)
EPCM 0.004 -0.016 0.005 -0.020 -0.017 -0.009 -0.002 -0.014
(0.74) (5.03) (0.62) (3.98) (1.67) (2.63) (0.37) (2.78)
Size -0.043 -0.001 -0.023 0.005 -0.019 -0.009 -0.035 -0.019
(14.07) (0.37) (9.28) (0.42) (6.78) (2.51) (11.23) (2.40)
Dividend - - -0.024 0.040 -0.034 -0.017 -0.029 0.090
- - (10.22) (5.28) (4.20) (3.80) (11.86) (4.58)
Volatility 0.020 0.017 0.015 0.013 0.013 0.018 0.017 0.010
(17.25) (9.96) (8.81) (8.70) (4.95) (12.09) (7.62) (6.70)
Market-to-Book 0.019 0.011 0.024 0.002 0.025 0.011 0.026 0.003
(5.26) (3.72) (10.74) (1.07) (3.46) (4.47) (9.93) (1.50)
NWC -0.068 -0.022 -0.045 -0.021 -0.026 -0.031 -0.052 -0.019
(33.44) (6.38) (15.58) (6.02) (5.54) (9.24) (20.54) (6.44)
Capex -0.048 -0.023 -0.030 -0.029 -0.026 -0.029 -0.038 -0.027
(29.02) (23.04) (14.37) (20.53) (8.46) (33.56) (19.98) (24.71)
Leverage -0.045 -0.058 -0.031 -0.080 -0.023 -0.061 -0.036 -0.070
(19.69) (29.06) (26.22) (25.57) (5.55) (26.07) (27.93) (22.26)
R&D 0.036 0.013 0.042 0.005 0.057 0.013 0.041 0.010
(7.36) (4.41) (4.68) (2.06) (6.94) (3.51) (4.48) (4.21)
Aquisitions -0.015 -0.011 -0.012 -0.014 -0.012 -0.013 -0.014 -0.012
(13.22) (8.72) (11.45) (7.24) (6.34) (12.03) (10.65) (4.86)
Constant 0.287 0.188 0.211 0.236 0.177 0.215 0.267 0.234
(24.78) (27.04) (20.87) (25.45) (12.34) (36.61) (25.00) (35.04)
Observations 14,813 24,411 15,637 14,538 3,804 47,001 15,081 13,990
Adjusted R2 0.35 0.26 0.27 0.22 0.30 0.28 0.30 0.23
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Table 15: Cash holdings and Competition for Constrained vs. Un-
constrained Firms: Robustness
Table 15 presents results of yearly cross-sectional regressions of cash holdings on
the intensity of competition, as measured by the number of firms per industry, and
control variables for constrained and unconstrained firms. We use four criteria
to classify firm-year observations as constrained (C) or unconstrained (U). The
sample is based on Compustat Annual Industrial files over the 1980-2005 period.
The parameter estimates shown are time-series averages of the individual cross-
sectional parameter estimates. Fama-MacBeth t-statistics, adjusted for first-
order autocorrelation, are reported in parenthesis.
Payout Firm Size Bond Rating WW index
(U) (C) (U) (C) (U) (C) (U) (C)
Number of Firms -0.001 0.010 -0.001 0.008 0.000 0.009 -0.002 0.006
(0.30) (3.36) (0.75) (2.10) (0.09) (2.84) (2.06) (1.66)
Size -0.043 -0.010 -0.023 -0.022 -0.018 -0.014 -0.036 -0.035
(13.76) (3.58) (9.12) (2.99) (6.94) (4.98) (10.93) (4.94)
Dividend - - -0.024 0.028 -0.033 -0.015 -0.030 0.080
- - (10.96) (3.74) (4.09) (3.90) (12.42) (4.29)
Volatility 0.020 0.014 0.016 0.011 0.012 0.015 0.018 0.009
(16.07) (9.74) (8.93) (7.47) (4.98) (15.91) (7.51) (6.16)
Market-to-Book 0.021 0.013 0.024 0.004 0.025 0.012 0.026 0.005
(4.96) (4.12) (10.42) (1.65) (3.61) (4.72) (9.35) (2.12)
NWC -0.068 -0.024 -0.045 -0.024 -0.025 -0.032 -0.054 -0.021
(34.39) (6.41) (16.45) (5.85) (5.58) (9.08) (19.36) (6.49)
Capex -0.049 -0.026 -0.029 -0.030 -0.028 -0.031 -0.037 -0.027
(26.56) (18.45) (12.72) (17.65) (7.77) (20.34) (20.55) (19.93)
Leverage -0.045 -0.057 -0.031 -0.081 -0.022 -0.060 -0.036 -0.070
(19.09) (30.10) (26.40) (26.14) (5.18) (28.79) (28.47) (25.12)
R&D 0.037 0.016 0.043 0.009 0.057 0.015 0.042 0.013
(7.53) (4.94) (4.72) (2.83) (7.38) (3.41) (4.60) (3.71)
Acquisitions -0.015 -0.012 -0.012 -0.014 -0.012 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013
(13.34) (9.40) (11.55) (7.55) (6.56) (11.80) (10.56) (5.38)
Constant 0.287 0.181 0.212 0.256 0.173 0.204 0.275 0.243
(31.01) (15.51) (22.55) (18.99) (12.23) (19.88) (25.48) (21.10)
Observations 14,813 24,411 15,637 14,538 3,804 47,001 15,081 13,990
Adjusted R2 0.34 0.26 0.27 0.21 0.29 0.28 0.30 0.22
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Table 16: Cash holdings, Competition and Volatility
Table 16 presents results of yearly cross-sectional regressions of cash holdings
on the intensity of competition, as measured by (i) the excess price-cost margin
(EPCM) or (ii) the number of firms per industry, and control variables for firms
in low and high volatility industries. Each cell displays estimates of the coeffi-
cient for the intensity of competition measure. The sample is based on Compu-
stat Annual Industrial files over the 1980-2005 period. The parameter estimates
shown are time-series averages of the individual cross-sectional parameter esti-
mates. Fama-MacBeth t-statistics, adjusted for first-order autocorrelation, are
reported in parenthesis. We test for difference in coefficients between low and
high volatility case. p-values are reported.
EPCM Nb Firms
Low Volatility High Volatility High-Low Low Volatility High Volatility High-Low
p-value p-value
-0.003 -0.012 0.01 0.002 0.014 0.01
(0.68) (2.52) (1.46) (3.41)
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Table 17: Cash holdings and Time Trend
Table 17 reports results on the effect of competition on cash holdings time trend.
A two stage procedure is used. In the first stage, cash holdings are regressed on
the intensity of competition measure and controls in every year of the sample for
financially constrained and unconstrained firms. In the second stage, the time-
series coefficients for the intensity of competition are regressed on a constant and
a time trend. Each cell displays estimated coefficients on the time trend. We
use four criteria to classify firm-year observations as constrained (C) or uncon-
strained (U). The sample is based on Compustat Annual Industrial files over the
1980-2005 period. Values of robust t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. The
standard errors for cross-equation differences are computed via a SUR system
that estimates the group regressions jointly.
EPCM Nb Firms
(U) (C) (U) - (C) (U) (C) (U) - (C)
p-value p-value
Payout -0.0008 -0.0013 0.43 0.0007 0.0016 0.00
(1.33) (4.94) (4.10) (12.47)
Size 0.0015 -0.0023 0.00 -0.0002 0.0019 0.00
(1.95) (6.55) (2.02) (10.7)
Bond Rating 0.0023 -0.0016 0.00 0.0003 0.0018 0.00
(1.88) (5.20) (1.96) (13.52)
WW index -0.0004 -0.0022 0.01 0.0002 0.0017 0.00
(0.70) (6.06) (1.43) (9.45)
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Figure 7: Marginal Cost and Benefit of Holding Cash.
Figure 7 shows that the optimal amount of cash holdings is given by the inter-
section of the marginal cost curve of being short of cash and the marginal cost
curve of holding cash.
Marginal cost of
holding cash θ
Cash holdings
Maginal cost of
cash shortage
Optimal cash 
holding α*
(n,c,φ,σ)
(x,k)
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Figure 8: Optimal Cash
Figure 8 plots the optimal amount of cash, α∗, as a function of the intensity of
competition, n, the intensity of financial constraint, φ, the cost of holding cash,
θ, volatility of cash flow shock σ, the moneyness of the option to abandon assets,
x, and the fixed cost of production, F .
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Figure 9: Optimal Cash and Interaction between Intensity of Com-
petition and Intensity of Financing Constraint
Figure 9 plots the optimal amount of cash, α∗, as a function of the intensity of
competition, n, for low, medium and high intensity of financial constraint, φ,
and the intensity of financial constraint, φ, for low, medium and high intensity
of competition, n.
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Figure 10: Cash Holdings and Intensity of Competition Time Trend
Figure 10 plots: (a) the average cash ratio through time, and (b) the intensity of
competition through time as measured by the excess price-cost margin, EPCM.
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Figure 11: Cash Holdings and Intensity of Competition
Figure 11 plots the average cash ratio for firms operating in high or low intensity
of competition industries. Intensity of competition is measured by (a) the excess
price-cost margin, EPCM , or (b) the number of firms per industry.
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(a) Cash holdings time trend for low and high EPCM
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(b) Cash holdings time trend for low and high number of firms
per industry
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